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Abstract
Today many brokerage firms use computer algorithms to make trade decisions, submit
orders, and manage orders after submission. This algorithmic trading is required to
maximize execution speed and so minimize the cost, market impact and risk associated
with trading large volumes of securities. Traders place orders to buy or sell a given
amount of a security for a specific price on an exchange. These buy and sell orders
accumulate in the ‘order book’ until they either find a counter-party for execution or are
canceled. All participants can also issue market orders to buy or sell at the best available
prices; these orders are immediately executed on a ‘first come first serve’ basis.
Using high frequency trading (HFT) data on the Toronto Stock Exchange, provided
by the TMX Group, we explore a data driven model to detect a form of high frequency
price manipulation – known as spoofing. A spoofer manipulates prices by placing limit orders which they do not intend to be executed in order to mislead other traders
about the available volume of shares. The hope is that this will cause prices to move in
their favour. We show that a generalized form of volume imbalance is associated with
price movements and this can be manipulated by spoofing strategies. The literature argues spoofing strategies are detrimental to the integrity of markets and new models are
necessary for regulators to combat them.
The size of the data sets we use definitely qualify for the moniker ‘Big Data’. The
limit order book must be constructed each time an order arrives for a particular stock.
This process is implemented on a distributed data system using Pyspark since it would
be impossible to do so, efficiently, on a local machine. We discuss some issues and
complications that arise from working with very large data sets of this type.
We define a generalized volume imbalance as the weight in a convex combination
of two price change distributions which forms our price change model. Price changes
for different stocks happen at different time scales. We remedy this issue by comparing stocks on time intervals over which they all have the same variance in their price
change distributions. Statistical and goodness of fit tests using Cramer’s V statistic and
Kullback–Leibler divergence, respectively, are implemented to validate our model across
a large collection of stocks. The model is then used to test the sensitivity of the limit
order book to spoofing and derive relationships between the spoofer’s constraints and
their optimal decisions. These results could then be implemented by regulators as a way
to flag periods of the trading day where market conditions make spoofing possible as a
means to improve market surveillance.
Keywords: limit order book, price manipulation, spoofing, data analysis, optimization, financial modelling, high frequency trading
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Summary for Lay Audience
Price manipulation is detrimental to the integrity of financial markets. Price manipulation strategies have always existed, but, since the adoption of computer systems,
new forms of price manipulation are emerging. In the past traders manipulated prices
by injecting false or misleading information into the market in order to capitalize from
resulting price movements and high frequency trading is not immune to these tactics.
Traders can ‘spoof’ the market by strategically commiting specific orders to an exchange
to buy or sell a set number of shares while actually never intending to allow their order
to be executed. The idea is that other traders can see these spoofing orders, act on this
misleading information, and move prices in the spoofer’s favour.
Using high frequency order data on the Toronto Stock Exchange, provided by the
TMX Group, we explore a data driven stock price model which is influenced by the
orders arriving to the exchange. From our model we can calculate the average costs
associated with a spoofer’s optimal decisions to manipulate the market. We analyze this
decision process to gain insights into how regulators can combat this type of illegal trade
behaviour.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1

The Stock Price and Manipulation

Ownership of publicly traded companies is divided into shares of stock (or securities).
These shares of stock naturally carry a monetary value which fluctuates over time to
form a price time series – sequence of prices indexed in time order. Everyone has seen
a stock price time series such as the one shown in Figure 1.1 where we see the price of
Bank of Montreal (BMO) stock change over the entire trading day on April 17, 2017.

Figure 1.1: Mid point price for BMO stock on April 17, 2017 for the entire trading day.
One of the first topics covered when one begins to learn mathematical finance is
modelling stock prices using continuous time stochastic processes. This is covered in
detail by any mathematical finance text book, such as [1]. These processes assume
the stock price changes continuously over time. Such stock price models have been
effective tools since the initial work by Bachelier [2] in 1900 which culminated in the
1

2
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Nobel prize winning research by Black, Scholes, and Merton, on pricing derivatives using
these underlying stochastic processes [3]. Similarly, modelling stock price changes is
instrumental in Markowitz’ classical work in portfolio optimization [4]. However, there
are key aspects of stock price dynamics which are not captured by these models. Namely,
changes in stock prices are not continuous and do not change continuously through time.
Also, there is no such thing as ‘the’ stock price.

(a) Entire Trading Day

(b) Two Minute Snapshot

Figure 1.2: Best ask and best bid for BMO stock on April 17, 2017 for the entire trading
day and a two minute snapshot.
One wishing to purchase a share of stock would find there are different prices quoted
for buyers and sellers and, in fact, there can be many different prices available to both

Chapter 1. Introduction

3

groups. The best available price to buy/sell a share of stock is called the best ask/bid
and Figure 1.2 (a) displays the corresponding best ask and bid for BMO on April 17,
2017 over the entire trading day. The price shown in Figure 1.1 was the midpoint price
– the average between the best bid and best ask.
Figure 1.2 (b) also shows how different things look over smaller time scales for the
stock price. Here we see changes in the price are in increments of a penny, also refered to
as a tick, and the prices change nonuniformly over time. However, these discontinuous
price changes have been modelled in mathematical finance with jump diffusion processes
[5] which are discontinuous at finitely many time points.
Prices are not driven by random movements, but by the actions of traders. It is the
aggregate behaviour of traders in the market which drives the stock price. In most cases
this is caused by traders buying and selling stocks over time with the bid and ask prices
reflecting the current supply and demand of the stock. However, there has been a history
of stock price dynamics being caused by manipulation. Two examples from Allen and
Gale [6] are: 1) during the Napoleonic Wars there was stock and bond price manipulation
on the London Stock Exchange where traders conspired with newspapers to spread false
information about the state of the war to profit from the resulting price changes, and 2) in
1901 the managers of American Steel and Wire Company shorted1 their stock then closed
its steel mills causing the stock price to fall and earning themselves a profit after reopening
the mills. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was an attempt to make manipulation
more difficult in the United States by regulating information disclosure and monitoring
the trading activities of firm insiders. However, manipulation in financial markets still
exists and has been actively studied.
Literature exists on studying whether a financial model allows for trade-based market
manipulation from buying and selling stocks [7–9], but a considerable amount of work
has gone into the impacts of insider trading and ‘pump and dump’ strategies [6, 10–15].
So called ‘pump and dump’ strategies involve a trader buying stock and then injecting
false information into the market to profit from increased price movements. A form of
this strategy rose to prominance with the adoption of computers and the internet – email
spam [16–18]. A manipulator will buy shares of stock and use email spam or social media
platforms to spread false information in an attempt to get others to buy the same stock,
increasing its price, so the manipulator can sell it at a profit. Manipulation has also
been studied in more exotic cases with derivative markets [19] and dark pools [20]. In
all these cases a key component is the injection of false or misleading information into
1

A trader shorts a stock by borrowing shares and immediately selling them with the hope the price
drops and they can buy the stock back and return it at a profit.
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financial markets to influence the behaviour of traders and, by extension, the stock prices
themselves.
Today, stock price dynamics are largely driven by electronic trading and the speed
of execution which modern computers bring to the market. Like the emergence of email
spam as a form of stock price manipulation, the age of high frequency trading (HFT) has
opened up new avenues for manipulators to take advantage of. In the following section
we introduce the mechanisms in which traders can interact with the stock market and
how these interactions lead to price dynamics. In section 1.4 we go into detail on the
form this high speed price manipulation takes – called spoofing.
Our first goal is to motivate and build a data-driven price change model from the
aggregate trader behaviour. The second goal is to then apply this model to the application
of high speed stock price manipulation in order to develop tools which could be used to
aid in the detection of such behaviour. However, we need to present the mechanisms
involved in electronic trading which will be important to incorporate into our model.

1.2

Electronic Trading

Today all brokers use computer systems to submit and manage orders. Algorithmic (algo)
traders use them to make decisions. The reason for using computers is to minimize the
cost, market impact and risk associated with trading large volumes of securities.
There are many different types of traders participating in the market at any given
time. This naturally leads to traders that operate on different time scales. Some traders
buy and hold stock for years as investors, some look to buy quotas of stock for multiple
days, and some buy and sell rapidly at nanosecond timescales. All of these different
traders simultaneously operate in the stock market, but each has different objectives and
different time horizons. This is outside the scope of our work, but how these traders
come together to form the dynamics we see in the stock market is an active field of study
(see for example: [21–24]).
Participants place buy or sell orders to an exchange. These show the intention to buy
or sell a given amount of a security for a specific price. Since all the available stock to
be bought or sold is spread across many different prices there is no such thing as ‘the’
stock price. There is a limited amount that can be bought/sold at any given price, and
traders are actively looking to buy/sell at the best possible prices.
The buy order with the highest price is called the best bid, while the sell order with
the lowest price is called the best offer. The difference between the best bid and best
offer is the spread. The mid price is defined as the average between the best bid and best

5
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ask. These buy and sell orders accumulate in what is called the limit order book (LOB)
until they find a counter-party for execution or are cancelled. We give the fictitious order
book in Figure 1.3 as an example. We will use this example to illustrate how traders can
interact with it and the effect they have. For the Figure 1.3 example LOB the best bid
is 19.24, the best ask is 19.26, the spread is 0.02, and the mid price is 19.25.
Mid Price = 19.25
600

Bid Side
Ask Side

Volume of shares

500
400
300
200
100
0
19.20

19.21

19.22

19.23

19.24

19.25

19.26

19.27

19.28

19.29

19.30

Price

Figure 1.3: Example limit order book.
Dealer markets exist where dealers (individual people or firms) post a price at which
they will buy and another at which they will sell a specific stock in order to make money
from the spread. This is analogous to a foreign exchange kiosk – buying and selling
currency at a different price in order to make money from the difference. Alternatively,
one could buy or sell stock in an auction market (such as the Toronto or New York stock
exchange) where there are many such people or firms posting prices in which they are
willing to buy or sell stock. Typically, one refers to the auction market as the stock
market. There exist brokers, known as ‘market makers’, which provide a significant
amount of the new buy/sell orders to the market. These market makers act like the
dealers in the dealer market, but for the auction market. These participants are looking
to take advantage of the difference in price that stocks are bought and sold, called the
spread, by constantly buying and selling without the purpose of holding onto the stock
as an investment. In theory, the faster you can process information and react, the better
your chances of profit. Some brokers pay a premium to an exchange for a faster connection
which gives them a time advantage over other participants. For a discussion of broker
behaviour, see Appendix A.
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The increased speed in which brokers can interact with the LOB gives room for unfair
or outright illegal behaviour by attempting to manipulate markets. This topic will be
discussed later, in section 1.4, but is central to the goal of this work. Once the neccessary
background has been established, we want to build a stock price dynamics model which
can be influenced by a broker’s (potentially) manipulative behaviour so that we can
analyze the conditions under which it is profitable to employ such a strategy and what
kind of payoff they can expect. A better understanding of how and why the limit order
book would be manipulated would provide insights to regulators on how to better detect
it and punish the offending party.
Market participants can interact with the LOB in three ways:
1. Limit orders: as buy/sell limit orders arrive they are added to the ask/bid side of
the LOB. If a buy and sell limit order are placed at the same price they will be
matched and executed.
2. Cancellation: traders may cancel their existing limit orders which are then removed
from the LOB.
3. Market orders: a buy/sell market order will remove shares from the best available
prices on the ask/bid side of the LOB until their total order is completed. Market
orders may end up removing shares deep into the LOB at worse and worse prices.
This is known as ‘walking the book’.
The order book changes constantly as buy/sell orders arrive, buy/sell market orders
arrive, and orders are cancelled. Depending on the stock these changes could be happening at time scales of a fraction of a nanosecond. The LOB also has a queuing system
aspect. The first limit orders placed at a particular price will be executed first when matched to an opposite limit or market order - known as ‘first in, first out’.2 This ‘battle’
over queue position is an area of research in its own right [25].
The top panel in Figure 1.4 shows the outcome of the placement of a sell limit order
of 100 shares at 19.28 with our example LOB from Figure 1.3. There are no limit orders
to match, so the sell limit order is added to the existing orders at 19.28. However, this
new order will be executed only after the existing limit orders since it is last in the queue.
The bottom panel shows there are now 300 shares available to be bought at 19.28.
When an order is cancelled that volume of stock at that price is removed from the
order book. The top panel of Figure 1.5 shows a trader cancelling their sell limit order of
2

There can be a preference given to certain brokers so that their orders are executed ahead of others
regardless of their position in the queue.
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Mid Price = 19.25

600

Limit Order
Bid Side
Ask Side

Volume of shares

500
400
300
200
100
0
19.20

19.21

19.22

19.23

19.24

19.25

19.26

19.27

19.28

19.29

19.30

Price

Volume of shares

600

Bid Side
Ask Side

400

200

0
19.20

19.21

19.22

19.23

19.24

19.25

19.26

19.27

19.28

19.29

19.30

Price

Figure 1.4: Sell limit order of 100 shares placed at 19.28 for our example limit order book.
After the limit order is placed there are 300 total shares available to be bought for 19.28.
The best bid and ask remain unchanged, so the spread and mid price are unaffected.
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Mid Price = 19.25

Volume of shares

600

Cancellation
Bid Side
Ask Side

400

200

0
19.20

19.21

19.22

19.23

19.24

19.25

19.26

19.27

19.28

19.29

19.30

Price

Volume of shares

600

Bid Side
Ask Side

400

200

0
19.20

19.21

19.22

19.23

19.24

19.25

19.26

19.27

19.28

19.29

19.30

Price

Figure 1.5: Cancellation of sell limit order of 200 shares for our example limit order book.
Since this was the only sell limit order at 19.28 there will be no shares available to be
bought for that price. The best bid and ask remain unchanged, so the spread and mid
price are unaffected.
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200 shares at price 19.28. The bottom panel of Figure 1.5 shows that, since there were
no other sell limit orders at 19.28, there are no longer any available shares to be bought
at this price. Traders may, at no cost, cancel their limit orders at any time while the
market is open. Usually these limit orders are cancelled and placed again at a different
price to reflect the changing attitudes of traders about where the stock prices will be
moving.
Mid Price = 19.25

Volume of shares

600

Market Order
Bid Side
Ask Side

400

200

0
19.20

19.21

19.22

19.23

19.24

19.25

19.26

19.27

19.28

19.29

19.30

Price
Mid Price = 19.255

Volume of shares

500

Bid Side
Ask Side

400
300
200
100
0
19.20

19.21

19.22

19.23

19.24

19.25

19.26

19.27

19.28

19.29

19.30

Price

Figure 1.6: Buy market order of 600 shares is placed on our example limit order book.
600 shares are removed from the ask side of the book at the best available prices. The
best bid is unchanged, but the best ask increases by 0.02. The spread and mid price
increase to 0.03 and 19.255, respectively.
A market order will be matched to the best price and however much stock was ordered
will be removed from the book. The top panel of Figure 1.6 shows a trader placing a
buy market order of 600 shares. Since it is a buy market order it removes shares from
the ask side of the LOB at the best available price until no shares remain at that price
and then begins removing shares at the next available price. In this case 200 shares are
bought for 19.26 per share and the remaining 400 are bought for 19.27 per share. The
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second panel of Figure 1.6 then shows the best ask has moved up to 19.27 because of this
market order. This example illustrates the idea of price impact on the LOB caused by
market orders which remove large amounts of shares from the market. The price impact
of a small enough order may only be temporary and new sell limit orders are placed back
at 19.26 – returning the price back to where you started after a short recovery period.
However, the price impact may also be permanent from a large order as prices move up
and volume is not replaced with new limit orders below the best ask or the best bid
increases to tighten the spread – causing the best ask to not return to where it started.
Since we could not get all 600 shares at the best ask we had to ‘walk the book’ with
our market order. This caused us to pay more per share than if we had been able to fill
the whole order at the best ask. Traders will look to minimize this extra cost of walking
the book by breaking large market orders up into smaller orders which they execute over
some fixed time horizon.
The order and price dynamics of limit order books have been studied before in the
context of general mixture models [26], Markov chains [27], Hawkes processes [28], and
stochastic partial differential equations [29], to name a few. These models do not make
use of the limit order book volumes directly and instead use continuous time stochastic
processes for the prices themselves or to model the intensities and distributions of the
different order types which drive a price process.
The study of optimal placement of limit orders is also of particular interest [8, 9,
30, 31]. These papers also explore whether or not trade-based manipulation can occur
in their limit order book model, but they approximate the volumes in the book with a
continuous shape function of the quoted bid and ask prices. For our model, we aim to
maintain the discrete nature of the book in both prices and share volumes at each price.

1.3

Level 1 and 2 Data

Limit order book data is labeled as either level 1 or level 2 data. Level 1 order book data
consists of just the best bid price, quantity at the best bid, best ask price, quantity at
the best ask, the last traded price, and the last traded quantity. Level 1 data provides
a surface level look at the trading activity of a particular stock ticker. Level 1 data is
publicly available and easy to access, but to know more market details one must examine
level 2 data.
Level 2 order book data requires a paid subscription to the exchange, but comprises
considerably more information. The level 2 data consists of all the orders placed on the
exchange as well as which broker is placing the orders. With the level 2 data one can see
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exactly how many shares are available to be bought or sold at any given price and who
would be the counter-party to the trade.
A sample of the level 2 data provided by TMX is shown in Table 1.1. This particular
collection of data is for the stock AEM, but orders for all stocks are normally mixed
together in the full dataset. The collected data includes all orders placed on the TSX
over any given day with each row corresponding to a single order. The information
provided in each row tells us everything we need to know about the order.
From Table 1.1 we see that columns are time, broker ID, side, book change, price,
order id, seq, reason, other broker id, other order id, best bid, best offer, best bid size,
best offer size, and market state. There is normally another column indicating the stock
ticker for the order, but this was suppressed for readability. Definitions of each column
are provided below.
time
Date and time stamp for order placement in nanoseconds.
broker id
Internal ID code for each broker with the exchange.
side
Side of the limit order book being interacted with.
book change
Change in number of shares.
price
Price placement of order
order id
Assigned ID code for the order
seq Internal sequence of received orders, included because two orders may have the
same time stamp.
reason
Either ‘TRADE’ (matched limit order or market order), ‘BOOKED’ (limit order),
or ‘CANCELLED’ (cancelled limit order).
other broker id
If reason is ‘TRADE’ then this is the broker id of the order on the other side of the
trade.
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other order id
If reason is ‘TRADE’ then this is the order id of the order on the other side of the
trade
best bid
Current best bid price for the given stock ticker.
best offer
Current best ask/offer price for the given stock ticker.
best bid size
Current quantity of shares at the best bid price for the given stock ticker.
best offer size
Current quantity of shares at the best ask/offer price for the given stock ticker.
market state
Current state of market (‘Open’, ‘Closed’, ‘Beginning of day’, etc).
As one can see from Table 1.1, the limit order book needs to be generated from this
much larger dataset of individual orders. For a single stock the number of orders placed
on a given day can be in the hundreds of thousands resulting in raw datasets of several
hundred megabytes for a single day. Generating the limit order book can therefore be
a computationally expensive exercise. The dataset is far too large to interact with on
a single personal computer, so we make use of an Amazon Web Service (AWS) account
provided by TMX to do our analysis. See Section 1.5 for further details of the distributed
data system. Sampling from the dataset does not help alleviate this issue since we need
to know all orders placed up to time t to know what the limit order book looks like at
time t.
One can reproduce the limit order book at a given time by simply summing the book
changes at each price for each side of the limit order book up to that time. The result
will be a collection of tuples (p, q) for each side of the book indicating the number of
shares q at each price p. However, some prices p may be missing from the dataset if no
one has placed a limit order at them. This is fine for display purposes like Figure 1.7,
but when using the data in modelling we will need to know the quantity of shares sitting
at every price p for both sides of the book.
Figure 1.7 displays an actual LOB for ABX stock on April 4, 2017 just after 3:00 PM
that was built from data provided from the Toronto stock exchange.

2017-04-17
2017-04-17
2017-04-17
2017-04-17
2017-04-17
2017-04-17
2017-04-17
2017-04-17
2017-04-17
2017-04-17
2017-04-17
2017-04-17
2017-04-17
2017-04-17
2017-04-17
2017-04-17
2017-04-17
2017-04-17

time

09:31:24.055621321
09:31:24.055621327
09:31:24.055793062
09:31:24.055915806
09:31:24.055935694
09:31:24.056082876
09:31:24.056089293
09:31:24.056901174
09:31:24.060729084
09:31:24.060735133
09:31:24.060737312
09:31:24.061368993
09:31:24.066693881
09:31:24.066844825
09:31:24.070886384
09:31:24.070886387
09:31:24.086019171
09:31:26.282657689

1
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
1
1
1
2
1
1
4
4
1
4

broker
Buy
Buy
Sell
Buy
Buy
Buy
Buy
Buy
Sell
Sell
Sell
Sell
Buy
Buy
Buy
Buy
Sell
Buy

side
-100
-100
100
-100
-100
100
100
-200
-100
-100
-100
-100
100
-100
-100
100
100
-100

book change

price
62.15
62.15
62.28
62.14
62.13
62.14
62.13
62.14
62.24
62.26
62.33
62.28
62.15
62.13
62.13
62.14
62.24
62.14

1—B20170417000000204
2—B20170417000000193
2—S20170417000000197
2—B20170417000000192
2—B20170417000000191
2—B20170417000000198
2—B20170417000000199
3—B20170417000000003
1—S20170417000000199
1—S20170417000000189
1—S20170417000000038
2—S20170417000000197
1—B20170417000000207
1—B20170417000000198
4—B20170417000000045
4—B20170417000000049
1—S20170417000000208
4—B20170417000000049

order id
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766150
766151
766153
766154
766156
766157
766159
766161
766169
766171
766172
766173
766194
766196
766202
766203
766223
769200

TRADE
TRADE
Booked
CANCELLED
CANCELLED
Booked
Booked
CANCELLED
CANCELLED
CANCELLED
CANCELLED
CANCELLED
Booked
CANCELLED
CANCELLED
Booked
Booked
CANCELLED

reason

other broker id
1
1
NaN
NaN
NaN
NaN
NaN
NaN
NaN
NaN
NaN
NaN
NaN
NaN
NaN
NaN
NaN
NaN

1—S20170417000000206
1—S20170417000000206
NaN
NaN
NaN
NaN
NaN
NaN
NaN
NaN
NaN
NaN
NaN
NaN
NaN
NaN
NaN
NaN

other order id

62.15
62.14
62.14
62.14
62.14
62.14
62.14
62.14
62.14
62.14
62.14
62.14
62.15
62.15
62.15
62.15
62.15
62.15

best bid

62.24
62.24
62.24
62.24
62.24
62.24
62.24
62.24
62.24
62.24
62.24
62.24
62.24
62.24
62.24
62.24
62.24
62.24

best offer

100
300
300
200
200
300
300
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100

best bid size

600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
500
500
500
500
500
500
500
500
600
600

best offer size

Open
Open
Open
Open
Open
Open
Open
Open
Open
Open
Open
Open
Open
Open
Open
Open
Open
Open

market state

Table 1.1: Sample of market data used to reconstruct the limit order book. Each line corresponds to a single order and provides all of the details of that order. Orders for different stock tickers are mixed together in this data, but the data
provided in the above table has been pulled for the stock AEM only. Broker ID has been anonymised in the ‘broker’ and ‘order id’ columns for privacy.
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Figure 1.7: Order book for American Barrick (ABX) stock.

1.4

Spoofing

In Section 1.2 we covered the various ways traders can interact in the stock market
through limit, market, and cancellation orders. Although traders are assumed to be
placing limit orders in good faith, they may actually be trying to manipulate the order
book in their favour by a process called ‘spoofing’ or ‘layering’. Spoofing and layering
are terms often, but not always, used interchangeably to refer to the act of placing an
ordered sequence of buy/sell orders with no intention of allowing them to be executed.
Spoofing can also refer to placing a single order with no intent to execute as opposed
to layering which is placing multiple orders instead of one [32]. The Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority, Inc. (FINRA)3 instead refers to spoofing as entering limit orders
on one side of the book with the intent of moving the market for a beneficial execution
on the opposite side of the book. However, FINRA refers to layering as enticing other
market participants to join the same side of the book as your spoofing limit order and
trading against them favourably [33].
The reason to place these limit orders – which you have no intention of executing
3

FINRA is a private corporation and the largest independent regulator in the United States.
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– is so other traders will see the increased liquidity in the book and react believing
(mistakenly) these orders were placed in good faith. That is, a trader may place their
own limit orders or market orders under the assumption all other trader’s orders are
there to be bought or sold. In essence, the spoofer is tricking other traders into making
decisions they might otherwise not do and then attempt to capitalize on the consequences
of these resulting trades.
To illustrate how this works suppose our spoofer, Alice, wishes to purchase 200 shares
of stock. As shown in Figure 1.8, she could place a market order to the exchange and
collect the shares now.

Volume of shares

500
400

Market Order
Bid Side
Ask Side

300
200
100
0
19.20

19.21

19.22

19.23

19.24

19.25

19.26

19.27

19.28

19.29

19.30

19.26

19.27

19.28

19.29

19.30

Price

Volume of shares

500
400

Bid Side
Ask Side

300
200
100
0
19.20

19.21

19.22

19.23

19.24

19.25

Price

Figure 1.8: Alice places a market order to buy her 200 shares. She gets her shares now,
but with no improved price.
Instead, what if Alice attempted to use spoofing to lower the best ask price to get her
200 shares for less money? Figure 1.9 shows the following example of a positive payoff.
Alice places a sell limit order of 400 shares at $19.28 – two ticks above the best ask price
so other traders believe there is a huge demand to sell shares at the current best ask
price. This might lead another trader, Bob, to believe that this increased liquidity to sell
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is because other traders believe the stock price is going to drop and they want to sell their
shares now before it does. Bob wants to sell his shares now before the price drops so he
places a sell limit order at $19.25 – one tick below the best ask price so Bob can have his
limit order executed ahead of everyone. Other traders like Bob follow suit and the best
bid drops to $19.25 with 400 total shares available to be purchased. Alice sees that her
plan has worked and places her market order to buy 200 shares at $19.25 and cancels her
limit order at $19.28. Alice has now made a small profit over having just placed a market
order like Figure 1.8. Since this would all be happening at nanosecond time scales Alice
is able to place spoofing orders and cancel them at extremely high speeds making use of
computer algorithms.
However, the price could move against Alice as shown in Figure 1.10. In Figure 1.10,
Alice places the same sell limit order of 200 shares at $19.28, but now Bob and the other
traders place market orders which remove 500 shares from the ask side of the order book.
This may be because they see a nice wall of stock at $19.28 and believe their market
orders will not go too deep in the book. This causes the best ask to increase to $19.27
when Alice places her market order and cancels her limit order. Unfortunately, Alice has
now paid more for her 200 shares than had she just placed her original market order as
in Figure 1.8.
Things can get even worse for Alice. In Figure 1.11 Alice places her limit order of
200 shares too close to the best ask. Like before, the best ask price increases because of
the market orders from Bob and other traders which causes Alice’s sell limit order to be
executed. Now Alice needs 200 shares to cover her executed limit order on top of the 200
shares she originally wanted to purchase. Alice places a market order of 400 shares to
cover this and ends up paying significantly more than if she had just placed her market
order as in Figure 1.8. From this example it should be obvious how dangerous it is for
Alice to place her spoofing orders close to the touch4 – such orders are more likely to
be executed by market orders which require her to buy them back at a higher price. No
trader wants to buy high and sell low.
The strategy for the spoofer is then to determine how large their limit orders need
to be and at what price to place them in order to manipulate the price in their favour
while also placing the limit orders deep enough into the order book so that they will not
be executed.
Clearly this is a conveniently devised example and this strategy may not always
work out in Alice’s favour. The increased spread could lead to more buy limit orders
which increase the best bid instead and Alice is back where she started. Spoofing is not
4

The ‘touch’ refers to the best bid and/or the best ask, simultaneously.
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Figure 1.9: Case where spoofing has positive payoff. Alice places a spoofing sell limit
order of 200 shares at $19.28. Bob and other traders enter sell limit orders totaling 400
shares at $19.25 – 1 tick below the best ask. The best ask has dropped so Alice cancels
her spoof order and places her market order of 200 shares which are lifted at $19.25. The
final result is Alice has acquired her 200 shares, saving $0.01 per share.
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Figure 1.10: Case where spoofing has negative payoff. Alice places a spoofing sell limit
order of 200 shares at $19.28. Bob and the other traders place market orders which
remove 500 shares from the ask side of the order book. This causes the best ask to
increase to $19.27 when Alice cancels her spoofing limit order and places her market
order of 200 shares which are lifted at $19.28. Alice has still acquired her 200 shares, but
she spent $0.02 per share more than she needed to.
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Figure 1.11: Worst case scenario for spoofing. Alice places a spoofing sell limit order of
200 shares at $19.27. Bob and the other traders place market orders which remove 700
shares from the ask side of the order book. Alice’s sell limit order is executed before
she can cancel it – now she must buy her 200 shares plus another 200 from the executed
trade. Alice places a market order for 400 shares which walk the book to $19.29. Alice
has paid more for her original 200 shares than she needed to, but she also had to buy
shares back at a higher price than she sold them. The executed spoofing order cuts
further into Alice’s profits.
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guaranteed to work for the spoofer – whose goal is to increase the odds of favourable
price movements and capitalize when they happen. In what follows we provide a list
of documented instances of spoofing. We see that spoofers are doing this over years on
specific stocks, futures, options, or commodities at high frequencies.
Stocks with large spreads and volatility would be obvious targets for spoofing orders
as their impact would be larger [34, 35]. The large spread would allow traders to place
limit orders below the best ask more easily – this is exactly the desire of a spoofer wishing
to buy shares. Very tight spreads would mean that shares need to be lifted from the best
bid before the best ask can drop. This can obviously happen, but the steps needed in
depleting the volume at the best bid (through cancellations or sell market orders) is more
involved than simply placing a single limit order to lower the best ask.
In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis the United States passed the (2010) DoddFrank act to overhaul regulations on the financial industry. It became “against the law
to spoof, or post requests to buy or sell futures, stocks and other products in financial
markets without intending to actually follow through on those orders.” [36].
In 2014, the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) told the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange & Chicago Board of Trade (CME Group Inc.) to continue developing spoofing detection [37]. Since then a number of individuals and groups have been
accused and sentenced for spoofing. That same year Michael Coscia was arrested for
spoofing commodity futures markets in the first application of the relevant sections of
the Dodd-Frank Act and was found guilty in 2015 [38]. Each spoofing count brings a
10 year jail sentence plus $1 million in fines. Coscia was sentenced to 3 years in prison
for his crimes. In 2015, Navinder Singh Sarao of the UK was arrested for contributing
to the 2010 flash crash – he pleaded guilty in 2016 [39]. A Canadian, Aleksandr Milrud,
pleaded guilty to US Federal prosecutors for spoofing to earn profits of $1.9 million [40].
Staff of the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) settled their first spoofing case in
2015 against Oasis World Trading [41]. In this case 0.14% of Oasis’ total trades and 0.04%
of their trade volume was found to be spoofing orders. It was a small number relative
to their total trades, but “a very high proportion” of the total orders and volume of
stocks targeted by Oasis. That is, very little of Oasis’ trading activity was manipulative
on the market except for the stocks they targeted for spoofing where they made up a
significant amount of the orders and volume on the book for that stock. This may imply
it is easier to detect manipulative practices on an individual stock rather than looking
at the aggregate of orders by a trader.
The OSC has also made allegations in 2018 against K2 Investment Fund for spoofing
options on the Montreal Exchange [42]. Fines and bans were placed on K2 and its upper
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management after the investigation. That same year three major financial institutions,
Deutsche Bank, UBS, and HSBC, paid $47 million collectively for manipulating futures
markets [43]. In 2019 a former Bear Stearns and Bank of Nova Scotia trader, Corey
Flaum, pleaded guilty for spoofing precious metal markets [44] and JPMorgan Chase has
also been accused by US Federal prosecutors of spoofing precious metals [45].
The problem facing prosecutors when charging traders with spoofing is proving intent.
A former UBS previous metals trader, Andre Flotron, was acquitted by a jury in Connecticut in 2018 on spoofing charges [46]. The main issue is that most orders on individual
stocks go unfilled (see Appendix A, for example) and canceling orders is not illegal, so its
hard to classify an order as spoofing [34]. What worked in Andre Flotron’s favour was
that the two traders that testified against him recieved non-prosecution agreements which
called into question their trustworthiness, he did not make use of computer algorithms
and allowed orders to stay on the book for up to a minute, and his victims were other
large financial firms that would not come across as sympathetic victims. After only a
few hours of deliberation, Mr. Flotron was found not guilty. Detecting potentially illegal
orders does not prove a trader’s intent to manipulate markets, but methods for detection
are needed to even bring these cases to the courts. Moreover, sophisticated detection
methods may lead to stronger evidence that suspicious orders were placed in bad faith.
All of these cases have come from increased scrutiny of the financial markets. As
the above list of incidents makes clear – spoofing is not limited to just stocks, but has
been detected in futures, options, and commodity markets. Financial regulators have
increased their efforts to detect manipulation and academic research has expanded into
this territory as well in recent years. Machine learning techniques have been applied to
detecting anomalies in limit order book timeseries [47, 48]. Also, we previously discussed
the work in trade-based manipulation for a limit order book model [8, 9], but research
into modelling limit order book spoofing still remains ‘scant’ [49].
Lee et al. [34] take an empirical approach studying the impacts of spoofing on the Korean Exchange (KRX) using intraday trading data taken from November 2001 - February
2002. This time period was chosen because up to the end of 2001 the KRX disclosed
the volume of shares on both sides of the limit order book in addition to the prices and
volumes 5 ticks from the best ask and best bid. At the start of 2002 the KRX, in an
attempt to stop price manipulation, stopped disclosing the total volume on both sides of
the book, but increased the visible portion of the book from 5 to 10 ticks from the best
ask and best bid. The authors define a spoofing order as a limit order at least twice the
size of the previous day’s average order size placed at least 6 ticks away from the best
ask/bid, followed by a market order on the opposite side of the book and cancellation
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of the spoofing order. The author’s goal was to test, empirically, if there was a statistically significant decrease in spoofing orders after the information disclosure change on
the KRX. They show that during the initial 2 month period the average spoofing order
is 5.6 times larger than the typical limit order and almost all spoofing orders are placed
more than 10 ticks away from the touch. The spoofer places an extremely large order
outside the disclosed portion of the book (so far from the touch that it is very unlikely
to be executed) so that other traders cannot see where it is placed, but they can see the
spoofing order’s impact on the total volume posted on that side of the book. This gives
other traders the impression of an imbalance between the number of shares available to
buy and sell and moves the price and achieving substantial net profits of 67 - 83 basis
points5 over the course of 45 minutes. They also show that spoofers target stocks with
higher return volatility, lower market capitalization, lower price level, and lower managerial transparency, and trading volume is not a significant determinant of targeting by
spoofers. The opening and closing of the market was also the most active spoofing period.
In addition, 96% of the spoofing orders are placed by individuals instead of institutional
investors which they argue is likely because: 1) a large firm would need to spoof considerably to earn profits that interest them which would raise flags to regulators, and 2) it
is not likely for compliance departments within the firms to allow the use of potentially
illegal trading strategies. When the information disclosure change came into effect on
January 2, 2002, the proportion of spoofing orders located 11 ticks and below decreased
from 89% to 40% – succeeding in reducing the total number of spoofing orders on the
KRX.
Wang [35] employs a similar empirical analysis of spoofing in the Taiwan’s index
futures market (TAIFEX). TAIFEX discloses the first 5 ticks on each side of the book,
but not the total volume beyond. For this reason they use a different definition of spoofing
– any order within the disclosed 5 ticks with a size larger than the prior volume on the
5th tick which is followed by a market order on the opposite side of the book, and then
a cancellation of the spoofing order. They find spoofing is associated with all types of
traders, but mostly with individuals, and that spoofing is likely to occur when volume,
volatility, and prices are high. Like Lee et al. [34] they find that spoofing is most common
during the first and last hour of the trading day and is profitable in the majority of cases.
Wang also argues that spoofing destabilizes the market by increasing trade volume along
with the spread and volatility.
Cartea et al. [49] take a mathematical modelling approach to spoofing a limit order
book. They continue the idea in Lee et al. [34] that volume imbalance in the book
5

A percent of a percent – 0.01%
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impacts price movements which a spoofer can take advantage. In their model they take
on the role of a spoofer that wishes to liquidate a collection of shares using spoofing
orders at the best bid to incite traders to execute the spoofer’s sell limit order at the
best ask. This is favourable to the spoofer over liquidating their shares by selling at
the best bid as the spoofer will earn the spread in profit. They use a Markov chain
to model the volume imbalance which moves the market between buy heavy, neutral,
and sell heavy regimes. Intensities of the various order types during each regime are
calibrated using Nasdaq high frequency data for a collection of individual stocks. The
spoofer can then influence which regime the market is in using their spoofing orders. The
stock’s price dynamics are then dictated by the different order intensities which change
with the imbalance regime. They also incorporate into their model the possibility of their
spoofing limit orders being executed causing them to purchase shares which would add
to the inventory they need to liquidate. The authors then formulate the maximization of
their profit over a finite time horizon as a dynamic programming problem. This problem
can then be converted into a partial differential equation by standard methods and solved
to yield the optimal spoofing strategy. Cartea et al. [49] find that spoofing increases the
performance of their execution strategy and considerable profit can be made. They argue
spoofing strategies are detrimental to the integrity of markets and their model can be
employed to understand these strategies better in order regulators to combat them.
In chapter 2 we detail the volume imbalance employed by Cartea et al. [49] and use
a generalized form of this statistic in our price manipulation model covered in chapter 3.

1.5

Distributed Data

We briefly touched on some aspects of the data system earlier in this chapter. We
illustrated the type of data in Table 1.1, we described the large size of the raw datasets,
and sketched some of the tools we need to use to work with them. In this section we will
provide more detail about the issues working with very large and complicated data sets.
This section will be particularly useful for readers without a background in big data.
All data was hosted on an Amazon Web Service (AWS) cluster with the ability to
interact with the data by executing scripts in an Apache Zeppelin notebook. Apache
Zeppelin is a front-end for the cluster which allows one to execute code from various
back-end languages such as R and Python. Apache Zeppelin is also fully integrated with
Apache Spark - an open-source distributed general-purpose cluster-computing framework.
With Apache Spark and Zeppelin we can create whatever data sets we want, regardless
of size, and work with them as if they were any small data set loaded into R or Python’s
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Pandas, for example. The advantages are that any calculations done on the data are
done in parallel across the cluster’s nodes and we can load data sets into memory that
would normally crash an ordinary personal computer.
The cluster itself starts with a collection of tables like Table 1.1 which are accessed
through ‘Structured Query Language’ (SQL) queries. Since this is a distributed framework we need to pass our SQL queries through Presto to load the massive data sets across
many executor nodes which are all passed instructions from the driver node. Presto is a
SQL query engine for big data which allows for easy data visualization and investigation.
However, the generated data frame from the Presto SQL query cannot be passed on for
deeper analysis - say optimization or statistical tests. Instead, we pass our SQL queries to Pyspark - an application programming interface (API) which exposes the Spark
programming model to Python. With Pyspark we can use our SQL queries to generate
Pyspark dataframes that can be manipulated with Python-esque scripts.
Anyone with a background in Python’s data analysis library (Pandas) will find it,
syntactically, very similar to Pyspark. In Pyspark the the data manipulation is passed to
the executor nodes and the results are passed back to the driver and collected. This can
be very time consuming if the dataset is large. We are also limited in what we can do
with Pyspark on the dataframe. The built in functions are for handling simple statistics,
groupings, windows, etc, but progress is being made on integration with machine learning
packages. However, we can use user-defined functions (UDFs) to do more complicated
operations by row or column in the dataframe. Again, this can be very time consuming
based on the dataframe size and how complicated the UDF is. To avoid this problem
we can take advantage of Pyspark’s ability to convert Pyspark dataframes into Pandas
dataframes so we have access to all Python libraries to carry out any analysis we want.
For example, the first optimization algorithm we tried would take over 2 hours to run
using UDFs and less than 5 minutes if converted to a Pandas dataframe. The drawback
is that if the data set is too large we risk crashing the entire cluster when we read it into
memory on the driver. This is because it was originally spread out across many nodes.
Size issues with this conversion can mostly be remedied by careful use of assigning
data types to each column. For example, we could convert a column with only a few
different entries into categorical variables. The ‘Side’ column in the data set stores the
string ‘Buy’ or ‘Sell’ which is expensive in a dataframe of several hundred thousand
rows. Since there are only two possible values in each row we can convert all of these
strings to a categorical variables 0 and 1 by ‘Buy’ → 0 and ‘Sell’ → 1. This effectively
turns each multi-byte entry into a single bit. Many columns can also be efficiently stored
as integers instead of floating point numbers. We can even convert our timestamps to
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integers instead of strings by using unix time (the number of seconds that has passed
since midnight UTC on Jan. 1, 1970) and splitting nanosecond portion of the time stamp
into a separate column – also converted to an integer. These easy steps can reduce the
size of our data frame by as much as 75%.
We have outlined the process we use to generate the data sets needed for our analysis
in later chapters. With that in mind, in the following subsection we can discuss some
examples of problems that arose from this project that are typical for data science projects
and the solutions used to fix them.

1.5.1

Examples of Issues Arising in Data Science

Example 1: Missing data One of the most common problems in data science is
missing data. This could be, for example, missing rows in a time series where data was
not collected or missing columns where only partial data was collected. The process of
cleaning data sets is often the most time consuming part of data analysis and in industry
there are usually entire groups dedicated to making sure data is complete and consistent.
Our problem with encountering missing data is that we cannot modify or control how
TMX collects and designs its data sets. Also, since we need to pass SQL queries to the
cluster to generate our data sets we cannot know if we have missing data until after it
has been collected. It would be impractical to read the entire data set of all trading
data across all stocks for years into memory - even distributed over a large cluster. We
need to generalize the code for our analysis enough that we can modify it easily when we
encounter these problems without actually knowing when or how they will appear.
An example of working with missing data happened in our work when generating
our data set for the limit order book on June 15, 2017 for all stocks we analyzed. The
problem was that there were multiple orders, with time stamps after the trading day had
concluded, that had a ‘not a number’ (NaN) stored for the price the order was placed
at. These orders had no reason to be there and it makes no sense to have no price listed
for the orders anyway. When attempting to store these NaN values in the data frame
the code would crash because our price column was set to unsigned integer data types
(after converting dollars to pennies). This problem was never encountered for any other
day. Its likely these entries in the order book table were present because of internal
TMX bookkeeping. The NaN values themselves did not raise suspicion because TMX
uses NaN’s to fill in entries where there is no value – for example, the ‘other broker
id’ column in Table 1.1 for ‘Booked’ or ‘CANCELLED’ orders. While TMX is using
‘NaN’ as a placeholder entry in their data sets this is against the Institute of Electrical
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and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) standard of using ‘NaN’ specifically for undefined or
unrepresentable values such as log(0) or 10 , for example.
Its important to have a solid knowledge of what your data is and how you are using
it in order to solve these kinds of problems when they show up. Since these orders with
missing prices appear after the regular trading time we can just drop these entries from
the data set - we do not need trade data after the market closes. Knowing the hours of
when the TSX is active presents this as a solution to our problem. If we knew nothing
about our data we would not expect to be able to throw problematic entries away nearly
so easily.

Example 2: Breaking existing data structure It is frequently helpful to build new
code from an existing code base. For us, our initial code to produce aggregate limit order
book data was written by TMX and gave us a skeleton code to modify for producing
what we needed. Our own code base for our order book analysis was entirely built from
these initial few scripts and never presented a problem until our code would crash for
different stocks on different days with a generic error message attempting to create a
data frame from empty arrays.
In the early hours of the morning, TMX updates the order book for the day by rolling
over any orders that were left from the previous trading day. These orders come in one
at a time at the same time every day. The sell orders appear first until they have all been
added to the book and then the buy orders are added. The initial code by TMX would
begin generating the limit order book a few seconds after this process would start. There
are often very few orders which roll over and both buy and sell orders have filled the
book by the time the code starts preparing data frames to fill with this data. However,
on some days with some stocks the sell orders had not finished rolling in by the time the
data frame tries to collect both sides of the book. It would find an empty buy side and
return errors - crashing the code.
This was never an issue for the original purpose of the code, but became an issue for
us when we modified it for our purposes. Again, like the first example, our knowledge
of how the data is organized gave us an easy solution - just start building and storing
the limit order book shortly before the regular trading time starts. All orders would
have rolled over hours before this happens. Like the previous example this seems like
an easy and obvious solution, but in data science we are often not so lucky to have the
problematic data entries appearing in parts of the data set we would be removing anyway.
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Example 3: Distributing data by incorrect columns When creating a distributed
data frame you need to select what columns of the data frame to partition over the
different nodes. A natural choice would be to partition by time, date, side of the order
book, or stock symbol. For time series outside of finance, say daily rain or snow fall, there
is usually never a problem with time not being unique to each data entry. However, in
the age of electronic algorithmic trading we cannot precisely give a unique time stamp to
an order even down to nano-second timescales. Our problem then arose by partitioning
over time of day and date since for some entries the time was not unique. When the
data set was collected back to the driver node the data set was completely out of order
with column entries from different rows being swapped. Since time is not unique in the
data set we also cannot just reorder it afterwards. No errors would be produced and
the distribution of the change in the best ask would not look out of the ordinary, so you
would never know there was an issue until you plotted, say, the best ask over the trading
day. Always check that your results are consistent when working with data. You may
never know you are using incorrectly generated data if you do not have safety checks set
up throughout your analysis.
Conveniently, TMX already thought of this problem and had a solution built into
the data structure. Looking back to Table 1.1 we have the ‘seq’ column which tracks
the order that all orders arrive to the exchange. Partitioning and ordering by the ‘seq’
column solves our issues with the distributed data frame and sorting in time. If time is
not guaranteed to be unique for your data you always need a way to know how the rows
are ordered. The growing theme across these examples is that having a solid knowledge
of what your data is and how you are going to use it allows you to handle potential
problems.

Example 4: Outliers Another thing that can happen with time series data is that
you can encounter specific days or time periods where you get vastly different results
than usual. Ordinarily, you might expect you simply made a mistake in your code or
your model does not present the consistent results you were expecting. However, with
financial data there can be alternative explanations for what you see.
In chapter 4 we investigate the calibration of the models we present in chapter 3
and find unusual results on the same dates across multiple stocks. In this example, the
dates are May 29, 2017 and July 4, 2017. If we were unable to extract exact dates (or
were never provided dates) we would never know these days correspond to holidays in
the United States where their own exchanges and financial institutions are closed. Our
unusual results are caused by significantly less trading activity because the American
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traders are on holiday when the Canadian traders are still active. We also find similarly
strange results for specific stocks which corresponded to dates surrounding their record
dividend date. This is the date in which the owner of the share is guaranteed to receive
a dividend payment usually a month later.
Since our data is properly labeled and timestamped these kinds of issues are possible
to solve with a little extra work. In our case these outlier points were not a bug, but
a feature of the model – we are able to detect unusual days in the time series from our
model parameters.

1.6

A Look Ahead

Price manipulation has existed in financial markets for a long time, but the introduction
of computer systems and the move towards high frequency trading (HFT) has introduced
new ways to manipulate. Like the pump and dump strategies of the past, spoofing is
a new form of price manipulation through introducing misleading information into the
market. The literature on detecting spoofing is relatively small, so it is important to
develop mathematical models which can combat these strategies.
So far we have covered how stocks are traded electronically through the limit order
book, how this data is stored, and how a spoofer could manipulate prices in the limit order
book. In recent years there has been a considerable up-tick in prosecution of spoofers,
but research needs to be done on better and more efficient detection methods to catch
these people before they do damage to financial markets – either through monetary losses
or distrust in the system. Our goal over the course of this work is to build a model which
can be used to explore the costs associated with spoofing that we saw in Figures 1.8,
1.9, 1.10, and 1.11 in order to determine when and how a spoofer can best profit from
the state of a limit order book. From this model we can develop tools to explore when
a limit order book is most vulnerable to spoofing and give regulators a way to narrow
their search for price manipulation caused by spoofing.
In the following chapters we build up our model for spoofing order detection. When we
talk about price change distributions we are naturally determining a time scale associated
with those changes. In chapter 2 we discuss the implications and complications related
to time scales in the limit order book. Information about volume imbalance has been a
common component in the study of spoofing. We continue with this idea by condensing
the limit order book into a single variable, the volume imbalance ratio, which we analyze
with statistical tests for its predictive power in price changes. These statistical tests will
be an important tool for us to compare models later this work.
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In chapter 3 we introduce our mathematical notation for the limit order book and
derive the equations needed to quantify the payoffs associated with the actions we saw in
Figures 1.8, 1.9, 1.10, and 1.11. We then develop a model for the price change distribution
dependent on the volume imbalance ratio before giving the final optimization problem
for the spoofer on where to place their limit orders for maximum impact. The ultimate
result is a starting point to look for manipulation in the book.
In chapter 4 we discuss the calibration of our model to the limit order book data
we presented in this chapter. The resulting model parameters are then analyzed against
each other as well as with data from the market activity itself. We also return to the
statistical tests conducted in chapter 2 to see which stocks found improvement under
the calibrated model parameters. A goodness of fit of our price change model is also
presented.
In chapter 5 we apply our spoofing cost model to multiple stocks to determine when
spoofing is the optimal decision for purchasing a fixed number of shares. This will provide
an idea of when our model would predict the book is sensitive to price manipulation. We
also explore including risk in the decision making process as spoofing may be profitable,
but the risk of your spoofing limit orders being executed against you may make spoofing undesirable. Incorporating risk into the decision making provides excellent clusters
which allows us to study changes to the decision boundary as we change the spoofer’s
constraints: the volume of shares they are willing to spoof with, and the number of shares
they wish to purchase. We also study the optimal spoofing strategy of a specific stock
and find the shape of book plays a key role in the spoofer’s decisions.
Finally, in chapter 6, we end with a summary of the work and possible directions and
extensions we can take to improve our model.
Figure 1.12 shows a breakdown of the key concepts covered in each chapter as well as
how these concepts are connected. We use arrows between sections to highlight how we
will be returning to specific ideas in later chapters once we have developed the machinery necessary to discuss these topics. For example, in chapter 2 we define the volume
imbalance ratio and conducted statistical tests to show its association with future price
movements. We generalize this definition in chapter 3 and use this definition to calibrate
our model in chapter 4. Afterwards we return to the statistical tests in chapter 2 using
our new model parameters to show improvements in the model over the classical definition of the imbalance. We also develop our price change model in chapter 3 and analyze
the goodness of fit in chapter 4. At least, the results from our model calibration and
generalized imbalance weights in chapter 4 are fed into our analysis of spoofing detection
in chapter 5.
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Chapter 2
Features of Limit Order Book Price
Movements
2.1

Introduction

Now that we have covered how stocks are traded electronically by means of the limit
order book we can can explore some deeper features of the book. Our main focus in this
work will be on the features which impact the changes in the best ask price and how
can we write down a model which incorporates these features into the price changes. We
focus on the ask side of the limit order book, but the same methodology can be applied to
the bid side by just flipping replacing ask → bid in all relevant equations and definitions
since there is a conceptual symmetry between the two sides of the book.
Extensive literature exists on features of the limit order book impacting future price
movements. The two most common features used are the current prices, volumes, and
order numbers on both sides of the limit order book. Cont et al. [50] show that the
difference between the order flows on the bid and ask sides of the book, net order flow
imbalance, is an excellent predictors of future prices. Similar work using net order flow
and future price prediction was conducted in [51, 52]. The volumes in the book have
been used frequently in the literature as a predictor variable of future price movements
in machine learning algorithms [53–55] and more standard financial modelling settings
[56, 57]. More recently, studies have been done using the volume imbalance ratio as
a predictor variable which aggregates the limit order book volumes down to a single
number. Cartea et al. [58] being the first to explore this idea and apply it to enhancing
algorithmic trading strategies1 . Since then a number of papers have expanded on this
1

Their paper on spoofing [49], which we discussed in chapter 1, uses the volume imbalance ratio for
its regime switching mechanism.
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work, [59] for example. However, information about depths in the book beyond the best
ask and bid has not been studied in the context of the volume imbalance ratio. Following
in the footsteps of Cartea et al. [49], in chapter 3, we generalize the classical definition of
the volume imbalance in order to include volume information deeper in the book which a
spoofer could influence, and, in turn impact future price movements. Past studies [51, 56]
have shown the depth of book plays a role in determining future price movements and
we aim to continue this study using the volume imbalance ratio.
In this chapter we discuss the time dependence that arises from limit order book
data on price movements as well as one particular feature that has been explored in the
literature in a different context – the volume imbalance ratio. The volume imbalance ratio
is a way of aggregating the volumes in the limit order book at all available prices into
a single feature variable. This variable, defined more precisely later in this chapter, has
been connected by the past literature with limit/market/cancel order frequency on both
sides of the book; the result of these, mediated through the logic of the order book, leads
to price impact. Instead of taking this approach we look directly at volume imbalance
and how it impacts the distributions of price movements as a way of describing how the
shape of the limit order book determines possible prices. When referring to the shape of
the limit order book we follow, for example [8], to mean how the quantities of shares q
at each price p can be thought of as some function q(p) on each side of the book. That
is, a general term to encompass the value, slope, curvature, etc, of q(p) for both sides of
the book.
Before we can discuss the volume imbalance we need to tackle the importance of some
of the properties of the limit order book over time. This includes both the time of day
and the time interval over which the limit order book is observed. From there we can
start to build our model.

2.2

Sampling Time and Price Movements

Care must be taken when investigating the distribution in change of best bid or ask
prices throughout the trading day for a particular stock. Computing a price change
distribution implicitly requires a time step or sampling frequency. This could be when
any order arrives, when a trade occurs, or every 5 or 10 seconds. The choice of frequency
will yield potentially very different results for each distribution.
For example, Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of best ask prices in ticks (of pennies)
for AEM stock on April 17, 2017 for different sampling intervals. We chose AEM stock
because it was the most actively traded stock on April 17, 2017. We observe the peak at
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Figure 2.1: Probability of change in best ask price (in pennies or ticks) for AEM stock
on April 17, 2017. Each subplot shows the distribution of prices when sampling every 1,
5, 10, 20, and 30 seconds, respectively.
0 decreases with an increase in sampling interval. This is because prices have a higher
probability of moving over longer time frames. Not surprisingly, we observe a larger
range of price movements over longer time periods.
The price distributions will also heavily depend on the activity of the stock. The
more active the stock, the larger the price movements we observe at a given sampling
frequency. For less traded stocks we may need to look at significantly larger sampling
times to produce pictures like Figure 2.1. When performing any kind of modelling of
price distributions with limit order book data one needs to be mindful of the sampling
intervals used.
Figure 2.2 compares the distribution in the best ask price for three different stocks
over 5 time intervals. We see each stock exhibits a different time dependency on its price
movements. Even after 60 seconds, XEG resembles HFU at 5 seconds. Similarly, HFU
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Entire Trading Day

(a) XEG

(b) HFU

(c) CNR

Figure 2.2: Distribution of change in best ask price for XEG, HFU, and CNR stocks on
June 1 - 8, 2017. Each subplot row from top to bottom is the distribution after sampling
1, 5, 15, 30, 60 second time intervals, respectively. Data used is from the entire trading
day for each day.
at 60 seconds resembles CNR at 15 seconds. Also, among these three stocks you would
likely say CNR is most like AEM, shown in Figure 2.1.
In addition to the sampling time problem we also have that different periods of the
trading day display different behaviour. It is well known from past literature that the
first hour of the trading day exhibits a larger number of orders and more frequent price
movements than other hours of the trading day [34, 49, 50, 56, 57, 59]. This is usually
dealt with by excluding data from the first 30 to 60 minutes of the trading day. Comparing
Figure 2.3 to Figure 2.2 we can see that the first hour of the trading day for our three
stocks see more frequent price movements over the same time interval and the movements
you do see are larger. This is odd and possibly due to our small selection of stocks. A
more expansive analysis will be done in the next chapter.
We also have another issue appearing in the final subplot of Figure 2.3 for CNR stock.
The same plot is shown blown up in Figure 2.4. If we take sampling times long enough
we start to lose the structure and symmetry of the price distribution we have at smaller
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First Hour of Trading Day

(a) XEG

(b) HFU

(c) CNR

Figure 2.3: Distribution of change in best ask price for XEG, HFU, and CNR stocks on
June 1 - 8, 2017. Each subplot row from top to bottom is the distribution after sampling
1, 5, 15, 30, 60 second time intervals, respectively. Data used is from the first hour of
the trading day for each day.
time intervals. It could be because the distribution in Figure 2.4 is a mixture of two or
more distributions that emerges over longer time intervals. This is outside the scope of
this work, but would be an interesting direction. We will end up up limiting ourselves to
time intervals over which this behaviour is not observed.
In contrast to the first hour of the day, taking a look at the final hour of the trading
day in Figure 2.5 we cannot see too much difference from the patterns in the entire
trading day in Figure 2.2. Although Figure 2.5 does not support this, the final 30 to 60
minutes of the trading day are often excluded from other works. This is to exclude the
period of the day where, on top of the continuous trading, traders are canceling their
orders in order to prevent them from staying on the book overnight. The TSX allows
people to cancel and place market orders after the market closes, but not to place new
limit orders.
This would suggest that stocks have their own time scales determined by their price
movements. If we want to investigate collections of stocks and analyze the characteristics
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Figure 2.4: Distribution of change in best ask price for CNR stock over 60 second intervals
during first hour of trading day. Zoomed in picture of the final subplot for CNR stock in
Figure 2.3.
of their price movements we need to be able to compare them ‘apples to apples’. Over
what time scales would XEG and CNR look most similar? We have to fix the time scale
and determine an appropriate way of determining what we mean by ‘most similar’. This
will be expanded on in the next chapter.

2.3

Volume Imbalance Ratio, Prices, and Time

A much studied predictor of limit order book price movements is the volume imbalance
ratio. The volume imbalance ratio is a variable which quantifies the mismatch in the
quantity of shares available to be bought versus sold. Its a function of the shape of the
book and the collection of ratios over the trading day forms a distribution. Cartea et
al. [58] show that the volume imbalance has a strong impact on the frequency of market
orders placed on a particular side of the limit order book. The increased frequency of
market orders would cause prices to move up (down) for the best ask (bid) as liquidity is
removed and orders walk the book. If the volume imbalance can be a predictor for market order frequency then it might be a predictor of the distribution of price movements.
A relationship between these two distributions would allow us to investigate the question - Does the shape of the limit order book have a hand in determining future price
movements?
If at time t, we can compute the volume of shares at the best bid Vbid (t) and the
volume of shares at the best ask Vask (t) we can calculate the volume imbalance ratio I(t)
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Last Hour of Trading Day

(a) XEG

(b) HFU

(c) CNR

Figure 2.5: Distribution of change in best ask price for XEG, HFU, and CNR stocks on
June 1 - 8, 2017. Each subplot row from top to bottom is the distribution after sampling
1, 5, 15, 30, 60 second time intervals, respectively. Data used is from the last hour of the
trading day for each day.

by equation 2.3.1.
I(t) =

Vbid (t) − Vask (t)
Vbid (t) + Vask (t)

(2.3.1)

It is clear from equation 2.3.1 that the volume imbalance ratio I(t) ∈ [−1, 1] and
I(t) → 1 as Vbid (t) → ∞ while I(t) → −1 as Vask (t) → ∞ holding the other volume
fixed. That is, an imbalance of 1 (-1) means that all volume is on the bid (ask) side of
the book. We refer to I(t) in equation 2.3.1 as the instantaneous volume imbalance at
time t.
For price movements from order to order we can use the instantaneous imbalance as a
predictor, but when looking at price movements over a specific time interval we need a way
to aggregate the instantaneous imbalance. A simple way to do this would be to just take
the mean of the instantaneous imbalances over the time interval. We start by choosing
equally spaced sample times t1 < t2 < · · · < tM . For a time interval ∆t = tm − tm−1
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we have orders at times s1 < s2 < · · · < sN where tm−1 ≤ s1 and sN ≤ tm . From the
instantaneous imbalances I(s1 ), I(s2 ), . . . , I(sN ) we define the average imbalance Iavg as
Iavg =

N
1 X
I(si )
N i=1

(2.3.2)

Keep in mind the number of orders N will likely be different for each time interval.
Another approach is to weight each instantaneous imbalance over the time interval. One
would expect that more weight should be applied to the imbalance the longer it goes
without changing. Many orders enter the book and are immediately cancelled and these
orders should have less impact on prices since they do not exist in the book long enough for
people to act upon them. We can incorporate this idea by weighting each instantaneous
imbalance I(si ) by the time between successive orders, si+1 − si . Instead of equation
2.3.2 we can define the average time weighted imbalance Iavg between times tm−1 and tm
as

Iavg

N
−1
X
1
=
I(si )(si+1 − si )
sN − s1 i=1

(2.3.3)

We exclude the instantaneous imbalance at sN since the next order would be outside
the time interval and we have no associated next price movement. Figure 2.6 shows our
one period model between times t and t + ∆t and how we aggregate our instantaneous
imbalances into an aggregated average imbalance Iavg .
Figures 2.7 and 2.8 are the time series and histograms of the average imbalance of
AEM stock on April 17, 2017 over 5 second intervals. We can think of the definition
from equation 2.3.2 as having no time weighting as all orders are treated as equal. In
this chapter we use time weighting when we refer to the average imbalance, but compare
results using both methods in a later chapter.
It is difficult to tell what the difference is between the subplots in Figure 2.7. Figures
2.9 and 2.10 depict the mean and variance, respectively, of the 5 second average imbalance
over 10 minute time intervals. The mean is roughly the same for both methods and they
alternate over which is greater throughout the day, but the variance is almost always
greater with time weighting.
The difference in the mean and variance of the average imbalance between the two
aggregation choices may be due to a change in sample size caused by the introduction of
the time weights in equation 2.3.3. Any order that arrives and is immediately cancelled
would be given a weight of approximately zero – effectively removing it from the calculation and lowering the sample size within that time interval. We can compare the sample

Chapter 2. Features of Limit Order Book Price Movements

39

Figure 2.6: One period model for aggregating instantaneous imbalances into the average
imbalance Iavg . We use the notation Ii = I(si ) for the instantaneous imbalances between
time t and t + ∆t.

(a) Average imbalance (simple mean)

(b) Average imbalance (time weighted mean)

Figure 2.7: Time series of the volume imbalance ratio for AEM stock on April 17, 2017.
Sampling was done every 5 seconds
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(a) Average imbalance (simple mean)

(b) Average imbalance (time weighted mean)

Figure 2.8: Probability density of volume imbalance ratio for AEM stock on April 17,
2017. Sampling was done every 5 seconds.

Figure 2.9: Mean of time series in Figure 2.7 over 10 minute intervals. Mean varies
slightly with both methods having periods being greater than the other.
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Figure 2.10: Variance of time series in Figure 2.7 over 10 minute intervals. Variance is
almost always greater with time weighting.
size in each 5 second bin to Kish’s effective sample size [60] when the mean of the data
is calculated with weights wi . The effective sample size is defined as
neff

P
( ni=1 wi )2
= Pn
2
i=1 wi

(2.3.4)

Here the weights wi are taken to be the time differences si+1 − si between orders
in equation 2.3.3. Figure 2.11 compares the sample size of each 5 second bin to the
effective sample size over the trading day. The smaller effective sample size is a possible
explanation for the increased variance when using time weighting. We also see that
when we use time weighting we need significantly fewer samples to achieve roughly the
same mean. This would suggest that there are a few orders in each 5 second bin which
dominate the calculation for the average imbalance.
Figures D.1 and D.2 show the result of replacing the instantaneous imbalance with
random draws from the standard normal distribution to see if it is solely the weighting
which causes the increased variance. We see the same increase in variance as we would
expect (although the gap is much smaller), but the mean for the average imbalance with
both weightings is much closer than we see from the standard normal. Figure D.6 is a
visual test to see if the imbalance is independent and identically distributed. We can see
that this is not the case over short time scales, but is true over longer time scales and
could explain why we see the approach taken to calculate Iavg has little impact on the
mean. We also see that there is an interesting grid appearing based on specific imbalance
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Figure 2.11: Average sample size in 5 second bins over 10 minute intervals. Sample size
is the number of orders in each 5 second bin and the effective sample size is calculated
from the time weights. Effective sample size is also known as Kish’s effective sample size.
Weights are the same as Figure 2.7.
values. It looks like the imbalance is bound between nice rational number values (ex.
1/3, 2/5, 3/4, etc). This may just be an artefact of how algorithms place limit orders
at the best bid/ask over the trading day. Cartea et al. [61] find a similar pattern in the
number of executed orders at particular cents in the stock price. Their interpretation
is “that for some reason (rational or not) there is a preference for providing liquidity at
prices that end in round cent values”. We may be seeing something similar in the volume
imbalance by traders placing orders to move the imbalance to nice round numbers as
well.
Figures D.3, D.4, D.5, and D.7, show the same characteristics as AEM on the same
day to show this is not an isolated case.
Our two different ways of calculating the average imbalance have only a small impact
on the mean while the variance increases from the smaller sample size. The preceding
figures were only for a single stock on a single day and would just be anecdotal evidence
for what we see in Figures 2.9 and 2.10, but the real test will be which weighting scheme
provides better predictive power of price movements.
The impact of the volume imbalance on the distribution of price movements for AEM
stock is shown in Figure 2.12. The effect of imbalance is not to translate the distribution,
but to skew it. A heavy positive (negative) imbalance skews the distribution to the right
(left). This would mean it is more likely to see an up (down) price movement when the
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imbalance is positive (negative).

(a) Average imbalance from mean

(b) Average imbalance from time weighting

Figure 2.12: Probability of change in best ask price (in pennies or ticks) for AEM stock on
April 17, 2017. Sampling was done every 5 seconds. The top plots show the distribution
of prices unconditional on the volume imbalance. The center is conditional on the volume
imbalance being less than the 25% quantile. The bottom is conditional on the volume
imbalance being greater than the 75% quantile.
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Since AEM was already skewed regardless of the imbalance on April 17, 2017 it is
hard to tell just from looking at the distributions what is really happening. In Figure
2.13 we plot the cumulative distribution function (cdf) for each subplot in Figure 2.12 on
top of each other. We can see that the cdf is skewed left when the imbalance is less than
the 25% quantile and skewed right when greater than the 75% quantile. We can also
see that the time weighting has helped separate the different imbalance regimes from the
unconditional case for the positive price movements, but this is just a single stock and
we will need look at some measure over a larger collection to see how these two ways of
calculating the average imbalance differ.
In these examples we condition on the imbalance taking its more extreme values in
order to magnify the effect, but we will need to use hypothesis testing to determine if
conditioning on the imbalance has a statistically significant impact on price movements
and how large that impact is if it exists. We then conduct two tests for statistical
independence between the price movements and the imbalance.

2.4

Statistical Tests of Volume Imbalance

In this section we explore two tests to provide evidence whether the impact of the volume
imbalance ratio is a predictor of changes in the best ask price. We will focus on the
instantaneous imbalance as a predictor of order-by-order price movements – the current
instantaneous imbalance as a predictor of the price movement caused by the next order.
We also perform the same tests for AEM stock on April 17, 2017 over 5 second intervals
as described in the previous sections of this chapter. So, the average imbalance over 5
seconds as a predictor of the overall price movement from the beginning to the end of the
time interval. We will explore the imbalance and price movements over time intervals
in the next chapter, but give a taste for what is to come in this section. Our examples
in the next subsections will be using the time weighting when calculating the average
imbalance, but we will present the results from both methods in chapter 4.
The purpose of the first test is to determine if the difference between the distribution
of the change in best ask price when the imbalance is positive or negative is statistically
significant. We will call the imbalance coarse because it is binary (positive or negative)
while the price movements are fine because we take the full distribution itself (probability
of seeing each individual tick). For the second test we bin the imbalance into 4 groups to
see if the probability of price movement being up or down dependent on the imbalance bin
is statistically significant. Here things are reversed where the imbalance is fine (broken
into bins) and the price movements are binary (up or down).
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(a) Average imbalance from mean

(b) Average imbalance from time weighting

Figure 2.13: Cumulative probability distribution for the three subplots shown in Figure
2.12.
For our statistical tests we will have two collections of categorical count data to which
we apply Pearson’s chi-squared test for statistical independence. The null hypothesis is
that the two collections are independent of each each other and the test gives us a pvalue for accepting or rejecting the null hypothesis. In our case the statistical population
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is the collection of all time-indexed orders placed on the exchange for a specific stock
over a given time period. At each order we know the instantaneous imbalance prior to
its arrival and the best ask price. Once a time interval ∆t has been specified we can
sample from this population by randomly drawing a time-indexed order and all other
orders ∆t seconds in the future. We can then aggregate the instantaneous imbalances
into the average imbalance via equation 2.3.3 and determine the change in the best ask
price between the first and last order in ∆t.
An issue which can arise with statistical tests is that very large sample sizes can
produce arbitrarily small p-values. To compensate for this we also provide the Cramer’s
V measure [62] from the chi squared value of the test which is independent of sample
size and bound between 0 and 1. A Cramer’s V score of 1 means the two collections
are identical to each other. The measure gives a strength of association between the
two count collections. We also apply a bias correction to the Cramer’s V to get a more
conservative estimate of the strength of association [63]. Details of how p-values and the
Cramer’s V are calculated for Pearson’s chi-square test for statistical independence can
be found in Appendix C.
In the following two subsections we detail the two count collections used in each test
and provide the results for a larger sample of stocks.

2.4.1

Test 1: Coarse Imbalance and Fine Price Movements

For our first test we look at the effect of the sign of the imbalance on the individual
price movement counts order-by-order and over 5 second intervals. Our categorical data
is the number of individual price movements we see when the imbalance is positive or
negative. A common rule for the chi square test is to have 5 or more counts in each cell for
larger contingency tables like Tables 2.1 and 2.2. We then take the largest range of price
movements which satisfy this rule. Order-by-order we take price movements between -3
and 3 ticks and over 5 second time intervals we take the price movements between -5 and
5 ticks. We will use AEM stock on April 17, 2017 for our examples. For the time interval
data we sample 30000 five second intervals throughout the day which can overlap. If the
5 second interval has 1 or fewer orders we discard it.
Table 2.1 summarizes the order-by-order count data. Table 2.2 summarizes the 5
second interval count data. In both cases we see that there is a significantly larger
number of price movements when the imbalance was positive, but there were more overall
downward price movements over the day.
Dividing the counts in each row of Tables 2.1 and 2.2 by the row’s total count we get
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Imbalance
I>0
I<0
Total by ∆pa
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∆pa
-3 -2
-1
0
1
2
3 Total by Imbalance
37 113 2859 248568 7936 257 71
259841
22 84 6193 179684 697
9
7
186696
59 197 9052 428252 8633 266 78
446537

Table 2.1: Counts for order-by-order price movements conditioned on sign of imbalance.
Data for AEM stock on April 17, 2017.
Imbalance
I>0
I<0
Total by ∆pa

-5 -4
-3
-2
-1
49 132 329 912 2625
34 136 339 945 2284
83 268 668 1857 4909

∆pa
0
1
2
3
4
9410 2493 1114 638 243
5529 1274 463 209 83
14939 3767 1577 847 326

5
84
66
150

Total by Imbalance
18029
11362
29391

Table 2.2: Counts for 5 second interval price movements conditioned on sign of imbalance.
Data for AEM stock on April 17, 2017. Average imbalance calculated using time weights.
the distributions shown in Figure 2.14. Figure 2.14 shows us that, when conditioning
on a negative imbalance, we see more downward price movements and vice versa for the
positive imbalance. This is the case order-by-order and also over the 5 second intervals.

(a) Order-by-order

(b) 5 second intervals

Figure 2.14: Distribution of change in best ask price order-by-order and over 5 second
intervals conditioned on the average imbalance being positive or negative. Data from
AEM stock on April 17, 2017.
This is all just initial observation from the count data, but now we can use Tables
2.1 and 2.2 as contingency tables and perform our chi square test on each under the null
hypothesis that the change in the best ask price is independent of the imbalance. The
results of the tests are shown in Table 2.3.
The p-values in both cases imply that we can easily reject the null hypothesis at any
significance level, but the Cramer’s V tells us the strength of the relationship between
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Cramer’s V
Order-by-order
0.122
5 second intervals
0.114

p-value
0.0
7.33e-76
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Correlation
0.123
0.129

Table 2.3: Summary of chi square test for coarse imbalance and fine price movements.
Correlation is taken between change in best ask price and the imbalance.
the imbalance and the count data is meaningful and the correlation between the two is
positive. We report the same test for a large sample of stocks in Table 2.4. We only run
the same test on order-by-order data for other stocks as we still need a way of comparing
stocks which have very different behaviour over the same time interval. This will be
discussed in the next chapter.

Figure 2.15: Cramer’s V for whole day and start of day plotted against each other. Data
is from Table 2.4. The dashed line would represent a totally linear relationship between
the two statistics.
Table 2.4 summarizes our first test across a large sample of stocks using data from the
entire trading day as well as the first hour of the trading day. We see that all p-values
imply we can reject the null hypothesis at any significance level and we have a fairly
strong association between our counts and the sign of the imbalance across all stocks.
Note that some stocks have a much larger Cramer’s V than others - HQU, HSU, VFV,
for example. These stocks have a stronger relationship between the imbalance and price
movements. From Figure 2.15 we see roughly the same Cramer’s V is found in both time
periods giving the impression that order-by-order the imbalance has roughly the same
association to changes in the best ask price regardless of time of day.
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ticker
HQU
HSU
VFV
HVI
VUN
PAAS
NA
POW
HOD
VGG
UFS
CNR
BMO
XWD
IPL
SLF
PPL
KL
FTS
AEM
BAM.A
HFU
PWF
ARX
PVG
BIP.UN
OR
GIL
HXU
SSO
FM
T
IMO
XQQ
ERF
ZEB
RBA
FR
FSV
GIB.A
CPG
CCO
SW
IMG
GOOS
WCN
XEG
K
G
TC

Cramer’s V
0.244
0.232
0.231
0.185
0.169
0.126
0.126
0.118
0.118
0.118
0.118
0.116
0.115
0.113
0.11
0.108
0.108
0.108
0.106
0.105
0.102
0.0996
0.0956
0.0934
0.092
0.0865
0.0848
0.0847
0.0846
0.0843
0.0842
0.0822
0.0815
0.0807
0.0797
0.0777
0.0739
0.0739
0.0724
0.0677
0.0655
0.0594
0.0562
0.0523
0.0521
0.0455
0.0417
0.0411
0.0383
0.0288

ticker
HQU
HSU
VFV
HVI
VUN
PAAS
NA
POW
HOD
VGG
UFS
CNR
BMO
XWD
IPL
SLF
PPL
KL
FTS
AEM
BAM.A
HFU
PWF
ARX
PVG
BIP.UN
OR
GIL
HXU
SSO
FM
T
IMO
XQQ
ERF
ZEB
RBA
FR
FSV
GIB.A
CPG
CCO
SW
IMG
GOOS
WCN
XEG
K
G
TC
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Cramer’s V
0.221
0.184
0.223
0.192
0.16
0.13
0.134
0.137
0.145
0.123
0.108
0.0913
0.103
0.128
0.122
0.102
0.104
0.117
0.113
0.0866
0.105
0.0918
0.108
0.0923
0.0956
0.0618
0.0844
0.0852
0.0793
0.0922
0.0999
0.102
0.0902
0.107
0.083
0.0904
0.0594
0.0747
0.0773
0.0647
0.0717
0.079
0.0409
0.0631
0.0406
0.0408
0.063
0.0479
0.0478
0.0368

Table 2.4: Summary of chi square test for coarse imbalance and fine price movements
order-by-order. Data is taken from June 1-8, 2017. All p-values are zero or very close
(≈ 10−46 at most) to zero. The left subtable uses data from the entire trading day while
the right subtable uses data only from the first hour of the trading day. Tickers are
sorted by magnitude of Cramer’s V for the whole day.
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In the next subsection we break the imbalance down into smaller intervals and looking
at the price direction in each interval. We can then apply the same statistical test to
that count data as we did in this subsection.

2.4.2

Test 2: Fine Imbalance and Coarse Price Movements

This time we divide the imbalance into bins and condition the sign of the price movement
on each imbalance bin. We follow [58] and split the imbalance up into the follow intervals
labeled 1, 2, 3, and 4:


Bin 1: I ∈ −1, − 31


Bin 2: I ∈ − 13 , 0
 
Bin 3: I ∈ 0, 31
Bin 4: I ∈

1
,1
3



Tables 2.5 and 2.6 show the count data for order-by-order and 5 second intervals,
respectively. With these counts we can test how the probability of up and down price
movements changes depending on the bin membership of the volume imbalance. As in
the previous subsection, we can divide each bin count by total in each bin to produce a
distribution for the probability of an up or down movement given the bin. The probabilities are shown in Figure 2.16. One will notice that the total counts in Tables 2.5 and
2.6 are very different than Tables 2.1 and 2.2. This is because we are conditioning on the
change in the best ask being nonzero in Tables 2.5 and 2.6 while a significant number of
samples in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 correspond to no change in the best ask price.
Bin
∆pa
∆pa > 0
∆pa < 0
Total by Bin

1
2
3
4
Total by ∆pa
657
58 1015 7259
8989
4051 2253 1484 1527
9315
4708 2311 2499 8786
18304

Table 2.5: Count data order-by-order price direction conditioned on imbalance bin. Data
from AEM stock on April 17, 2017.
From Figure 2.16 we see order-by-order almost all price movements are down in bins
1 and 2, while almost all price movements are up in bin 4. However, in bin 3 we are still
more likely to see a price drop even though the imbalance is positive. We see a similar
pattern across all stocks we examined. In Figure 2.17 we are looking at the same plot as
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Bin
∆pa
∆pa > 0
∆pa < 0
Total by Bin

1
2
3
4
Total by ∆pa
312 1809 3179 1489
6789
991 2785 3078 978
7832
1303 4594 6257 2467
14621

Table 2.6: Count data over 5 second intervals for price direction conditioned on imbalance
bin. Data from AEM stock on April 17, 2017.

(a) Order-by-order

(b) 5 second intervals

Figure 2.16: Probability of change in best ask price being positive or negative conditioned
on the average imbalance being in bins 1, 2, 3, or 4. Data from AEM stock on April 17,
2017.

Figure 2.17: Probability of change in best bid price being positive (orange) or negative
(blue) conditioned on the average imbalance being in bins 1, 2, 3, or 4. Data from AEM
stock on April 17, 2017.
Figure 2.16a except for the change in the best bid price – that is, order-by-order changes
in the best bid. Here the pattern has been reversed and we see that there is a slightly
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higher probability of a price increase even though the imbalance is negative. Again, we
see the same thing across all stocks when looking order-by-order. These two plots would
suggest that one needs a much higher (lower) imbalance in order for the best ask (bid)
to increase (decrease) than decrease (increase). Gould and Bonart [59] found a similar,
but very small, symmetry violation with volume imbalance as well. Focusing on the best
ask, this could be because the best ask price can only increase if all shares at the best
ask are completely removed. This would be caused by traders placing market orders and
we see the best ask will almost only increase if there are few shares left at that price.
The best ask can decrease from a limit order placed 1 tick below if the spread is at least
1 tick. It appears that it is simply easier to decrease prices (given the spread is not zero)
than to increase them. The same argument applies to changes in the best bid price. This
seems to be the case only when looking at price movements order-by-order. As we see in
Figure 2.16b, with 5 second intervals, this pattern disappears.
We have a different story when looking at price movements over 5 second intervals,
but there is still a skew in the probabilities towards needing a larger imbalance for up
movements than one needs a small imbalance for down movements. However, it is not
as severe as it was order-by-order. The price does have a steadily increasing probability
of moving up as we pass from bin 1 to 4. Likewise we have a steady decrease in the
probability of a down movement as we pass from bin 1 to 4.
Before discussing the outcome of the statistical test on Tables 2.5 and 2.6 we take
the opportunity to check a previously studied aspect of price movements in limit order
books [61]. We take the counts in our two tables, but also condition on what the previous
price movement was. The results are converted to probabilities like before and shown in
Figures 2.18 and 2.19.
Order-by-order we see that if there was no previous price movement the probabilities
are very similar to Figure 2.16a. This is likely because order-by-order there are almost
no price movements as shown in Figure 2.14. The interesting result is that if the previous
price movement was up, then the next movement is very likely to be down regardless of
what the imbalance is. Similarly, if the previous price movement was down it is very
likely that the next movement is up regardless of imbalance. This was discussed in [61],
but independent of the volume imbalance. Here we see that the reverting aspect of prices
happens regardless of the imbalance. When prices move, the next most likely move is
in the opposite direction. We do not look at the magnitude of the price movement here
though. Even though prices appear to be reverting we could have the best ask increase
by 2 cents, but then drop 5 cents. This is not in conflict with Figures 2.18 and 2.19, but
is not captured by them either.
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(a) No previous price movement

(b) Previous price move down

(c) Previous price move up

Figure 2.18: Probability of change in best ask price order-by-order being positive or
negative conditioned on the average imbalance being in bins 1, 2, 3, or 4. Also conditioned
on the last price movement being zero, down, or up. Data from AEM stock on April 17,
2017.
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(a) No previous price movement

(b) Previous price move down

(c) Previous price move up

Figure 2.19: Probability of change in best ask price over 5 second intervals being positive
or negative conditioned on the average imbalance being in bins 1, 2, 3, or 4. Also
conditioned on the last price movement being zero, down, or up. Data from AEM stock
on April 17, 2017.
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The output of our statistical test is shown in Table 2.7. Like the first test we still
get p-values which imply we can easily reject the null hypothesis at any significance level
and that the relationship between the imbalance and price movements is positive. The
main difference here is the strength of the relationship given by the Cramer’s V measure.
We get an extremely significant association order-by-order when we break the imbalance
into bins compared to when we looked at just the sign of the imbalance in the previous
subsection. We also get a stronger association over 5 second intervals, but it is much
smaller than order-by-order. This could be because order-by-order we are only looking at
the next price movement while over 5 seconds we are seeing an aggregate of many price
moves and instantaneous imbalances. Some information is possibly lost along the way in
how we choose to aggregate our data, but the positive correlation between the imbalance
and price movements still exists. We should also note that the correlation between the
change in the best ask price and the imbalance is the same in Tables 2.3 and 2.7 because
they use the same sampled data.

Order-by-order
5 second intervals

Cramer’s V
0.676
0.200

p-value
0.0
3.03e-126

Correlation
0.123
0.129

Table 2.7: Summary of chi square test for fine imbalance and coarse price movements.
Correlation is taken between change in best ask price and the imbalance.

Figure 2.20: Cramer’s V for whole day and start of day plotted against each other. Data
is from Table 2.8. The dashed line would represent a totally linear relationship between
the two statistics.
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ticker
ZEB
HOD
XEG
XWD
VUN
HSU
PWF
POW
VFV
GIL
FTS
PPL
SLF
XQQ
IPL
ARX
T
HXU
IMO
BAM.A
CCO
PVG
FM
G
CPG
ERF
HQU
NA
SSO
BMO
FR
PAAS
CNR
VGG
GIB.A
AEM
IMG
OR
HVI
HFU
RBA
KL
UFS
K
FSV
WCN
BIP.UN
GOOS
SW
TC

Cramer’s V
0.953
0.946
0.922
0.897
0.871
0.87
0.837
0.824
0.81
0.806
0.805
0.803
0.78
0.775
0.767
0.767
0.761
0.75
0.741
0.739
0.729
0.723
0.714
0.703
0.702
0.699
0.698
0.692
0.69
0.687
0.674
0.668
0.668
0.662
0.651
0.644
0.637
0.629
0.606
0.591
0.537
0.528
0.527
0.484
0.415
0.381
0.371
0.367
0.351
0.0387

ticker
ZEB
HOD
XEG
XWD
VUN
HSU
PWF
POW
VFV
GIL
FTS
PPL
SLF
XQQ
IPL
ARX
T
HXU
IMO
BAM.A
CCO
PVG
FM
G
CPG
ERF
HQU
NA
SSO
BMO
FR
PAAS
CNR
VGG
GIB.A
AEM
IMG
OR
HVI
HFU
RBA
KL
UFS
K
FSV
WCN
BIP.UN
GOOS
SW
TC
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Cramer’s V
0.912
0.954
0.855
0.875
0.75
0.78
0.784
0.775
0.706
0.726
0.721
0.71
0.699
0.704
0.702
0.703
0.754
0.685
0.703
0.645
0.719
0.712
0.646
0.652
0.636
0.661
0.642
0.655
0.659
0.591
0.618
0.645
0.574
0.597
0.538
0.622
0.651
0.565
0.651
0.607
0.506
0.517
0.454
0.684
0.389
0.352
0.314
0.326
0.322
0.038

Table 2.8: Summary of chi square test for fine imbalance and coarse price movements
order-by-order. Data is taken from June 1-8, 2017. All p-values are zero or very close
(≈ 10−73 at most) to zero. The left subtable uses data from the entire trading day while
the right subtable uses data only from the first hour of the trading day. Tickers are
sorted by magnitude of Cramer’s V for the whole day.
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In Table 2.8 we report the same test for a large sample of stocks. As in the previous
subsection, we only run the same test on order-by-order data for other stocks as we still
need a way of comparing stocks which have very different behaviour over the same time
interval. All p-values imply we can reject the null hypothesis at any significance level
and we have a very strong association between the binned imbalance and price direction.
Figure 2.20 shows a similar relationship as in Figure 2.15 except the Cramer’s V during
the start of day is usually less than the whole day for this test. This may suggest a
weaker association during the start of day between the imbalance and price movements,
but the association is still strong and the difference between the Cramer’s V in both time
periods is small.

2.5

Conclusions

In this chapter we investigated the impact of time on price movements and how the
volume imbalance ratio can be used as a predictor of future price movements. We saw
that individual stocks have their own time scales over which we see larger and larger
price movements. Care must be taken to determine a way to compare all stocks given
that they may not have similar behaviour at the time scales. We need a way of fixing
the time scale on all stocks so that we can compare any future analysis in an ‘apples to
apples’ way. In chapter 4 we shall explore this comparison between model parameters.
We also saw the problem of dealing with how to aggregate the instantaneous volume
imbalance over a given time interval. We gave two ways of doing this - by taking the mean
and also weighting by the time between successive orders. The analysis that followed only
used the time weighting, but we will come back to this in chapter 4 once we have discussed
how to fix the time intervals for each stock.
We used hypothesis testing in two different ways to test how the volume imbalance
ratio impacts price movements:
1. How the sign of the imbalance influences specific price movements
2. How the value of the imbalance influences price direction
In both cases we found a strong positive relationship order-by-order and also over 5
second intervals for AEM stock on April 17, 2017. We also ran the same tests over a larger
sample of stocks order-by-order and found the same strong relationship in both tests.
All tests showed the association between the volume imbalance ratio and price changes
was statistically significant, but the Cramer’s V allows us to numerically represent the
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strength of that association. We will use the Cramer’s V to compare models under
different parameters once we define a generalized volume imbalance ratio in chapter 3.
The generalized form of the volume imbalance ratio that incorporates volumes beyond the
best bid and best ask. Improvements in the Cramer’s V between models would suggest
a stronger association under different choices in how we calculate the volume imbalance.
These results and the existing literature support the use of the volume imbalance,
and by extension the volumes in the limit order book, to predict the possible future price
movements. In chapter 3 we look at how we incorporate these ideas into a model for
determining price changes based on the orders that interact with the limit order book.
We can use this model to calculate the costs associated with a spoofer’s decision to
manipulate the limit order book. The calibration of our price change model is done in
chapter 4 along with comparisons between the resulting parameters. In chapter 5 we can
use our calibrated models to explore the sensitivity of the limit order book to spoofing
and the conditions under which a spoofer decides to manipulate the book.

Chapter 3
Spoofing Cost Model and
Generalized Imbalance Ratio
3.1

Introduction

In this chapter we develop the notation and mathematical description necessary to analyze the limit order book. With this notation in place we can build a model for determining the optimal limit order placement to manipulate the best ask price through
the volume imbalance ratio. We saw in the previous chapter that the imbalance has a
statistically meaningful impact on the distribution of the change in best ask price. The
spoofer will place their spoofing limit orders in order to minimize the cost associated
with their spoofing strategy. The spoofer’s strategy will be made exact in this chapter.
The resulting optimal limit order placement will give us a starting point for detecting
manipulation - we will know where to look in the limit order book for spoofing orders.
We start this chapter by defining some initial notation before deriving cost functions
associated with a trader wishing to purchase a number of shares of stock for three cases:
1. Placing a market order for the shares immediately
2. Delaying their market order to see where the best ask moves then placing a market
order
3. Placing a limit order to impact the imbalance which in turn impacts the possible
price movements before placing a market order
The third case will necessitate a model for how the imbalance directly changes the
distribution of the change in best ask price.
59
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We also saw in the previous chapter that our definition of the volume imbalance ratio
was based only on the volume of shares at the best ask and best bid prices. We will
generalize this definition to include all prices on both sides of the book with appropriate
weights assigned to the volumes. We ultimately want to allow the weights at each depth
of the limit order book to be free parameters1 in our model, but we also explore the use
of exponential weights. This is because exponential weights serve as a middle ground
between free weights and the classic definition of all weight assigned to the best bid and
ask. Using either choice of generalized imbalance will allow us to calibrate a model in
which a spoofer can manipulate prices by placing limit orders anywhere in the book instead of only at the touch.
We will develop a price change model which uses the volume imbalance ratio as
the weight in a convex combination of two price change distributions: the price change
distributions conditional on I as I → ±1. We will use this model to calculate the
expected costs of the three decisions listed above to determine what a spoofer would do
given a state of the limit order book. The algorithm we use to calibrate our price change
model will be discussed in chapter 4 and we implement it in chapter 5 to explore spoofing
detection.

3.2

Spoofing Cost Model

3.2.1

Notation and Definitions

We start by assigning notation to the volumes and prices of the limit order book as well
as the movements in the best ask price.
Let ~vt = [v−K , . . . , vK ] ∈ R2K+1
be the volumes in the limit order book at time t with
≥0
v0 = 0. We suppress the index t in the components of ~vt for ease of notation. Then, v1
is the number of shares sitting at the best ask price p+
t at time t and v−1 is the number
−
of shares sitting at the best bid price pt at time t. Prices p±
t are in Canadian dollars
(CAD). K denotes the number of prices we include from each side of the book so that
K−1
the volume vK is located at price p+
t + 100 (for ask prices). Another way of saying this
is that the volume vK is K − 1 ticks from the best ask. v−K is then −K + 1 ticks from
the best bid.


+
xt
=
p
+
Let ϕ(xt ; It ) = P p+
|I
denote the probability of the change in best
t
t
t+∆t
100
ask price moving xt ∈ Z ticks from time t to time t + ∆t conditional on the average
1

We will enforce a constraint where the weight assigned to the best bid and ask is at least as large
as any other weight.

Chapter 3. Spoofing Cost Model and Generalized Imbalance Ratio

61

imbalance over ∆t being It .
This is a one period model from time t to t + ∆t where the spoofer will act at
either time, but not in between. We assume that the corresponding price process pt is
right-continuous on a given filtered probability space (Ω, Ft , P) where Ft is the natural
−
filtration of the stochastic processes ∆p+
t = xt /100, ∆pt , and limit order book volumes
~vt . However, for our work we will not need the process ∆p−
t . We use the notation that,
for example, pt+∆t = pt+1 . The price process is defined as
+
p+
t+1 = pt + xt /100 ,

(3.2.1)

+
+
∆p+
t = (pt+1 − pt ) = xt /100 ,

(3.2.2)

or

where the expected value of p+
t+1 given Ft and It is
E[p+
t+1 |Ft , It ] =

X

(p+
t + i)P [xt = i|Ft , It ]

i

=

p+
t

+

X

(3.2.3)
iϕ(i; It )

i
+

So, for ease of notation, we take pt = p at the start of the period with random
variable pt+1 = p+ + xt /100 denoting the best ask price at the end of the period.
Denote the volume of shares on the ask side of the order book N ticks from the best
ask price as:
+

V (~vt , N ) =

N
X

vi .

(3.2.4)

i=1

Denote the volume of shares on the bid side of the order book N ticks from the best
bid price as:
V − (~vt , N ) =

−1
X

vi .

(3.2.5)

i=−N

Define the generalized inverse of V ± by
U ± (~vt , H) = inf {i : V ± (~vt , i) ≥ H}

(3.2.6)

The financial intuition here is, given a limit order book ~vt , U ± (~vt , H) gives the limit
order book index i necessary to satisfy a market order of at least H shares.
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Case 1: Immediate Market Order At time t we could to decide to place a market
+
order based on ~vt and p+
t which would be made immediately after at time t . This is
represented in Figure 3.1.

Figure 3.1: We see the limit order book at time t and decide to place our market order.
This is sent immediately after at time t+ .

If we place a market order for the H shares immediately there may be fewer than H
shares available at the best ask price. We then need to pay a premium for walking the
book. We saw this example in Figure 1.8. Let CMO (~vt , H, p+ ) denote the cost of placing
the market order immediately. We choose to simplify the problem by ignoring the time
lag between placement and execution of the market order. It is possible that the price
could move against you after placing the order because of other orders in the queue. This
problem is explored in [64].
If there are at least H shares available at v1 then the cost we pay is p+ H. However, if
H > v1 we need to walk the book and remove liquidity at increasing prices until we have
all H shares. We can satisfy our market order by removing liquidity up to and including
)v
index U + (~vt , H). For now we will write U + (~vt , H) = U for clarity. So we pay (p+ + i−1
100 i
at each price tick i ∈ [1, U ) and purchase the remaining shares H − v1 − · · · − vU −1 at
−1
. The associated cost would then be:
price p+ + U100





2
1
+
+
CMO (~vt , H, p ) = p v1 + p +
v2 + p +
v3 · · · +
100
100


U −1
+
p +
(H − v1 − · · · − vU −1 )
100
!



U
−1 
U
−1
X
X
U
−
1
i
−
1
vi + p+ +
H−
vi
=
p+ +
100
100
i=1
i=1
+

+

We can expand the sums in equation 3.2.7 and group terms to get

(3.2.7)
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+

CMO (~vt , H, p ) = p

+

U
−1
X

vi +

i=1

U
−1
X
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U −1

X
i−1
vi + p+ H − p+
vi +
100
i=1

i=1

U −1

U −1
U −1X
H−
vi
100
100 i=1

U −1
U −1
1 X
1 X
U −1

+
=
H−
ivi −
 vi + p H +
100 i=1
100
100
 i=1


U
100

U
−1
X
i=1

= p+ H +
=

vi +

p+ H
|{z}

(3.2.8)


U
−1
X

1 
 vi
100
 i=1



U −1

U −1

U −1
1 X
U X
H+
ivi −
vi
100
100 i=1
100 i=1

Market Order

+ G(~vt , H)
| {z }
Penalty

where


G(~vt , H) =

1  +
(U (~vt , H) − 1)H −
100

U + (~vt ,H)−1

X



(U + (~vt , H) − i)vi 

(3.2.9)

i=1

So we have broken CMO (~vt , H, p+ ) into two pieces: the cost if we could have bought
all H shares at the best ask price p+ plus a penalty paid for each share purchased beyond
the best ask denoted by G(~vt , H). Note that the penalty term does not depend on the
best ask price p+ .
Since we know ~vt , p+ , and It at time t then CMO (~vt , H, p+ ) is known at time t and its
expected value is simply the value of the function. That is,


E CMO (~vt , H, p+ )|Ft , It = CMO (~vt , H, p+ )

(3.2.10)

Case 2: Delayed Market Order Instead of placing our market order immediately
we delay it one time period ∆t, so the market order is placed immediately before the end
of the period at time t− + ∆t. This is represented in Figure 3.2.
To find the cost associated with making this decision at time t requires an assumption
or approximation for the shape of the order book at time t + ∆t. That is, we do not know
what the shape of the book will be at time t + ∆t and we need to know this to calculate
the cost of a market order placed at this time. The simplest modelling assumption would
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Figure 3.2: We see the limit order book at time t and decide to delay our market order
to time t + ∆t. This is sent at time t− + ∆t just before the end of the period.
be that the volumes at each price are the same at both times and translate with the price
movement xt . This is unlikely to be true for the entire order book, but if we only intend
to spoof to buy a small number of shares H we only need to know how much our penalty
G(~vt , H) changes over the trading day for different H. If this effect is small we say we
can approximate the volumes at the first few ticks in the future by the volumes we see
now.
Figure 3.3 shows the impact of purchasing H shares over the entire trading day by
the change in cost of walking the book [G(~vt , H) − G(~vt+1 , H)]/H between 5, 30, and
60 second time intervals. Note that G(~vt , H)/H is a per share cost measure. We see
that the difference in the penalty per share is distributed roughly the same over the day
with the exception of a few larger penalties at the beginning of the day. This is to be
expected before the limit order book fills up. We also see no penalty for small orders of
100 shares which is not surprising since the best ask will always have at least 100 shares.2
The penalty also remains symmetric about 0 indicating you are just as likely to benefit
as be harmed by the assumption that the volume remains the same in the first few ticks.
The penalty is almost entirely bounded between ±0.02$ per share. We will ignore this
for now, but one could set G(~vt , H) → G(~vt , H) ± γH where γ = 0.02 is an uncertainty
factor for our approximation and we could calculate the best and worst case scenarios for
the cost function under our assumption. Or we could just limit our analysis to orders of
100 shares to completely avoid worrying about this assumption, as shown in Figure 3.3
(a).
We see similar results for ARX stock on April 17, 2017 in Figure D.8. Here we see a
tighter bound even for H = 1000 shares, but the main result that the penalty is bounded
and symmetric still holds. The price for ARX stock was also about $ 18 CAD while
AEM was about $ 46 CAD. The penalty per share is roughly that of AEM even though
the stock price is over twice as much. We see similar results across other stocks with the
penalty being bounded by ±$0.02 per share.
We denote the cost of a delayed market order by CDMO (~vt , H, p+ , xt ) where the price
2

100 shares is the minimum order size for the book.
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(b) H = 300
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(c) H = 500

Figure 3.3: Difference in G(~vt , H)/H between different time intervals and H throughout
the trading day. The top, middle, and bottom subplots correspond to time intervals of
5, 30, and 60 seconds, respectively. Data taken from AEM stock on April 17, 2017 for
the entire trading day. Stock price ≈ $46 CAD.
movement xt is in ticks. Since we are assuming the limit order book translates with the
price and the penalty term G(~vt , H) does not depend on p+ the cost is

xt 
H + G(~vt , H)
CDMO (~vt , H, p+ , xt ) = p+ +
100
H
xt
= p+ H + G(~vt , H) +
100
H
= CMO (~vt , H, p+ ) +
xt
|100
{z }

(3.2.11)

Impact of Delay

So when the best ask moves xt ticks we pick up an extra term which can work for or
against us. If xt < 0 we benefit for waiting while we lose if xt > 0. If xt = 0 then case 1
and 2 have the same outcome.
For a time interval ∆t, the expected cost for the strategy at time t of delaying our
market order to time t + ∆t is
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 X
E CDMO (~v , H, p+ , xt )|Ft , It =
CDMO (~vt , H, p+ , i)ϕ(i; It )
i


H
i ϕ(i; It )
=
CMO (~vt , H, p ) +
100
i
H X
= CMO (~vt , H, p+ ) +
i ϕ(i; It )
100 i
X

= CMO (~vt , H, p+ ) +

+

(3.2.12)

H
E [xt |Ft , It ]
100

Case 3: Spoofing With Market Order However, a trader can spoof the order book
by placing limit orders at time t+ on the ask side of the book with a hope of lowering
the best ask price and then, at time t− + ∆t, placing a market order and canceling the
previous limit orders. This is represented in Figure 3.4.

Figure 3.4: We see the limit order book at time t and decide to spoof the book. Our
spoofing orders are sent immediately after at time t+ . We then cancel our remaining
limit orders and place a market order at time t− + ∆t.
2K+1
Denote the volume of the limit orders by ṽt = [ṽ−K , . . . , ṽK ] ∈ R≥0
and the change
in the best ask price as xt in ticks. Our limit orders ṽ impact the volume imbalance ratio
I(~vt + ṽt ). We suppress the dependency of It on ṽt now for clarity. We define ṽt this way
so we can add ~vt + ṽt to get the limit order book plus our spoofing orders, but we are
limiting our orders to the ask side of the book based on the analysis in chapter 2.

The trade-off of this strategy is that our limit orders can be executed and we would
need to buy more shares to cover our limit orders as in Figure 1.11. We will assume
that if the best ask price moves up xt > 0 ticks then all of our spoofing limit orders
ṽ1 , ṽ2 , ṽ3 , . . . , ṽxt are executed and we need to cover the shares we sold. To get a more
conservative estimate for the cost of spoofing we allow our limit orders at ṽxt to be
executed if the best ask price moves up xt ticks, but this may not be the case in reality.
This means that we are assuming any limit order we place at ṽxt +1 and above will not be
executed before we can cancel it. The total number of shares we would need to purchase

Chapter 3. Spoofing Cost Model and Generalized Imbalance Ratio

67

would be H + V + (ṽt , xt ) as our limit orders are all on the ask side.
Let CS (~vt , H, p+ , xt , ṽt ) be the cost of placing limit orders ṽt at time t then canceling
all limit orders at time t + ∆t and placing a market order for H + V + (ṽt , xt ) shares
after the besk ask price has moved xt ticks. The cost of the market order would be
CDMO (~vt , H + V + (ṽt , xt ), p+ , xt ) and then we get paid −(p+ + i)ṽi+1 , i ∈ [0, xt ], for each
limit order that was executed between 0 and xt ticks, inclusive, from the best ask price.
Putting all this together we get
CS (~vt , H, p+ , xt , ṽt ) = CDMO (~vt , H + V + (ṽt , xt ), p+ , xt ) −

xt 
X
i
+
ṽi+1
p +
100
i=0

xt 
= p+ +
H + V + (ṽt , xt ) +
100
G(~vt , H + V + (ṽt , xt )) − p+ V + (ṽt , xt ) −
xt
1 X
i ṽi+1
100 i=0


+
= p+ H + 
p+V
(ṽt , xt ) +

H
xt +
100

1
xt V + (ṽt , xt ) + G(~vt , H + V + (ṽt , xt )) −
100
xt

1 X
+ +

p V (ṽt , xt ) −
i ṽi+1

100 i=0
= p+ H + G(~vt , H + V + (ṽt , xt )) +

(3.2.13)

H
xt +
100

x

t
1 X
(xt − i) ṽi+1
100 i=0

= p+ H + G(~vt , H + V + (ṽt , xt )) +
H
xt +
CLO (ṽt , xt )
,
| {z }
100
Adjusted Buyback Cost

where
x

CLO (ṽt , xt ) =

t
1 X
(xt − i) ṽi+1 .
100 i=0

(3.2.14)

CLO (ṽt , xt ) is an adjustment to the net cost associated with selling spoofing orders
ṽi+1 at price p+ + i/100 then buying them back at price p+ + xt /100. The function
G(~vt , H + V + (ṽt , xt )) then takes into account the cost of walking the book for the H

Chapter 3. Spoofing Cost Model and Generalized Imbalance Ratio

68

shares the spoofer intends to buy, plus the total executed spoofing orders V + (ṽt , xt ).
For a time interval ∆t, the expected cost for the strategy at time t after manipulating
It = I(~vt + ṽt ) is

X


E CS (~vt , H, p+ , xt , ṽt )|Ft , It = p+ H +
G(~vt , H + V + (ṽt , i))ϕ(i; It ) +
i

X
H X
iϕ(i; It ) +
CLO (ṽt , i)ϕ(i; It )
100 i
i


+
= p H + E G(~vt , H + V + (ṽt , xt ))|Ft , It +
H
E [xt |Ft , It ] + E [CLO (ṽt , xt )|Ft , It ]
100

(3.2.15)

Note the cases that if xt ≤ 0 or ṽt = ~0 then CS (~vt , H, p+ , xt , ṽt ) = CDMO (~vt , H, p+ , xt )
as V + (ṽt , xt ) = 0 and CLO (ṽt , xt ) = 0.

3.2.2

When to Spoof ?

For our model, the limit order book ~vt admits a spoofing strategy ṽt if the expected cost
of spoofing is less than the expected cost of a delayed market order or an immediate
market order. That is, using equations 3.2.10 and 3.2.12, we delay our market order if





E CDMO (~vt , H, p+ , xt )|Ft , It < E CMO (~vt , H, p+ )|Ft , It
(
(
H
((
((
CMO
(~v(t ,(
H,
p+ ) +
CMO
(~v(t ,(
H,
p+ )
=⇒ (
E [xt |Ft , It ] < (
((
((
100
=⇒ E [xt |Ft , It ] < 0

(3.2.16)

where the final line is because H > 0. The result here is easy enough to understand
– we delay our market order if we expect the best ask price to drop.
We adopt the following notation to differentiate between expected values taken with
respect to ϕ(xt ; I(~vt )) and ϕ(xt ; I(~vt + ṽt )).
E [ · ] = E [ · |Ft , I(~vt )]
Ẽ [ · ] = E [ · |Ft , I(~vt + ṽt )]

(3.2.17)

We should note that both expectation values are taken at time t, when we must make
the decision on where to place our spoofing orders ṽt . With this notation we can write
down the condition for spoofing over delaying our market order as
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Ẽ CS (~vt , H, p+ , xt , ṽt ) − E CDMO (~vt , H, p+ , xt ) < 0


=⇒ Ẽ G(~vt , H + V + (ṽt , xt )) + Ẽ [CLO (ṽt , xt )] +

H 
Ẽ [xt ] − E [xt ] − G(~vt , H) < 0
100
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(3.2.18)

Equation 3.2.18 is not as simple as 3.2.16 since we choose where we place our limit
orders ṽ. We spoof if it is possible to place our limit orders such that the expected cost of
our executed limit orders and subsequent market orders is less than the penalty we take
for walking the book with a single market order. We also need to consider the difference
in the expected change in the best ask price under both measures. There is a trade off
here with ṽ: the larger the limit orders the more we can influence the imbalance, but the
larger penalty we pay if the price moves against us and those limit orders are executed.
We need to find the optimal ṽt which balances these opposing forces or pushes the payoff
in our favour.
Finally, we can combine equations 3.2.16 and 3.2.18 to get the condition where we
would spoof over immediately placing a market order. This gives us



H
Ẽ [xt ] − G(~vt , H) < 0
Ẽ G(~vt , H + V + (ṽt , xt )) + Ẽ [CLO (ṽt , xt )] +
100

(3.2.19)

Equations 3.2.18 and 3.2.19 are very similar except in equation 3.2.19 we gain the
entire benefit of the expected change in the best ask price instead of the difference under
both measures. This reflects the fact it may be better to spoof over immediately placing a
market order, but spoofing may yield no real advantage over simply delaying your market
order.
With our spoofing model and equations developed we are left now with determining
a model for ϕ(xt ; It ). We look first at how we can impact It through ṽt . In chapter 2 we
used a definition for the volume imbalance ratio that depended only on the volume at
the best ask and best bid. We want to be able to impact the distribution of the change
in the best ask through the imbalance at all price ticks, hence, we need to generalize our
definition of the imbalance ratio to include the entire order book – not just the touch.

3.3

Generalized Imbalance Ratio

We can rewrite equation 2.3.1 for the volume imbalance ratio It with our new notation
as
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It = I(~vt ) =

v−1 − v1
v−1 + v1
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(3.3.1)

The problem is that we can only impact the imbalance with v−1 and v1 , but we want
all orders to influence the imbalance. We saw in Figure 1.11 what can happen if a spoofer
places their limit orders too close to the touch. Without a generalized definition of the
imbalance we can only influence price movements at the touch, so we define the following
as the generalized volume imbalance ratio
PK

I(~vt ; w,
~ K) =
=

Pi=1
K
i=1
PK
Pi=1
K
i=1

wi v−i −
wi v−i +

PK

i=1
PK
i=1

wi (v−i − vi )
wi (v−i + vi )

w i vi
w i vi

(3.3.2)

,

where K ≥ 1 denotes the number of price increments (ticks) we include on both sides
PK
of the book and w
~ = [w1 , . . . , wK ] ∈ RK
≥0 and
i=1 wi = 1. The wi is the weight assigned
to the imbalance v−i − vi at tick i. Dividing the sum of these weighted imbalances
by the total weighted volume gives us a volume imbalance ratio between -1 and 1 as
before. Equation 3.3.2 then represents a family of definitions that depend on the choice
of parameters w and K.
For our work we wish to use free weights for w
~ which we calibrate to our data, but we
also analyze an intermediate choice for the weights that lies between all weight applied
to the touch (classic definition) and fully free weights – exponentially decaying weights.
The added benefit of calibrating with the exponential weights before the free weights is
that it gives us a numerical check for the free weight results – the free weights should
provide calibration results at least as good as the exponential weights. This is because
the free weights would be able to reproduce the results of the exponential weights if it
were the better choice for the imbalance weights. This statement is made more precise
in the next chapter.
The exponentially decaying weights are defined as wi = exp(−(i − 1)α) for some
constant α ∈ [0, ∞). That is, the significance of each volume imbalance diminishes
exponentially as you move deeper into the limit order book with the highest weight
assigned to the best ask and best bid. This is a natural extension to the case where all
weight is applied to the touch, i.e. wi = δ1i and δij is the Kronecker delta function. To
ensure the free weights also assign the highest weight to the touch we add the constraint
w1 ≥ wk ∀k ∈ [1, K] for its calibration. Table 3.1 displays all necessary information
about the three choices for the imbalance weights.
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Only Touch (Classic)
Exponential
Free
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Definition
wi = δ1i
δij = Kronecker Delta
wi = exp(−(i − 1)α)
α ∈ [0, ∞)
wi subject to w1 ≥ wk ∀k ∈ [1, K]

Table 3.1: Three choices for imbalance weights w
~ used to calibrate our model.
Equipped with a general definition we can now write down a model for the distribution
of the change in the best ask price dependent on the volume imbalance ratio I(~v ; w,
~ K).

3.4

Price Change Distribution Model

With a general volume imbalance ratio we can describe the model we use for ϕ(xt ; It ) as
influenced by orders placed at the best bid/ask and beyond. Remember from the previous
section that the imbalance is now parameterized by the weights w and parameter K ≥ 1
such that I = I(~vt ; w,
~ K). We note that w
~ and K are fixed in the model and do not depend
2K−1
on time. Let dp ∈ R≥0 be a vector of positive real numbers dp x , x ∈ [−K + 1, K − 1],
such that
K−1
X

dp = {dp −K+1 , . . . , dp 0 , . . . , dp K−1 } ,

dp x = 1

and

(3.4.1)

x=−K+1

µ=

K−1
X

xdp x .

(3.4.2)

x=−K+1

We can then view dp as a probability distribution on the discrete support x ∈ [−K +
1, K − 1]. The reason we do not take the support x ∈ [−K, K] is because all volumes vk ,
1 ≤ k ≤ K, should be necessary to determine dp K−1 . If the best ask were to move up
2 ticks we would expect the volumes up to 2 ticks from the best ask to be important in
determining the probability of that movement since all these volumes would need to be
depleted for the best ask to move up more than 2 ticks.
From chapter 2 we saw that the distribution of the change in best ask price remains
peaked at zero, but the probability skews left when I → −1, and skews right when I → 1.
Using equation 3.4.1 we define two distributions dp + and dp − with expected values µ−
and µ+ , respectively. We want dp → dp + as I → 1 and dp → dp − as I → −1. That is,
dp + and dp − are the distributions for the change in the best ask price as I approaches
1 and -1, respectively. The simplest way to do this is to take ϕ(x; I) as the convex
−
combination of dp +
x and dp x . Our unnormalized model for the distribution of the change
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in the best ask price ϕ(x; I) is then
−
ϕ̃(x; I) = (I + 1)dp +
x + (1 − I)dp x

(3.4.3)

with normalization constant
X

ϕ̃(x; I) =

X

x

(I + 1)dp +
x +

X
(1 − I)dp −
x
x

x

= (I + 1)

X

dp +
x

+ (1 − I)

X

dp −
x

x

x

(3.4.4)

=I +1+1−I
=2
So our normalized model is
ϕ(x; I) =

I +1 + 1−I −
dp x +
dp x
2
2

(3.4.5)

Due to the skewness and symmetry of the volume imbalance, we assume that
−
dp +
x = dp −x

(3.4.6)

This guarantees that ϕ(x; I) skews in the direction of the volume imbalance, is symmetric about I = 0, and µ+ = −µ− . The last equality is from
µ+ =

X
x

xdp +
x = −

X

xdp −
x = −µ−

(3.4.7)

x

Figure 3.5 gives a preview of dp + , dp − , and ϕ, for AEM stock over 5 second intervals.
We have dp + and dp − skewing right and left, respectively, as we enforced by equation
3.4.6. Also, ϕ given I = 0 is symmetric about 0 as we enforced by the same equation.
This model would also imply that the probability of the price movements change
independent of I. That is,
−
∂ϕ(x; I)
dp +
x − dp x
=
∂I
2

(3.4.8)

If we wanted to incorporate an asymmetry in the distribution as we change I we could
include an extra parameter η ∈ (0, 1) in the unnormalized distribution such that
−
ϕ̃(x; I) = η(I + 1)dp +
x + (1 − I)dp x

(3.4.9)

This biases ϕ(x; I) one way (in this case, against I > 0), so the imbalance does not
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(a) dp + and dp −

(b) ϕ given I = 0

Figure 3.5: Preview of dp + , dp − , and ϕ for AEM stock over 5 second intervals. Data
2
used from April 17, 2017 over the entire trading day. We have µ+ = 0.701, σ+
= 1.42,
θ+ = 2.55, and κ+ = 11.96.
shift the distribution equally in both directions. We found evidence of this bias against
positive I for AEM stock in Figure 2.16 which we could incorporate this way. Subplot (b)
in Figure 2.16 shows the probability of the price increases less with increasing imbalance
than the probability of the price decreases with decreasing imbalance. The placement
of η in equation 3.4.9 breaks the symmetry about I = 0, but also makes it so that the
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expected value of ϕ(x; I) is 0 at a strictly positive imbalance I which is dependent on
the value of η. However, we will assume the distributions are symmetric to simplify the
model.
Next we will calculate the moments of ϕ in terms of the moments of dp + .

3.5

Moments of Distribution Model

In this section we present the moments of our distribution model. These moments will
allow us to check that our distribution is satisfying the conditions we want and to provide
a better statistical understanding of the model. Each moment is defined as
nth Moment = E[(X − E[X])n ]

(3.5.1)

for random variable X and n ∈ N. The first and second moments are the mean and
variance, respectively. The skewness and kurtosis are defined in terms of the third and
fourth moments, respectively. These definitions are
Skew[X] =

E[(X − E[X])3 ]
3

E[(X − E[X])2 ] 2

E[(X − E[X])4 ]
Kurt[X] =
E[(X − E[X])2 ]2

(3.5.2)

(3.5.3)

It should be noted that kurtosis is sometimes defined as the ‘excess kurtosis’ Kurt[X]−
3, but we will use equation 3.5.3 when we refer to the kurtosis. The reason for the use of
excess kurtosis is because the kurtosis of the univariate normal distribution is 3, so the
excess kurtosis is a measure relative to the normal distribution.
Given the volume imbalance I, the change in best ask price x ∼ ϕ, and the conditional
expected value of x is
E [x| I] =

X

xϕ(x; I)

x

I +1X
1−I X
=
xdp +
+
xdp −
x
x
2
2
x
x

(3.5.4)

I +1
1−I
µ+ −
µ−
2
2
= Iµ+

=

In the limit cases where I = ±1 the mean is ±µ+ and smoothly moves between these
two values. We also have that the mean is 0 when I = 0 as expected – we forced our
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distribution to be symmetric with equation 3.4.6.

Figure 3.6: E [x| I] where µ+ is taken from Figure 3.5.

Figure 3.6 presents E [x| I] for dp + in Figure 3.5. As in equation 3.5.4 it varies linearly
with I, is 0 at I = 0, and ±µ+ at I = ±1.
2
We define the variance σ+
of dp + as

!2
2
σ+
=

X

=

X

x2 dp +
x −

X

x

xdp +
x

x

x

2

dp +
x

−

µ2+

x

=⇒

X

x

2

dp +
x

2
= σ+
+ µ2+

x

2
2
Equations 3.4.6 and 3.5.5 imply that σ+
= σ−
. The variance of x given I is

(3.5.5)
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I +1X 2 + 1−I X 2 −
x dp x +
x dp x − I 2 µ2+
2
2
x
x
X
X
I +1
1−I
2 2
=
x2 dp +
x2 dp +
x +
−x − I µ+
2
2
x
x
I +1X 2 + 1−I X 2 +
=
x dp x +
x dp x − I 2 µ2+
2
2
x
x
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Var[x|I] =

(3.5.6)

I +1 2
1−I 2
(σ+ + µ2+ ) +
(σ+ + µ2+ ) − I 2 µ2+
2
2
2
+ µ2+ − I 2 µ2+
= σ+
=

2
= σ+
+ (1 − I 2 )µ2+

We find that the variance of x is largest when I = 0 and decreases as I → ±1. This
is because when the imbalance is 0 we have less information about where prices will be
moving. This is in contrast to when I = ±1 where the distribution will be skewed by the
extreme imbalance in the book like we saw in chapter 2.

2
Figure 3.7: Var[x|I] where µ+ and σ+
are taken from Figure 3.5.

Figure 3.7 presents Var[x|I] for dp + in Figure 3.5. As in equation 3.5.6 it reaches a
2
maximum at I = 0 and a minimum at I = ±1 where the minimum is σ+
.
We now define θ+ and κ+ as the third and fourth moments of dp + , respectively, so
we can write down the Skew[x|I] and Kurt[x|I]. Using the fact that
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(3.5.7)

and

E[(X − E[X])4 ] = E[X 4 ] − 4E[X]E[X 3 ] + 2E[X]2 E[X 2 ] − 3E[X]4

(3.5.8)

we can write out the third and fourth moments of our distributions. From Equation
3.5.7, the third moment of dp + is
θ+ =

X

=

X

x3 dp +
x − 3µ+

X

3
x2 dp+
x + 2µ+

x

x

x

3

dp +
x

2
− 3µ+ (σ+
+ µ2+ ) + 2µ3+

(3.5.9)

x

=⇒

X

2
3
x3 dp +
x = θ+ + 3µ+ σ+ + µ+

x

Equations 3.4.6 and 3.5.9 imply that θ+ = −θ− . Equation 3.5.7 then gives the third
moment of ϕ as

E[(x − Iµ+ )3 |I] = E[x3 |I] − 3Iµ+ E[x2 |I] + 2I 3 µ3+
I +1X 3 + 1−I X 3 −
x dp x +
x dp x −
=
2
2
x
x
2
3Iµ+ (σ+
+ µ2+ ) + 2I 3 µ3+ )
I +1
1−I
2
2
=
(θ+ + 3µ+ σ+
+ µ3+ ) +
(−θ+ − 3µ+ σ+
− µ3+ ) −
2
2
2
3Iµ+ (σ+
+ µ2+ ) + 2I 3 µ3+

(3.5.10)

2
2
= I(θ+ + 3µ+ σ+
+ µ3+ ) − 3Iµ+ (σ+
+ µ2+ ) + 2I 3 µ3+

= θ+ I + 2µ3+ I(1 − I 2 )
= I[θ+ + 2µ3+ (1 − I 2 )]
The skew of ϕ given I is given by
Skew[x|I] =

E[(x − Iµ+ )3 |I]
3

E[(x − Iµ+ )2 |I] 2
θ+ + 2µ3+ (1 − I 2 )
=I
3
2
(σ+
+ (1 − I 2 )µ2+ ) 2

(3.5.11)
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Equation 3.5.11 shows the skewness of ϕ is 0 when I = 0 because we have forced
the distribution to be symmetric at I = 0. At the limits I = ±1 we have Skew[x|I] =
3
, respectively, which is just the skewness of dp + and dp − as we should expect.
±θ+ /σ+

2
Figure 3.8: Skew[x|I] where µ+ , σ+
, and θ+ are taken from Figure 3.5.

Figure 3.8 presents Skew[x|I] for dp + in Figure 3.5. As in equation 3.5.11 the skew
3
at I = ±1.
is 0 at I = 0 and moves to ±θ+ /σ+
From Equation 3.5.8, the fourth moment of dp + is

κ+ =

X

=

X

x4 dp +
x − 4µ+

x

X

2
x3 dp+
x + 6µ+

X

x

x

4

dp +
x

− 4µ+ (θ+ +

4
x2 dp+
x − 3µ+

x
2
3µ+ σ+

+

µ3+ )

+

x
2
6µ2+ (σ+
+ µ2+ ) − 3µ4+
X
4
2 2
=
x4 dp +
x − 4µ+ θ+ − 6µ+ σ+ − µ+

(3.5.12)

x

=⇒

X

4
2 2
x4 dp +
x = κ+ + 4µ+ θ+ + 6µ+ σ+ + µ+

x

Equations 3.4.6 and 3.5.12 imply that κ+ = κ− . Equation 3.5.8 then gives the fourth
moment of ϕ as
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E[(x − Iµ+ )4 |I] = E[x4 |I] − 4µ+ E[x3 |I] + 6µ2+ E[x2 |I] − 3µ4+
I +1X 4 + 1−I X 4 −
x dp x +
x dp x −
=
2
2
x
x
2
+ µ3+ ) +
4I 2 µ+ (θ+ + 3µ+ σ+
2
6I 2 µ2+ (σ+
+ µ2+ ) − 3I 4 µ4+
2
= κ+ + 4µ+ θ+ + 6µ2+ σ+
+ µ4+ −

(3.5.13)

2
4I 2 µ+ (θ+ + 3µ+ σ+
+ µ3+ ) +
2
6I 2 µ2+ (σ+
+ µ2+ ) − 3I 4 µ4+
2
= κ+ + 4µ+ θ+ (1 − I 2 ) + 6µ2+ σ+
(1 − I 2 ) +

µ4+ (1 + 3I 2 )(1 − I 2 )
2
= κ+ + (1 − I 2 )[4µ+ θ+ + 6µ2+ σ+
+ µ4+ (1 + 3I 2 )]

The Kurtosis of ϕ given I is given by
E[(x − Iµ+ )4 |I]
E[(x − Iµ+ )2 |I]2
2
κ+ + (1 − I 2 )[4µ+ θ+ + 6µ2+ σ+
+ µ4+ (1 + 3I 2 )]
=
2
(σ+
+ (1 − I 2 )µ2+ )2

Kurt[x|I] =

(3.5.14)

From equation 3.5.14 we recover the kurtosis of dp + and dp − when I = ±1, respecti4
vely. That is, Kurt[x|I] = κ+ /σ+
when I = ±1 as we expect.
Figure 3.9 presents Kurt[x|I] for dp + in Figure 3.5. As in equation 3.5.14, the kurtosis
4
at I = ±1 with a local minimum at I = 0. Taking the derivative of equation
is κ+ /σ+
3.5.14 with respect to I and setting the result to zero allows us to find the extrema of
the kurtosis as

s
I = 0 and I = ± 1 +

2
4
2
κ+ µ+ − 2µ3+ σ+
− 3µσ+
− 2σ+
θ+
for µ+ 6= 0
5
3 2
2
2µ+ + 6µ+ σ+ + 2µ+ θ+

(3.5.15)

Equation 3.5.15 matches the extrema in Figure 3.9 which are found at I = 0, ±0.545.
With equations 3.5.4, 3.5.6, 3.5.11, and 3.5.14, we know how to calculate the measures
of our distribution model once we know the moments of dp+ – as per the examples
depicted in Figures 3.6, 3.7, 3.8, and 3.9.
Putting everything together we can now write down the optimization problem to give
us a starting point for spoofing detection in the limit order book.
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2
Figure 3.9: Kurt[x|I] where µ+ , σ+
, θ+ , and κ+ are taken from Figure 3.5.

3.6

Optimization Problem

We now have a model which allows us to influence the distribution of the best ask price
ϕ by placing spoofing limit orders ṽt in the book ~vt to alter the volume imbalance ratio
I(~vt + ṽt ; w,
~ K). This in turn has an impact on the cost functional CS (~vt , H, p+ , xt , ṽt )
which we want to minimize. However, we also have conditions given by equations 3.2.16
and 3.2.18 on when to delay our market order and when to spoof, respectively.
Given parameters dp + , w,
~ and K, the optimization problem for determining the
optimal limit order placement is
min
ṽt

X

CS (~vt , H, p+ , xt , ṽt )ϕ(xt ; I(~vt + ṽt ; w,
~ K))

(3.6.1)

xt

We may find a ṽt which minimizes equation 3.6.1, but the expected cost may not
be smaller than simply placing a market order or delaying your market order – spoofing
would not be the optimal strategy. The optimal strategy will depend on the shape of the
limit order book as much as it depends on how the price change distribution is influenced
by the volume imbalance ratio.
In the next chapter we estimate all of our model parameters so that we can solve
equation 3.6.1 over a collection of stocks. The solutions will give us a starting point for
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flagging suspicious behaviour in the limit order book.

3.7

Model Summary

In this chapter we developed the notation and definitions necessary for discussing the
limit order book as well as the costs associated with market orders, delayed market
orders, and spoofing orders in our one period model. We also generalized the definition
of the volume imbalance ratio and used this new definition to allow one to influence the
distribution of the change in the best ask price by adding volume beyond the touch of
the limit order book. We also now have a model for the distribution of the change in
best ask price parameterized by the generalized imbalance ratio.
Our model was a convex combination of two distributions which smoothly transition
to one another through the volume imbalance ratio. We assume that the total distribution
was symmetric about I = 0 while providing a starting point for symmetry breaking
through equation 3.4.9. We also derived the relevant moments of the model and made
checks to show that the results at I = ±1 were consistent with the definitions of dp + and
dp − .
The next step we take in the following chapter is to calibrate our model using data
provided by TMX for various stocks. To summarize, our model parameters so far are
• w:
~ weights in our generalized volume imbalance ratio
• K: depth we take in the limit order book
• dp + : distribution of the change in best ask price when I = 1
Parameters w
~ and K tell us how to calculate I(~v ; w,
~ K) and dp + will give us our price
distribution. With these pieces we can solve the optimization problem, given by equation
3.6.1, for optimal placement of limit orders to manipulate the best ask price. This will
give us a starting point for flagging possible manipulation in the limit order book as now
we can quantify the costs associated with a spoofer’s decisions to manipulate the limit
order book.
In chapter 4 we discuess how we can compare the results across different stocks. From
chapter 2 we saw that different stocks behave differently over different time scales. We
start the next chapter by fixing this time scale, so we can compare the results of our
calibration between stocks. This allows us to explore the relationships between model
parameters and statistics we can draw from activity on the limit order book. We then
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return to the statistical tests in chapter 2 to see improvements in our generalized imbalance definitions over using just the touch – increasing Cramer’s V under new parameters
would suggest an increase in the association between changes in the price and the volume
imbalance definition using those same parameters.

Chapter 4
Model Calibration
4.1

Introduction

In this chapter we set up the calibration for the parameters of our price distribution
model, but we first need to resolve a problem we discussed back in chapter 2 – what
do we do about sampling time? The first thing we will do is outline how to choose the
sampling time as a way of comparing the calibration results stock to stock. However,
the calibration itself can be done over any sampling time one chooses. We just want an
initial set of results which is comparable between stocks so as to investigate relationships
between our parameters and statistics we can derive from the limit order book. For
example, these statistics could be the spread, time between limit/market/cancellation
orders, volume traded, or number of each type of order.
We also define the depth of book we take in our model calibration based on the support
of the empirical price change distribution. We then have a method for determining the
optimal sampling time ∆t and depth K, so we provide an algorithm for calibrating our
model to data from the limit order book. With all of our parameters and limit order
book statistics we can investigate any relationships we find between them which provide
a qualitative way of understanding what each parameter represents for a given limit order
book.
We want to calibrate our model using exponential and free imbalance weights w,
~
but they will require different estimation techniques. The free imbalance weights can
be calibrated using maximum likelihood estimation and we will show that a penalized
version of maximum likelihood, maximum a posterior estimation, is required for the
exponential weights. This is due to the exponential weights being parameterized by an
unbounded, positive, real number.
With an optimal sampling time ∆t and model parameters w, K, and dp + , established
83
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for each stock, we can repeat the statistical tests of chapter 2 across the same collection
of stocks in Tables 2.4 and 2.8. We present results for the statistical tests using both
definitions for calculating the imbalance – equations 3.3.1 and 3.3.2. This will give us
a way of comparing if the optimal weights w give an improvement over just using the
volumes at the touch. The weights will also tell us which stocks have price movements
that have strong association to volume imbalances deep in the limit order book.
We then discuss the goodness of fit between the empirical price change distribution and our calibrated model. We use Kullback–Leibler divergence and probabilityprobability plots to argue, numerically and visually, that we have an excellent fit for our
models. We also return to the discussion of how to appropriately aggregate the instantaneous imbalances into an average imbalance and show that time weighting removes
negative correlations between the change in the best ask price and the volume imbalance
ratio.
Finally, we present the optimization problem presented to the spoofer which we solve,
in detail, in chapter 5.

4.2

Optimal Sampling Time

Stocks are not the same and people do not trade on all stocks at the same frequency.
The trading activity of a stock varies during the day and even day to day. The higher
the trade volume and frequency the more prices can move in a given time interval. The
time needed to observe a particular variation in the distribution of the best ask price is
dependent on this sampling time ∆t as we saw in chapter 2.
In our calibration we need to specify a sampling time to generate the distribution of a
change in the best ask price. Choosing too small a time interval can give us distributions
with very small variance, i.e. little movement in the price. We want to be able to
compare stocks over time intervals where they show similar movement in their prices. It
is a common theme in financial mathematics that variance and time scales are linked.
For example, the increment of Brownian motion dW t = Wt − Ws with s < t, which many
financial models are built from, is drawn from the normal distribution N (0, t − s) for
time interval ∆t = t − s. The larger the time interval, the larger the variance of the
random variable. We can use this idea to fix a time scale by fixing the variance of the
distribution of the change in the best ask price.
To do this we can pick a benchmark variance σb2 and then find the sampling time
2
∆t > 0 which gives an empirical variance σ∆t
as close to the benchmark as possible. For
2
each stock we need to find ∆t and σ∆t such that
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(4.2.1)

∆t>0

It just remains to determine what to choose for our σb2 . When we refer to the optimal
sampling time we mean optimal with respect to σb2 according to equation 4.2.1. Alternative methods for determining the time scale could be based on the number of seconds to
see a set number of trades, number of orders, specific amount of volume entering/exiting
the book, etc. For example, Bechler & Ludkovski fix their time scale by the number
of seconds to see 20,000 shares traded in the book [51]. We do not take this approach
because our goal is to model the distribution in the change in the best ask and fixing the
variance guarantees a certain amount of price movement which may be more difficult via
an indirect way like trade volume – it will be more difficult to control the price change
distribution.
Fixing the variance also gives us the advantage that the shape of the distribution
will be heavily determined by the probability that the best ask does not change. Since
the distributions are all peaked at 0, if we fix the variance and the P[x = 0] ≈ 1 then
the probability mass in the tails of the distribution spreads out deep in the support to
achieve the fixed variance. By the same argument, as P[x = 0] decreases the support
will decrease with it. The financial intuition for this is that stocks with a best ask that
changes very little must increase/decrease multiple ticks when it does move in order to
see the same fixed variance as a stock with a best ask which is constantly moving.
Initially, only data for AEM stock on April 17, 2017 was available to us – full access to
TMX’s data came later. From initial analysis of this data we determined that 5 seconds
showed an adequately large support for us to test our model. This is why in chapter 2
our statistical analysis was done over 5 second intervals. The distribution of the change
in the best ask price for AEM on this day had a variance of ≈ 2 ticks and the optimal ∆t
to see a variance of 2 in the change in the best ask price was 5 seconds as well. This will
serve as our benchmark variance for determining the optimal sampling time ∆t. This
result is shown in Figure 4.1.
It is worth repeating that ∆t is just the sampling time we are calibrating our model
over. We can choose any interval we want, but for the purposes of comparing calibration
results we want to pick a sampling time large enough to see a reasonable amount of price
movement.
We can also investigate the intraday optimal sampling time for each stock by finding
for the first hour, the middle 4.5 hours, then the final hour of trading. That is, 9:30
- 10:30, 10:30 - 15:00, and 15:00 - 16:00. We refer to these as the start, mid, and end
2
σ∆t
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Figure 4.1: Output of equation 4.2.1 for AEM stock on April 17, 2017 with σb2 = 2. We
find the optimal number of seconds is ∆t = 5. Data used is from the entire trading day.
periods, respectively.

4.2.1

Optimal Sampling Time Analysis

We select four stocks from the top 100 most active stocks on the TSX during the year
2017 to discuss the optimal time interval. We take AEM, BMO, PPL, and CPG as these
stocks exhibit very different time scales for their price changes – which we will see in this
section. The objective is to minimize the absolute value of the difference of 2 and the
variance of the distribution calculated over increasing interval lengths. Figures 4.2-4.5
show the results for determining the optimal time interval needed to see a variance of 2
in the distribution of the change in the best ask price.
We see that the optimal sampling time for the first hour of the day is always smaller
in our 4 cases than the sampling time over the whole day. This would imply that, at the
beginning of the day, price movements happen more frequently and at a larger intensity
than they do during the rest of the day. We expect this since the beginning of the trading
day is usually the most active time for any stock.
We also see that the general order from smallest to largest interval is the first hour,
whole day, mid day, and the last hour can fall above or below the mid day. This is
shown, for example, in Figures 4.2 and 4.6 where the last hour falls below the mid day
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Figure 4.2: Optimal sampling time for AEM stock on June 9, 2017 to see a variance of
2 in the distribution of the change in best ask price. ∆t = 5, 2, 8, and 7 seconds, for the
whole day, first hour, mid day, and last hour, respectively.

Figure 4.3: Optimal sampling time for BMO stock on June 9, 2017 to see a variance of
2 in the distribution of the change in best ask price. ∆t = 10, 4, 13, and 7 seconds, for
the whole day, first hour, mid day, and last hour, respectively.
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Figure 4.4: Optimal sampling time for PPL stock on June 9, 2017 to see a variance of 2
in the distribution of the change in best ask price. ∆t = 38, 16, 51, and 29 seconds, for
the whole day, first hour, mid day, and last hour, respectively.

Figure 4.5: Optimal sampling time for CPG stock on June 9, 2017 to see a variance of 2
in the distribution of the change in best ask price. ∆t = 51, 28, 59, and 68 seconds, for
the whole day, first hour, mid day, and last hour, respectively.
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and then above the mid day, respectively. However, we do not see the last hour being as
active as the first hour of the day. We saw this back in chapter 2 in Figure 2.5 where the
distribution over the whole day and the final hour appeared very similar.

Figure 4.6: Optimal sampling time for AEM stock on June 8, 2017 to see a variance of
2 in the distribution of the change in best ask price. ∆t = 4, 2, 5, and 6 seconds, for the
whole day, first hour, mid day, and last hour, respectively.
Now we can investigate if any clusters or patterns emerge within an individual stock
or between stocks for the optimal sampling time and any descriptive quantities we can
derive from the stock – say the average spread or volume traded, for example. We take
the stocks BMO, CNR, HFU, HSU, PAAS, and PPL and calculate the optimal sampling
time ∆t for each day between May 29, 2017 and August 04, 2017.
In Figure 4.7 we show the relationship between ∆t and the average daily spread for
the start, mid, and end periods of a day. The spread is largest during the start period of
the day and narrows as the day goes on. The optimal time sampling decreases with the
increasing spread with the optimal time sampling being smallest during the start period.
We see no difference in the optimal sampling time between the mid and end periods, but
the spread is generally wider in the mid period. However, we see 6 points as outliers –
the two blue dots near a spread of 17 ticks, two red dots between a spread of 4 and 5
ticks, and two green dots between a spread of 5 and 6 ticks. These 6 points are the three
periods from May 29, 2017 and July 4, 2017. These two days correspond to the holidays
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in the United States for Memorial Day and Independence Day. Also, these two days see
significantly fewer orders (< 50% as many) and generally larger spreads in all periods.

Figure 4.7: Optimal sampling time ∆t (seconds) against the average spread (ticks) for
CNR stock during start, mid, and end, periods. Each point corresponds to a trading day
between May 29, 2017 and August 4, 2017.
Figure 4.8 depicts the relationship between the ∆t and the average interarrival time
of all orders for each day. We see the optimal sampling time increasing with increasing
average interarrival time. The longer the time between orders, the longer it takes to
see our variance of 2 in the distribution of the change in best ask price. The average
interarrival time is smallest during the start period and then increases into the mid and
end periods. We also have 6 more outlier points corresponding to May 29, 2017 and July
4, 2017. In addition, July 3, 2017 was when the TSX was closed for Canada Day. There
are fewer orders placed during these days so the time between orders increases accordingly.
Interestingly, even in our age of algorithmic trading, we still see a noticeable decrease in
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trading activity on days where the American markets are closed. The American traders
could still place orders in Canada via computer algorithms without needing to actually
place the orders themselves. We see that the same outliers in all stocks we have looked
at on those two days which would suggest either American traders do not operate at near
the same level on their days off or they do not trust letting a computer place their trades
unsupervised.
We also see evidence of why we found little difference between the mid and end periods
for CNR in Figures 2.2c and 2.5c. The two periods cluster together with similar ranges
in ∆t, albeit with the end period having a tighter spread.

Figure 4.8: Optimal sampling time ∆t (seconds) against the average interarrival time
(seconds) of all orders for CNR stock during start, mid, and end, periods. All trading
days between May 29, 2017 and August 4, 2017.
We also see outlier points for some stocks on days that are not holidays. For example,
PPL has data points outside their usual clusters on July 24-26, 2017. This, possibly,
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corresponds to the record dividend date for PPL on July 25. The holder of the share on
that date receives the dividend payment issued on August 15. July 24 sees significantly
slower activity on PPL as holders of the stock are less likely to sell their shares before
they become the holder on record for the dividend payment. Then on July 25 and 26 the
activity picks up as orders are placed to sell shares once the dividend payment has been
locked in.
Similarly, BMO has several unusual points. All of these events were unlikely to have
caused this change in trading behaviour on these days, but we were unable to find any
other news and there was no dividend record date nearby. June 5, BMO announces it is
bringing Android Pay to its Canadian customers with a ≈ 30% drop in order numbers
causing an increase in the average interarrival time, but with a normal average spread.
June 14, BMO announces increasing US$ prime lending rate from 4.00% to 4.25% which
accompanies a significant uptick in activity at the end of the trading day. BMO also
has a share repurchase program complete on July 24 and appointed a new Leader for
Financial Advisors on July 25. The dates July 24-27 then saw unusual spreads and
average interarrival times.
However, there are outliers that we were unable to give possible links to news about
the associated stock. For example, PAAS has an unusually low average interarrival time
on June 14, 2017, but this date has nothing to do with dividends or exact press releases.
So, like the BMO points that are unlikely to have been impacted by the news we did
find, there are many points with no clear explanation for what caused them. This may
indicate something out of the ordinary happening on these dates. It is not clear that this
is caused by manipulation, but the exchange could use this information to scrutinize the
trading behaviour of stocks on these days to look for possible irregularities.
Some stocks also had noticeably different behaviour on August 4, 2017. This was the
Friday before the Ontario civic holiday long weekend where the TSX would be closed on
the Monday. Some of our 6 stocks had an uptick in the number of orders during the day
causing a decrease in the average interarrival time, but ∆t remained large. This was not
the case across all of the 6 stocks though – CNR did not have this issue as we saw in
Figures 4.7 and 4.8.
Figures 4.9, 4.10, and 4.11, show the relationship between ∆t and the average spread
for our 6 stocks on all days except for the days we removed due to their unusual behaviour in at least one of our stocks. The figures are for the start, mid, and end periods,
respectively. We see some clear clustering for individual stocks with the general trend
being that smaller spreads lead to longer sampling times. This would make sense as
smaller spreads mean prices have little room to move when they do. Interestingly, HFU
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Figure 4.9: Optimal sampling time ∆t (seconds) against the average spread (ticks) during
the start period of the trading day. Each point corresponds to a trading day between
May 29 - August 4, 2017 – excluding May 29, July 4-6, July 24-25, August 4.

Figure 4.10: Optimal sampling time ∆t (seconds) against the average spread (ticks)
during the mid period of the trading day. Each point corresponds to a trading day
between May 29 - August 4, 2017 – excluding May 29, July 4-6, July 24-25, August 4.
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Figure 4.11: Optimal sampling time ∆t (seconds) against the average spread (ticks)
during the end period of the trading day. Each point corresponds to a trading day
between May 29 - August 4, 2017 – excluding May 29, July 4-6, July 24-25, August 4.

and HSU show very different results compared to BMO, PAAS, PPL, and CNR. HSU
has a spread of ≈ 2 regardless of time period or day in the 10 week sample, but has
no clear relationship with ∆t. Similarly, HFU appears to have no relationship between
the average spread and ∆t, but the average spread decreases over the day like the other
stocks. HFU appears to share characteristics of both HSU and our other stocks, whereas
HSU is obviously different than the rest.
Figures 4.12, 4.13, and 4.14, show the relationship between ∆t and the average interarrival time of all orders for our 6 stocks on all days except for the ones we remove
which had unusual behaviour in at least one of our stocks. The figures are for the start,
mid, and end periods, respectively. Like the average spread we have clear clustering with
the average interarrival time. The general trend is that longer average interarrival times
leads to longer sampling times and this relationship becomes stronger as the trading day
goes on. During the first period the average interarrival times of all stocks are roughly
between 0.2 and 0.5 seconds, regardless of the sampling time. The average interarrival
time then increases in the mid and end periods for each stock with the individual stocks
still clustering together, but the stock clusters separate from each other.
This surface level look at the optimal sampling time ∆t leads to some interesting
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Figure 4.12: Optimal sampling time ∆t (seconds) against the average interarrival time
(seconds) of all orders during the start period of the trading day. All trading days between
May 29 - August 4, 2017 – excluding May 29, July 4-6, July 24-25, August 4.

Figure 4.13: Optimal sampling time ∆t (seconds) against the average interarrival time
(seconds) of all orders during the mid period of the trading day. All trading days between
May 29 - August 4, 2017 – excluding May 29, July 4-6, July 24-25, August 4.
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Figure 4.14: Optimal sampling time ∆t (seconds) against the average interarrival time
(seconds) of all orders during the end period of the trading day. All trading days between
May 29 - August 4, 2017 – excluding May 29, July 4-6, July 24-25, August 4.
clustering with the average spread and average interarrival time of orders within and between individual stocks. We can also identify clear outliers in the data which correspond
to dividend dates or holidays, but there are also days with unusual results to which we
are unable to assign a cause. This could possibly be used to identify days on which the
exchange could scrutinize trading behaviour, but we have not seen evidence yet that this
is caused by price manipulation. Further investigation would be needed to determine
exactly what is causing these days to be so different from any other both within and
between stocks.

4.3

Depth of Book

In chapter 3 we defined the parameter K as the depth we take from both sides of the
limit order book. So, our limit order book vk has support in [−K, K] with v0 = 0 and v1
(v−1 ) is the volume at the best ask (bid) price. We also made the argument that the price
change distribution would then have support in [−K + 1, K − 1] since the probability of
the best ask price moving up one tick will depend on the volumes at the first two ticks.
This is because the best ask will move up exactly one tick if only the volume at the first
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tick is completely depleted.
From this we can set the depth of the book K after determining the number of ticks in
the support of the empirical price change distribution over ∆t seconds. Let X denote the
empirical price change distribution with Q1 (X) and Q2 (X) as the 0.001% and 99.999%
quantiles of X, respectively, defined such that
P [X ≤ Q1 (X)] = 0.001%
P [X ≤ Q2 (X)] = 99.999%

(4.3.1)

Q1 (X) and Q2 (X) may not be whole integers so we need to round them to the nearest
integer. Then
K = max(−Q1 (X), Q2 (X)) + 1

(4.3.2)

However, due to the limitations of our AWS cluster, we generated limit order books
including only the first 15 prices on either side of the order book. So, if K > 15 we take
K = 15 for calculation purposes. Of the 50 stocks we investigated, only 2 of them had
depths larger than 15 after fixing ∆t by equation 4.2.1 – FSV and TC.
Using equation 4.3.2 we calculate the depth K for stocks TC and AEM from their
empirical price change distributions shown in Figure 4.15. Since we have fixed the variance over time interval ∆t to be as close to 2 as possible given the data we have that the
larger the support of the empirical distribution, the larger the probability that the best
ask price does not change over ∆t. An example of this is shown in Figure 4.15 where
TC has a higher probability of no price movement compared to AEM, which is accompanied by twice the depth. In order for a stock which has a high probability of no price
movement to see a variance of 2, the price movements to be large when they actually
happen. Like TC, when the price moves it is usually ±1 or ±2, but movements of ±3 to
±8 ticks occur with almost equal probability to each other. These long tails deep in the
support of the price change distribution happen for any of these low movement stocks.
In Figure 4.16 we show the relationship between the depth K and the probability of
no change in the best ask price using our collection of stocks from the previous section.
As we expect – as the probability of no movement increases to 100%, the depth increases
with it since the variance is fixed. The depth then gives us an idea of the frequency in
which the stock price moves over its optimal time interval ∆t. That is – large depth
means higher probability of no movement in the best ask over ∆t seconds.
The only clear relationship found between the depth K and other statistics drawn
from our data is with the optimal time interval ∆t. In Figure 4.17 we see that, in general,
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(a) TC, K = 20, ∆t = 1

(b) AEM, K = 10, ∆t = 5

Figure 4.15: Empirical price change distributions for TC and AEM stocks. Data taken
from the week June 1-8, 2017 over the full trading day. From equation 4.3.2 the depth
K is 20 and 10 for subplots (a) and (b), respectively.
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Figure 4.16: Depth K against the probability of no change in the best ask price for
BMO, PAAS, PPL, HFU, HSU, and CNR. Data from all three time periods. Each point
corresponds to a trading day between May 29 - August 4, 2017 – excluding May 29, July
4-6, July 24-25, August 4.

Figure 4.17: Depth K against the optimal time interval ∆t for BMO, PAAS, PPL, HFU,
HSU, and CNR. Data from all three time periods. Each point corresponds to a trading
day between May 29 - August 4, 2017 – excluding May 29, July 4-6, July 24-25, August
4.
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price changes which have a variance of 2 over short time scales (less than 5 seconds)
also have larger depth – their prices move less frequently, but they move multiple ticks
when they do. This is because prices can only move after a new order comes into the
book. Order-by-order, the best ask will change with these new incoming orders which is
aggregated over ∆t seconds. The bigger ∆t, the more orders can be included in the time
interval to impact the price movements as seen in Figure 4.18.

Figure 4.18: Average number of orders during ∆t seconds against the optimal time
interval ∆t for BMO, PAAS, PPL, HFU, HSU, and CNR. Data from the start period.
Each point corresponds to a trading day between May 29 - August 4, 2017 – excluding
May 29, July 4-6, July 24-25, August 4.
For a small ∆t the orders which come into the book would have to have a large impact
on the price when they do eventually cause it to move. We see this in Figures 4.19 and
4.18 where a very small ∆t comes with a very small number of average orders and a high
probability of no change in the best ask price. A high probability of no change in the best
ask price means that the price change distribution must have a large support in order to
get a variance of 2. In turn, this gives a large depth in the price change distribution.
Likewise, stocks with longer time scales require time for their small price changes to
accumulate enough to give a variance of 2 in the distribution of the change in best ask
price. These stocks see small price changes order-by-order which add together over ∆t to
give enough movement to see a variance of 2 in the price change distribution. The longer
the time scale, the more orders during ∆t and the smaller the probability of no change
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Figure 4.19: Average number of orders during ∆t seconds against the probability of no
change in the best ask price for BMO, PAAS, PPL, HFU, HSU, and CNR. Data from
the start period. Each point corresponds to a trading day between May 29 - August 4,
2017 – excluding May 29, July 4-6, July 24-25, August 4.
in the best ask price. In turn, this gives a smaller depth in the price change distribution.

4.3.1

Spread and Price Movement

We also found interesting clustering with the average spread and the probability of no
movement in the best ask price. Figure 4.20 shows these clusters for the start period of
our six sample stocks. Like the clusters we saw earlier between the spread and ∆t, the
stocks HFU and HSU are clearly different from the rest. The probability of no movement
in the best ask price as no real impact on the spread of HFU or HSU – this is exactly
what we saw where the spread for these two stocks is roughly consistent regardless of the
other statistics.
However, excluding HFU, we do see the average spread increasing when the best ask
price move less and less. This is consistent with what we have seen so far because we have
fixed the variance so if a stock has a small probability of price movement, the movement
will be large when it happens. Large spreads would facilitate an environment for a stock’s
best ask price to move multiple ticks at a time when an order does finally cause it to
move.
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Figure 4.20: Average spread against the probability of no change in the best ask price
for BMO, PAAS, PPL, HFU, HSU, and CNR. Data from the start period. Each point
corresponds to a trading day between May 29 - August 4, 2017 – excluding May 29, July
4-6, July 24-25, August 4.
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4.4

Price and Imbalance Model Calibration

In this section we present two methods for calibrating our price change distribution model
to the data – dp + and w.
~ The two methods are maximum likelihood estimation (MLE),
and maximum a posteriori estimation (MAP). Details of how these methods are used to
fit our model to the data are presented in Appendix B. One can view the MAP estimate
as a penalized version of the MLE.
To calibrate our model for dp + and w
~ we take 20,000 ∆t second intervals for dates
between June 1-8, 2017. The optimal time interval ∆t is calculated from equation 4.2.1.
We do the same calibration for the first hour of trading. Sometimes a ∆t second interval
has only one or no orders in it and we drop such intervals. This happens at most ≈ 400 out
of our 20,000 samples. From this data set we can calculate K using equation 4.3.2. The
ith ∆t second interval then has an associated change in best ask and average imbalance
pair denoted by (xi , I(~v i ; w,
~ K)) for given weights w
~ and depth K.
For each stock we then have optimal time interval ∆t, depth K, and data pairs
(xi , I(~v i ; w,
~ K)) which we can use to calibrate our model to find dp + and w.
~

4.4.1

Calibration without Penalty

We first look at maximum likelihood estimation to calibrate our model for exponential
and free imbalance weights. Let N denote the number of ∆t second intervals and data
from the ith interval is denoted by (xi , I(~v i ; w,
~ K)). We calibrate first using exponential
weights as they serve as an intermediate choice between using only the touch and using
free weights. Once the model is calibrated using exponential weights we can use the value
of the likelihood function to check the results of the free weights – the free weights should
produce a likelihood value at least as good as the exponential weights.
We now write down the calibration problem for exponential and free weights using
maximum likelihood estimation. For the exponential weights we have that the individual
weights w
~ are given by
wi = e−(i−1)α

(4.4.1)

with α ∈ [0, ∞). The largest weight is assigned to the best bid and best ask volumes.
The weights w(α)
~
are now entirely parameterized by α. However, we can transform α →
ᾱ ∈ [0, 1) to make our calibration more tractable. We make the following transformation
ᾱ = 1 −

1
,
1+α

α=

1
−1
1 − ᾱ

(4.4.2)
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Using maximum likelihood, our calibration problem becomes:
" N
#


X
1
1
−
− 1 , K))
arg min
log ϕ(xi ; I(~v i ; w
~
+
N
1 − ᾱ
dp , ᾱ
i=1

(4.4.3)

with constraints
−
dp +
x = dp −x

K−1
X

dp +
x = 1

(4.4.4)

(4.4.5)

x=−K+1

0 ≤ ᾱ ≤ 1

(4.4.6)

as maximizing the likelihood is equivalent to minimizing the negative log likelihood.
The factor of 1/N outside the negative log likelihood provides numerical stability while
not affecting the optimization since it is a positive constant.
The calibration problem using maximum likelihood estimation with free weights is
then given by
" N
#
X
1
arg min
−
log ϕ(xi ; I(~v i ; w,
~ K))
+
N
dp , w
i=1

(4.4.7)

−
dp +
x = dp −x

(4.4.8)

with constraints

K−1
X

dp +
x = 1

(4.4.9)

x=−K+1
K
X

wk = 1

(4.4.10)

k=1

w1 ≥ wk

∀k ∈ [1, K]

(4.4.11)

The extra constraint in equation 4.4.11 is to ensure that the weight assigned to the
best ask/bid is at least as large as any other weight. We want the volume at the best
bid/ask to be the most important volume in determining the average imbalance. This way
we can also compare our free weight results to the results where we used exponentially

Chapter 4. Model Calibration

105

weighting as the exponential weights assign the largest weight to the touch as well. The
financial intuition here is that the volumes at the best bid and ask will dictate whether
the best ask moves at all, while the volumes at depths beyond the best bid and ask would
determine how deep the price moves when it does.
We also found that removing the constraint made the optimization problem unstable
and often did not converge to a solution. This may be caused by having too much
freedom in the imbalance weights. Adding the constraint solved this issue while also
keeping the free weights conceptually similar to the classic and exponential imbalance
weight definitions.
Ultimately, we want to use the free weights when exploring spoofing detection, but
calibrating with the exponential weights first allows us to numerically check the results
of our higher dimensional free weight calibration for consistency.

4.4.2

Calibration with Penalty

Alternatively, we can take a Bayesian approach and include a penalty function by assuming a prior distribution P (ᾱ) on ᾱ. This is known as maximum a posteriori probability
(MAP) estimation and is given by a slight modification to the maximum likelihood estimation. For the exponential weights, an α of 0 would imply that all depths carry equal
weight in determining the effect of volume imbalance on price changes - which the literature suggests is not the case [51]. It would also mean a spoofer could place a spoofing
limit order so deep in the book it would not be executed while having a large impact
on the imbalance. Essentially manipulating the book with no downside. There is also
no real difference between an α of 5 or 100 as the exponential weight would decay any
contribution beyond the best ask/bid.
That is, we want to penalize α near 0 and as it approaches +∞. After rescaling α as
we did in the calibration without penalty we can use a beta distribution Beta(ᾱ; a, b) for
P (ᾱ) to penalize our bounds at 0 and 1.
Figure 4.21 shows an example penalty function using the beta distribution. We penalize the ᾱ = 1 boundary more harshly because of how we rescaled α as our original α
will grow to infinity rapidly for ᾱ > 0.8.
The calibration problem with penalty then becomes

" N
#


X
1
1
−
log ϕ(xi ; I(~v i ; w
~
− 1 , K)) − log P (ᾱ)
arg min
+
N
1
−
ᾱ
dp , ᾱ
i=1

(4.4.12)
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(a) Prior PDF

(b) Prior Penalty

Figure 4.21: Subplot (a) is the beta distribution Beta(ᾱ; a, b) and subplot (b) is negative
log of Beta(ᾱ; a, b). We take a ≈ 2.55, b ≈ 3.42 to be the smallest pair where 95% of the
probability of P (ᾱ) lies in the interval [0.1,0.8] (≈ [0.11,4.00] in the unscaled α).
with constraints
−
dp +
x = dp −x

K−1
X

dp +
x = 1

(4.4.13)

(4.4.14)

x=−K+1

0 ≤ ᾱ ≤ 1

(4.4.15)

where P (ᾱ) = Beta(ᾱ; a, b) for suitable constants a and b. As in Figure 4.21, we will
take (a, b) ≈ (2.55, 3.42) as this is the smallest pair of numbers for which 95% of the
probability in Beta(ᾱ; a, b) lies in the interval [0.1,0.8]. This way our penalty is almost
entirely applied near our boundaries and should have little impact on ᾱ ∈ [0.1, 0.8].
Figure 4.22 shows the impact of the MAP estimate over MLE for AEM stock on April
17, 2017 for the entire trading day. There is little difference between the optimal ᾱ for
either method as the minimum value falls in the interval with the smallest penalty, but
we have a significant enough penalty to the boundaries of ᾱ.
It should be mentioned that the MAP estimate, unlike the MLE, is not parameterization invariant. This is because the maximum likelihood is a function over the parameter
space, while the maximum a posteriori is a probability density over the parameter space.
The MAP estimate is the maximum mode of the posterior density which can change
with reparameterization as regions of the parameter space can be stretched/contracted
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(a) MLE

(b) MAP Estimate

Figure 4.22: MLE and MAP estimate for AEM stock on April 17, 2017 for the entire
trading day.
under a non-linear map, but the probability in those regions must be conserved. However, in our calibrations the reparameterization from ᾱ → α had minimal impact on
location of the optimal α outside of the heavily penalized regions of the parameter space.
We also run all calibrations using ᾱ so we can compare results and any impact on the
reparameterization is negligible for our current purposes.

4.5

Statistical Tests for Exponential Weights

Now we can return to the statistical tests we did in chapter 2, but this time we calculate
the average imbalance using the weights found from our model calibration. Again, we
calculate the p-values and Cramer’s V of the test statistic to report the level of association
between the average imbalance and changes in the best ask price.
The results for the coarse imbalance and fine price movement test are presented in
Table 4.1 where we have included the Cramer’s V, CVTouch and CVα , obtained by calculating
the average imbalance using only the volumes at the touch, and from the optimal weights,
respectively. The results in the table are presented for the whole trading day and for the
first hour of the trading day. We also include the optimal ∆t for each stock.
Table 4.2 presents the results from the fine imbalance and coarse price movement test
with the same formatting as Table 4.1.
We aggregate the results in Table 4.1 of the Cramer’s V in Figure 4.23. We have
plotted CVTouch against CVα and compare the results against a relationship where the two
values are the same – given by the dashed blue line. We see that there is an overall
improvement in the association between the average imbalance and changes in the best
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ticker

∆t

α

CVTouch

CVα

CNR
GIL
XWD
XQQ
HXU
PPL
IMO
G
GIB.A
FSV
BMO
ARX
NA
T
WCN
UFS
BIP.UN
HOD
PAAS
FR
BAM.A
IPL
FM
HQU
AEM
RBA
ERF
PWF
CPG
FTS
K
ZEB
SLF
IMG
KL
CCO
OR
HVI
TC
GOOS
POW
HSU
SW
VUN
VFV
SSO
HFU
XEG
VGG
PVG

6
41
237
126
38
22
21
62
11
1
10
42
19
67
4
8
15
36
21
74
27
53
78
28
5
18
68
46
55
42
326
180
18
281
78
122
37
88
1
2
67
58
5
179
112
61
34
246
190
45

2.16
4.05
5.48
7.28
4.95
4.31
6.78
0.0202
1.66
0.447
3.39
4.31
4.05
4.61
0.559
0.419
2.69
0.00598
1.13
0.01
0.608
8.02
8.18
0.525
0.593
1.2
0.01
0.00598
7.42
5.31
4.94
0.01
3.95
5.74
6.77
0.01
0.01
0.012
0.512
1.14
7.01
0.01
4.26
0.399
0.00799
0.00398
0.01
0.00598
0.0202
0.00398

0.163
0.151
0.141
0.123
0.122
0.113
0.112
0.112
0.109
0.108
0.105
0.105
0.105
0.104
0.103
0.103
0.102
0.102
0.101
0.101
0.101
0.0932
0.088
0.0879
0.0875
0.0867
0.0864
0.0819
0.0807
0.08
0.0788
0.0751
0.0723
0.0665
0.0629
0.062
0.0602
0.0592
0.0556
0.0555
0.0539
0.0514
0.0505
0.0453
0.0438
0.0304
0.0278
0.0245
0.0238
0

0.171
0.166
0.158
0.158
0.136
0.113
0.122
0.235
0.133
0.0757
0.108
0.12
0.106
0.125
0.108
0.151
0.115
0.246
0.139
0.167
0.131
0.109
0.106
0.182
0.137
0.12
0.201
0.158
0.0787
0.102
0.0928
0.207
0.0764
0.0792
0.0713
0.138
0.147
0.0753
0.0804
0.0593
0.0658
0.245
0.0588
0.238
0.109
0.105
0.123
0.308
0.181
0.114

ticker

∆t

α

CVTouch

CVα

CNR
GIL
XWD
XQQ
HXU
PPL
IMO
G
GIB.A
FSV
BMO
ARX
NA
T
WCN
UFS
BIP.UN
HOD
PAAS
FR
BAM.A
IPL
FM
HQU
AEM
RBA
ERF
PWF
CPG
FTS
K
ZEB
SLF
IMG
KL
CCO
OR
HVI
TC
GOOS
POW
HSU
SW
VUN
VFV
SSO
HFU
XEG
VGG
PVG

1
10
109
18
11
9
7
20
3
1
3
15
6
13
1
2
5
29
8
24
7
18
19
1
2
5
25
18
21
13
99
42
5
57
21
27
14
28
1
1
20
19
1
74
45
15
8
75
76
15

1.46
1.66
6.32
6.11
6.21
3.04
2.74
0.01
1.08
0.247
1.59
5.73
4.61
2.22
0.263
0.656
0.791
0.00799
1.82
0.0202
1.13
6.89
6.48
2.3
0.549
0.934
5.51
5.92
7.42
2.26
5.73
0.0161
3.59
0.981
6.77
6.22
0.00598
0.00799
0.878
3.59
6.11
0.01
0.823
0.226
0.00799
3.01
0.01
0.00598
0.354
0.0202

0.0963
0.123
0.121
0.175
0.243
0.106
0.0653
0.0843
0.0873
0.119
0.086
0.102
0.07
0.0969
0.0604
0.097
0.0727
0.0556
0.107
0.0417
0.091
0.0624
0.0283
0.132
0.112
0.0875
0.114
0.0699
0.0871
0.0872
0.168
0.139
0.0942
0.0261
0.131
0.102
0.0722
0.0354
0.0388
0.051
0.0948
0.0414
0.0558
0.0292
0.1
0.0558
0.0152
0.0547
0.0874
0

0.108
0.155
0.149
0.196
0.261
0.0995
0.0692
0.245
0.108
0.0818
0.0872
0.106
0.0673
0.125
0.0906
0.117
0.1
0.32
0.143
0.0862
0.125
0.075
0.0328
0.135
0.146
0.131
0.12
0.0789
0.0862
0.0894
0.185
0.211
0.0991
0.0786
0.137
0.108
0.0948
0.104
0.0483
0.0685
0.109
0.253
0.0926
0.332
0.125
0.083
0.179
0.351
0.182
0.0254

Table 4.1: Summary of chi square test for coarse imbalance and fine price movements
over ∆t seconds. Data is taken from June 1-8, 2017. All p-values are zero or very close
(≈ 10−46 at most) to zero. The left subtable uses data from the entire trading day while
the right subtable uses data only from the first hour of the trading day. Tickers are
sorted by magnitude of Cramer’s V for the whole day.
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ticker

∆t

α

CNR
GIL
GIB.A
XQQ
HXU
XWD
IMO
T
BIP.UN
RBA
G
HQU
PPL
BMO
UFS
WCN
BAM.A
ARX
FM
FSV
AEM
NA
PAAS
IPL
HOD
SW
GOOS
FTS
PWF
ERF
SLF
CCO
FR
VUN
CPG
TC
KL
OR
IMG
ZEB
HFU
K
POW
VFV
HSU
SSO
HVI
VGG
XEG
PVG

6
41
11
126
38
237
21
67
15
18
62
28
22
10
8
4
27
42
78
1
5
19
21
53
36
5
2
42
46
68
18
122
74
179
55
1
78
37
281
180
34
326
67
112
58
61
88
190
246
45

2.16
4.05
1.66
7.28
4.95
5.48
6.78
4.61
2.69
1.2
0.0202
0.525
4.31
3.39
0.419
0.559
0.608
4.31
8.18
0.447
0.593
4.05
1.13
8.02
0.00598
4.26
1.14
5.31
0.00598
0.01
3.95
0.01
0.01
0.399
7.42
0.512
6.77
0.01
5.74
0.01
0.01
4.94
7.01
0.00799
0.01
0.00398
0.012
0.0202
0.00598
0.00398

CVTouch

CVα

0.284 0.286
0.281 0.277
0.264 0.278
0.22
0.221
0.205 0.205
0.2
0.201
0.193 0.193
0.191 0.192
0.19
0.199
0.188 0.205
0.187 0.278
0.186 0.212
0.182 0.184
0.177 0.178
0.177 0.245
0.175 0.224
0.172 0.167
0.166 0.169
0.165 0.165
0.164 0.136
0.163 0.204
0.162 0.161
0.153 0.189
0.15
0.15
0.149 0.319
0.147 0.153
0.144 0.164
0.139
0.14
0.137 0.178
0.123 0.236
0.116
0.12
0.113 0.166
0.106 0.196
0.103
0.27
0.102 0.102
0.0999 0.141
0.0938 0.0935
0.0843 0.207
0.0808 0.0835
0.0787 0.193
0.0782 0.163
0.0728 0.0673
0.0698 0.0697
0.0692 0.107
0.066 0.272
0.0656 0.129
0.0624 0.0552
0.0497 0.201
0.0286 0.357
0.0277 0.0995

ticker

∆t

α

CVTouch

CVα

CNR
GIL
GIB.A
XQQ
HXU
XWD
IMO
T
BIP.UN
RBA
G
HQU
PPL
BMO
UFS
WCN
BAM.A
ARX
FM
FSV
AEM
NA
PAAS
IPL
HOD
SW
GOOS
FTS
PWF
ERF
SLF
CCO
FR
VUN
CPG
TC
KL
OR
IMG
ZEB
HFU
K
POW
VFV
HSU
SSO
HVI
VGG
XEG
PVG

1
10
3
18
11
109
7
13
5
5
20
1
9
3
2
1
7
15
19
1
2
6
8
18
29
1
1
13
18
25
5
27
24
74
21
1
21
14
57
42
8
99
20
45
19
15
28
76
75
15

1.46
1.66
1.08
6.11
6.21
6.32
2.74
2.22
0.791
0.934
0.01
2.3
3.04
1.59
0.656
0.263
1.13
5.73
6.48
0.247
0.549
4.61
1.82
6.89
0.00799
0.823
3.59
2.26
5.92
5.51
3.59
6.22
0.0202
0.226
7.42
0.878
6.77
0.00598
0.981
0.0161
0.01
5.73
6.11
0.00799
0.01
3.01
0.00799
0.354
0.00598
0.0202

0.29
0.256
0.273
0.32
0.43
0.173
0.132
0.202
0.162
0.244
0.121
0.255
0.141
0.174
0.193
0.187
0.189
0.162
0.0609
0.182
0.236
0.121
0.199
0.141
0.0881
0.202
0.162
0.142
0.111
0.168
0.174
0.161
0.0527
0.0393
0.122
0.103
0.235
0.124
0.0565
0.171
0.0654
0.239
0.115
0.108
0.0859
0.106
0.0399
0.124
0.0577
0.0274

0.289
0.293
0.287
0.319
0.429
0.17
0.128
0.202
0.207
0.298
0.336
0.252
0.135
0.177
0.234
0.253
0.206
0.164
0.06
0.0998
0.257
0.124
0.217
0.141
0.393
0.226
0.166
0.151
0.112
0.166
0.174
0.163
0.0872
0.383
0.122
0.0715
0.234
0.141
0.0351
0.222
0.241
0.241
0.114
0.15
0.319
0.112
0.105
0.206
0.421
0.0351

Table 4.2: Summary of chi square test for fine imbalance and coarse price movements
over ∆t seconds. Data is taken from June 1-8, 2017. All p-values are zero or very close
(≈ 10−46 at most) to zero. The left subtable uses data from the entire trading day while
the right subtable uses data only from the first hour of the trading day. Tickers are
sorted by magnitude of Cramer’s V for the whole day.
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ask price for this statistical test across all stocks, with the exception of the stock FSV
who’s points lie well below the dashed blue line.
FSV is a stock with an average spread of over 25 ticks, ∆t = 1 second, and an average
interarrival time of ≈ 0.6 seconds. Running the calibration multiple times often yielded
different results each time depending on the time intervals we sampled over the week.
FSV is a very inactive stock which would require special care in that we likely need more
data and sample more points. It may also be that our restriction of looking at stocks
over time intervals where they show a variance of 2 ticks in the change in the best ask
price is unfair to stocks which move very little or move many ticks at a time when they
do move. This was the only stock encountered in our list that exhibited this behaviour,
but there are very likely more stocks like this as we look at less active stocks.
Aside from FSV we have the greatest improvement in the Cramer’s V with our calibration on stocks with small α values. This makes sense as these are stocks where the
association with the imbalance increases as we take volumes deeper in the book. Some
stocks have an optimal α which just reproduces the imbalance taking only the touch as
these stocks are more likely to have their price dynamics determined by the volumes at
the touch.
Similarly, we aggregate the results in Table 4.2 of the Cramer’s V in Figure 4.24. We
see the same improvement from stocks in each α category as in Figure 4.23 with FSV
being the only outlier again for the same reasons stated before.
Both statistical tests show that there are some stocks which gain significant improvement in the association between the average imbalance and changes in the best ask
price while others see little to no benefit. This may imply there are some stocks which
have their price dynamics influenced more heavily than others by volumes deeper in
the book than by volumes only at the touch. This dependency on the depth of book
may make these particular stocks more vulnerable to manipulation. Prices could still be
manipulated at the touch, but it would be a much riskier strategy in our model.
The take away here is that we see a statistically significant increase in our desired
association by capturing information deeper in the limit order book for some stocks. It
is also good to see some stocks which gain nothing from orders placed deeper in the book
and whose price dynamics are most associated with the touch. It would have been very
surprising to see an across the board improvement in all stocks using our model, so we
are at least able to say that the existing literature involving only the touch is still very
relevant across most of the stocks we presented in Tables 4.1 and 4.2.
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Figure 4.23: CVTouch against CVα for chi square test for coarse imbalance and fine price
movements. The blue dashed line would be the relationship that both Cramer’s V values
are the same. We separate the Cramer’s V values by the optimal α of each stock. The
intervals are chosen based on the regions we assigned our penalties to in Figure 4.21.

4.6

Calculating Average Imbalance Over ∆t

Returning to a point we left in chapter 2 – we decided to calculate the average imbalance
using time weighting instead of taking a simple mean. Now that we have an algorithm for
determining our sampling time ∆t we can come back to another reason for choosing the
time weight over the simple mean, in addition to the reasons presented back in chapter
2.
When calculating the correlation between the average imbalance and the change in
the best ask price using a simple mean for the average imbalance we often found negative
correlations between these two variables after calibrating for the optimal α. Regardless of
the α picked, we would always see a negative correlation even after resampling from the
larger data set. This might not be too surprising if the optimal α was found to be small
so as to incorporate volumes deeper in the book when calculating the imbalance, but this
was the case even for stocks with large α where only the touch is used in the calculation.
No matter the model we should find a positive correlation between the volumes at the
touch and the price dynamics because the best ask can never increase without the volume
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Figure 4.24: CVTouch against CVα for chi square test for fine imbalance and coarse price
movements. The blue dashed line would be the relationship that both Cramer’s V values
are the same. We separate the Cramer’s V values by the optimal α of each stock. The
intervals are chosen based on the regions we assigned our penalties to in Figure 4.21.
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at the best ask going to zero so the best ask moves to the next highest price with a nonempty volume. Also we should see prices almost never decreasing unless the best bid
volume has been depleted. Of course, if the spread is large enough we could have new
limit orders come in below the best ask which causes it to decrease, but even stocks with
tight spreads of a 1 tick would appear to have negative correlations between imbalance
and price movements.

Figure 4.25: Comparison between average imbalance with and without time weighting
captured by the correlation between the average imbalance and the change in best ask
price. The average imbalance is calculated using the calibrated α. Data is taken from
June 1-8, 2017 for the entire trading day across the stocks presented in Table 4.1. The
dashed blue line would represent identical correlation using both methods.
In Figure 4.25 we show the two methods for calculating the average imbalance and
their impact on the correlations between this average imbalance and price movements.
The time weighting approach completely removed the negative correlations we would
find after our calibrations. This is not to say that the time weighting always increased
correlation. There are stocks that had their correlations decreased, but still positive. Our
arguements back in chapter 2 were statistical and financial in nature, but here we can see
the impact of one method over the other in finding a predictor of price dynamics which is
consistent across all stocks we investigated – that is we no longer found any stocks with
strong negative correlations. We would still find some stocks with very small negative
correlations (≈ −0.02, for example), but we would argue this is really no different than
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a very small positive correlation in our case and that we would find no correlation at all
if taking a sufficient number of samples.

4.7

dp+ Goodness of Fit

We would like to have a goodness of fit for the calibrated dp+ for each stock when
compared to the respective empirical distribution of price movements. We refer to the
calibrated distribution dp+ here because the contraints we apply to our price change
model dp made it fully determined by dp+ and the imbalance weights wi . After the
calibration we have all the model parameters which we can plug into equation 3.4.5 to get
our fitted distribution for the change in the best ask price given some average imbalance I.
To compare our fitted distribution to the empirical we then need an estimate of I over the
entire relavent time period. We simply take the mean of the average imbalances calculated
for each ∆t time sample as our estimate for the stock’s overall average imbalance.
We need a way to compare two discrete distributions – one way involves the Kullback–Leibler (KL) divergence [65] in equation 4.7.1.
DKL (P k Q) =

X
x∈X


P (x) log

P (x)
Q(x)


(4.7.1)

where P (x) and Q(x) are two discrete distributions over the support X . Typically,
P (x) is taken to be the empirical distribution and Q(x) is the fitted distribution. We
should note that the KL divergence is not a metric on the space of probability distributions as it is not symmetric and it does not satisfy the triangle inequality. Instead, the
KL divergence is a measure of how much information is lost when approximating P by
Q. The KL divergence is zero for identical distributions and is unbounded to positive
infinity.
Figure 4.26 presents a histogram of the KL divergence for the stocks presented in
Tables 4.1 and 4.2. Overall the KL divergence is small across all stocks and provides
evidence of a good fit for our model price change distribution.
We can also show the fitted distribution to the empirical distribution as in Figure 4.27.
The fitted distributions provide an excellent approximation to the empirical distribution
except for at ±1 and ±2 ticks. This was not the case across all stocks, but for many the
empirical distribution was not symmetric about 0 when not conditioning on the average
imbalance. Any discrepancies we found with our fits were likely because of the modelling
assumption that the change in the best ask price is a symmetric distribution. Returning
to Figures 2.16a and 2.17 we saw that order-by-order the probability of the best ask
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Figure 4.26: Histogram of the KL divergence calculated for each stock after calibration.
We are comparing the empirical price change distribution to the fitted distribution with
the average imbalance taken to be the mean of the sampled average imbalances.

increasing or decreasing was not symmetric about I = 0. This asymmetry extends over
∆t as in Figure 2.16.
Figure 4.28 shows the probability-probability (PP) plot of the distributions in Figure
4.27. A PP plot displays the value of the cumulative distribution function at each tick
for the empirical and fitted price change distributions against each other. A perfect fit
to the data would have all black points lying on the dashed blue line. Again, here we
can see the two distributions do not completely match at ticks ±1 and ±2. However, we
get a very good approximation in the tails. We use AEM here as a representative plot
because none of our other fits are any worse than the one we present here.
Future work would be to incorporate the imbalance asymmetry in the model to see
if this remedies the problem in our distribution fit, but for now we at least have a fairly
accurate model for how the distribution of changes in the best ask price are impacted
through the average imbalance. Though we may not have a perfect fit at all ticks, we do
have a great fit deep in the tails of the distribution so that the least likely price movements
will be properly incorporated in the cost functions we derived in chapter 3. It is important
to fit the least likely events to properly capture the profits and losses the spoofer realizes
in the worst (large price increase) or best (large price decrease) case scenarios. These
events may be unlikely, but a spoofer would want to have them incorporated in their
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Figure 4.27: Empirical and fitted price change distributions for AEM stock on April 17,
2017 over the entire trading day. The average imbalance is the mean of the sampled
average imbalances.

Figure 4.28: Probability-probability plot for the two distributions in Figure 4.27. The
CDF of the two distributions is evaluated at each tick in the support and plotted against
each other. The points would lie on the dashed blue line if the two distributions were
identical.
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expected costs to properly account for the risks associated with placing spoofing orders
deep in the book. This would allow the spoofer to, in theory, make better decisions.

4.8

Exponential and Free Imbalance Weights

Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show that there are many stocks with α ≈ 0 even after the penalty. This value of α would imply that all volumes up to depth K carry roughly equal
weight when determining how to calculate the average imbalance which has the highest
association to changes in the best ask price. It is unlikely all weights would be equally
important, but due to our choice of exponentially decreasing weights if a stock has a
significant enough correlation to volumes deep in the book then α ≈ 0 is the only choice
in order to capture that volume.
We now present the results for the free weights using the stocks BMO, CNR, HFU,
HSU, PAAS, and PPL calibrated weekly between May 29, 2017 and August 04, 2017 for
the entire trading day. We will then compare the free and exponential weights from the
two calibrations and then return to the two statistical tests using the free weights.
In Figure 4.29 we show free and exponential weights determined by our calibrations
for BMO, CNR, and HSU stocks during the week of May 29 - June 2, 2017 over the entire
trading day. We use these three examples to show the outcome of the free calibration
when we have a large, medium, and small α, respectively. In each case the free weights
still pick up the exponentially decaying portion near the touch, but we also see weights
deeper in the order book for CNR and HSU. Even with the free weights BMO still only
wants the volume at the touch for best determining movements in the best ask price,
while CNR and HSU benefit from information several ticks into the book.
CNR has free weights deep in the book which we cannot capture with the exponential
weights without giving more weights to the volumes that have a weaker association to
the price dynamics – you would not be able to include the weights at 6, 7, or 8 ticks
without giving increasing weight to ticks 4 and 5, for example. However, this is not an
issue for HSU as the weights are so strong a few ticks into the book that the unimportant
volumes (ticks 2, 7, and 8) are overshadowed by the increased association in the price
dynamics we get from including the several volumes that do matter (ticks 3,4,5, and 6).
We see the same patterns emerge in each of the stocks over the 10 week period. We
just present these three examples to showcase the three ‘regimes’ (small, medium, and
large α) of α when calibrating with free weights.
In Figures 4.30 and 4.31 we plot the Cramer’s V for our two statistical tests using the
free weights as well as the exponential weights. We see that the free weights either give
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(a) BMO, α ≈ 5.79

(b) CNR, α ≈ 1.71

(c) HSU, α ≈ 0.0108

Figure 4.29: Free and exponential weights for BMO, CNR, and HSU calibrated using
data from May 29 - June 2, 2017 over the entire trading day.
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Figure 4.30: CVFree against CVα for chi square test for coarse imbalance and fine price
movements. The blue dashed line would be the relationship that both Cramer’s V values
are the same. We separate the Cramer’s V values by the optimal α of each stock. The
intervals are chosen based on the regions to which we assigned our penalties in Figure
4.21.

back the same results we had originally or they greatly improve the association of the
average imbalance and changes in the best ask price. Clearly, the free weights provide
a better association as they will be at least as good as the exponential weights while
also giving more flexiability in which volumes are incorporated in calculating the average
imbalance. Interestingly, we also see that the improvements are not isolated to one α
category as even stocks with a large α found improvements by including volumes deeper
in the book.
The first test in Figure 4.30 has some stocks with no improvement over the exponential
weights as this test is only against the sign of the average imbalance in predicting price
movements – the changes to the weights may not have any statistically significant change
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Figure 4.31: CVFree against CVα for chi square test for fine imbalance and coarse price
movements. The blue dashed line would be the relationship that both Cramer’s V values
are the same. We separate the Cramer’s V values by the optimal α of each stock. The
intervals are chosen based on the regions to which we assigned our penalties in Figure
4.21.

to the sign of the imbalance calculated from either weight choice. However, Figure 4.31
shows the second test where we broke the average imbalance into bins. Changing the
weights can change the average imbalance enough that our observations are moved from
one bin to another. The increased granularity of the imbalance in the second statistical
test can then pick up improvements in how the imbalance is calculated when there is no
change in sign. This could be why we see such huge improvements in Figure 4.31 over
Figure 4.30.
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Conclusions

In this chapter we introduced an algorithm for fitting our model parameters w,
~ K, and
+
dp to stock data in a given time period over some time interval ∆t. In order to compare
the results across stocks we decided to fix ∆t for each stock based on a benchmark variance
in changes in the best ask price. This way we are comparing all stocks over time intervals
where they have approximately the same variance. We then found relationships between
∆t, the average spread, and average interarrival time of orders which also cluster for
each stock during different periods of the day. Increasing spreads and decreasing average
interarrival times are associated with decreasing ∆t. We also found that we could spot
outliers within the data using these parameters and stock statistics which were linked to
holidays in Canada and the United States and dividend dates. There were other outliers
which we were unable to pin to any specific event associated with the stock.
With a time interval ∆t set we could discuss price movements. We then defined the
depth of book K based on the support of the distribution of the change in the best
ask price. Since we had fixed the variance we had forced a relationship between K and
the probability of no change in the best ask price. We then found increasing depth was
associated with decreasing ∆t which we motivated based on the number of orders a stock
receives during ∆t and how this related to movements in the stock price. We also found
clusters for each stock during different time periods using the average spread and the
probability of no movement in the best ask price.
With some meaning assigned to our model parameters we then calibrated our model
to stock data using MAP estimation – maximum likelihood estimation with penalty.
Here we assumed the weights w
~ decayed exponentially as one included more depth in the
book and were parameterized by α – the exponential decay constant. With our calibrated
model parameters we repeated the two statistical tests we ran in chapter 2 for the average
imbalance calulated from α. We found improvements across many stocks over using only
the volume at the touch, but mostly for stocks with smaller α. This would be because
the smaller the α the more volumes we incorporate deeper in the limit order book.
We also returned to the point of why we used time weighting over taking a simple mean
for calulating the average imbalance. We found that we often had negative correlations
between the volume imbalance and changes in the best ask price even when using just
the volumes at the touch. This was against conventional wisdom of how the limit order
book operates and when we used time weighting these negative correlations vanished.
We then provided evidence of goodness of fit for dp+ based on the Kullback-Leiber
divegerence and probability-probability plots. Overall we had excellent fits for the price
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change distributions, but there was still a discrepancy between the two distributions.
This was likely caused by our assumption that the distribution is symmetric about the
average imbalance I as we had evidence of an asymmetry from our statistical tests in
chapter 2. Our fits were still very good, but this would be one avenue of improvement in
future work.
Since we found many stocks had α values close to zero we also had our calibration
with free weights w
~ to see if we could find which volumes in the book these stocks had the
most association with their price movements. We chose a particular constraint on w
~ to
be consistent with our exponential weights. The results of the free weights then included
the results of the exponential decaying weights, but we also found important volumes
beyond the touch that were not included by the original results. We repeated our two
statistical tests again using the free weights and found that all stocks either benefited
from applying weights deeper in the book or were no worse off. This is further statistical
evidence that information about the volumes beyond the touch in the limit order book
give us a better association with price dynamics.
In the next chapter we can finally implement our spoofing model from chapter 3 using
parameters we generate from our calibration algorithm.

Chapter 5
Spoofing Detection
5.1

Introduction

Now that we have a methodology for calibrating our model we can solve the optimization
problem we originally presented in chapter 3. That is, we want to buy H shares and we
need to determine if we should immediately place a market order at time t for the H
shares or should we delay our market order to t + ∆t. Alternatively, as the spoofer, we
could spoof the book at time t and delay our market order to time t + ∆t, cancel our
spoofing orders, and lower our cost of purchasing the H shares.
We derived expressions for the expected cost associated with each of these three
decisions. We just need to compare which option saves us the most money for purchasing
H shares, bearing in mind that the option to spoof the book also involves an optimization
problem for picking where to place our spoofing limit orders. We compare two methods
of determining the optimal strategy – comparing expected costs, and a hybrid using
expected costs and the Sharpe ratio.
In this chapter we determine the optimal decision at each time throughout the day
for multiple stocks to see if there are periods throughout the day where the limit order
book is susceptible to spoofing, and if so, how much more profitable is spoofing the book?
This will depend on the number of shares H we wish to purchase as well as the number of
shares Ṽ that we spoof with. We show that incorporating risk into the spoofer’s decision
making process yields better decision clusters which allow us to explore the dependency
on the boundary between spoofing and placing market orders based on H and Ṽ .
We also analyze the optimal spoofing strategy with BMO stock using four example
limit order books taken from the data. We show that the spoofer’s strategy not only
depends on H and Ṽ , but the initial volume imbalance and the predicted shape of the
book when the spoofer needs to make their decision. We argue that properly modelling a
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spoofer’s prediction of the shape of the order book in the next time period is important
to determining how they will act as to better combat them.

5.2

Determining the Optimal Strategy

From chapter 3 we wrote down equations for the cost associated with our three strategies
- market order, delayed market order, and spoofing. We then choose the strategy which
yields the smallest expected cost. We also round each result to the nearest penny when
making our strategy decision. Spoofing may yield the lowest cost between the three
strategies, but if it is not lower by at least a penny then there is no practical reason to
take the risk in spoofing. We take this more conservative approach to decision making
because spoofing may always yield a numerically lower cost than delaying a market order
(due to manipulating the imbalance), but if that cost is only lower by some negligible
amount then we argue the spoofer cannot justify the risk associated with manipulating
the book.
Since one could, in theory, always gain an advantage by spoofing the book with an
arbitrarily large number of shares we have to limit our investigation to a finite number.
Also, limit orders of 100 shares are the smallest possible order one can place on the
book1 and orders are in increments of 100 shares. This significantly reduces the size of
our solution space and we can even solve the optimization problem by brute force in some
cases. Given parameters dp + , w,
~ and K, the optimal spoofing strategy is obtained by
solving the optimization problem
min
ṽt

X

CS (~vt , H, p+ , xt , ṽt )ϕ(xt ; I(~vt + ṽt ; w,
~ K))

(5.2.1)

xt

Subject to
0
X
i=−K

ṽi = 0,

K
X

ṽi ≤ Ṽ ,

ṽi ≥ 0 and ṽi ∈ 100N ∀i ∈ [−K, K]

(5.2.2)

i=1

The first condition in equation 5.2.2 is to further reduce the solution space, but by
construction we would never spoof the bid side of the book because that would push the
volume imbalance against us. The second condition limits the total size of our spoofing
orders to Ṽ . The final condition forces all spoofing orders to be 0 or multiples of 100
shares. The solution to equation 5.2.1 subject to 5.2.2 then gives the optimal spoofing
strategy. We, as the spoofer, decide how many shares Ṽ we are willing to spoof with.
1

Orders less than 100 shares go to a separate book called Oddlot. This book has lower liquidity.

Chapter 5. Spoofing Detection

125

We cannot assume that all orders would have happened exactly the same over ∆t
if we place a spoofing order at the start of the time period, so we cannot calculate the
average imbalance in the same way as we did for the calibration. We can only use the
information we have at time t. We have to make our optimal spoofing decision based on
the assumption that the imbalance we create from our spoofing order remains constant
over ∆t. There is no other option in the absence of data on how the market would react
to specific limit order sizes and placement to model the market dynamics over the time
interval based on our choices at time t.2 This is where a multi-period model would come
into play where we could update our strategy at multiple times over the day – which
would be a more realistic spoofing strategy. This work is, however, a first step towards a
more complicated and complete model to capture the behaviour of a market manipulator.

Figure 5.1: Calibrated weights w
~ for BMO stock on April 17, 2017 over the entire trading
day. ∆t = 5 seconds and K = 10.
As an example, Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show the weights w
~ and the optimal limit order
placement for a specific limit order book configuration for BMO stock on April 17, 2017.
Optimal limit order placement is decided using the free imbalance weights. We spoof
with up to 500 shares and wish to purchase 1000 shares. From the weights in Figure
5.1 we can easily tell that the volume imbalance heavily favours the best ask to decrease
over ∆t = 5 seconds. For purchasing 1000 shares with this limit order book the expected
2

One would need considerable money and resources to test this type of market sensitivity to limit
order placement.
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Figure 5.2: Optimal limit order placement for spoofing with example book for BMO
stock taken on April 17, 2017. This is a stylized figure where we only show the first 15
prices in the bid and ask sides of the book and ignore the spread. Ṽ = 500 and we use
the free weights for calculating the imbalance.
cost savings are $2.50 if we spoof and $2.36 if we delay our market order, implying an
improved cost of $0.14 with spoofing.
We now need to compare this results to our other two available choices – delayed and
immediate market orders. Instead of using the expected cost of all three strategies, we
can subtract the cost of an immediate market order to see the expected net cost savings.
We denote these as µS and µDMO for the relative savings of spoofing and a delayed market
order, respectively. That is,


µS = E CS (~vt , H, p+ , xt , ṽt ) |Ft , I(~vt + ṽt ) − CMO (~vt , H, p+ )


µDMO = E CDMO (~vt , H, p+ , xt ) |Ft , I(~vt ) − CMO (~vt , H, p+ )

(5.2.3)

We can bring CMO (~vt , H, p+ ) outside the expected value since it is Ft measurable.
This way we can also compare the savings seen across different limit order book states
since the costs are recorded relative to the immediate market order option for each time
period.
In Figure 5.3 we show the decision process for picking the optimal strategy based
purely on the expected net cost of the three options. We place an immediate market
order if we cannot save money by spoofing or delaying our market order. We spoof
or delay our market order if we can expect to save money and we choose the option
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Figure 5.3: Decision tree using only expected costs to determine optimal strategy. The
three options: Spoof, DMO, and MO, refer to spoofing, delayed market order, and immediate market order, respectively.

which yields the greatest savings. However, using only the expected net savings in the
decision making process also ignores the risk associated with spoofing or delaying our
market order. We can incorporate the risk through the Sharpe ratio [66], S, defined for
an investment as
S=

µ−r
σ

(5.2.4)

where µ is the expected rate of return, r is the risk-free rate, and σ is the standard
deviation or volatility. One can think of the Sharpe ratio as the net return per unit of
increased risk. To unpack the Sharpe ratio we first subtract the risk-free rate from the
expected return of our investment since if µ < r we would have been better off investing
in the risk-free asset (usually taken to be a government bond). We then divide the excess
return by the volatility as a stand-in for the risk associated with the investment. This is
done to compare the ratio of excess returns to risk for a collection of different investments
(stocks, for example) that could make up a portfolio. Ideally, one wants to maximize
their return per unit of risk and would invest in assets with the highest Sharpe ratio.
Since we are looking at such small time intervals we can take r ≈ 0 in our case3 . The
volatility σ for the cost of spoofing or delaying a market order is then given by
1

A large risk free rate of 5% per year would yield 1.05 250×6.5×60×60 − 1 = 8.34 × 10−7 % per second.
Assuming approximately 250 trading days with 6.5 hours of trading per day.
3
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σS2 = Var CS (~vt , H, p+ , xt , ṽt ) − CMO (~vt , H, p+ ) |Ft , I(~vt + ṽt )


2
σDMO
= Var CDMO (~vt , H, p+ , xt ) − CMO (~vt , H, p+ ) |Ft , I(~vt )

(5.2.5)

and the simple returns from spoofing and the delayed market order relative to the
immediate market order are given by

CS (~vt , H, p+ , xt , ṽt ) − CMO (~vt , H, p+ )
Spoofing Return = E
Ft , I(~vt + ṽt )
CMO (~vt , H, p+ )
µS
=
CMO (~vt , H, p+ )




(5.2.6)

CDMO (~vt , H, p+ , xt ) − CMO (~vt , H, p+ )
Ft , I(~vt + ṽt )
DMO Return = E
CMO (~vt , H, p+ )
µDMO
=
CMO (~vt , H, p+ )


Similarly, the volatility of each strategy relative to the immediate market order is
given by


CS (~vt , H, p+ , xt , ṽt ) − CMO (~vt , H, p+ )
Ft , I(~vt + ṽt )
Spoofing Volatility = Var
CMO (~vt , H, p+ )
σS2
=
CMO (~vt , H, p+ )2



CDMO (~vt , H, p+ , xt ) − CMO (~vt , H, p+ )
Ft , I(~vt + ṽt )
DMO Volatility = Var
CMO (~vt , H, p+ )
2
σDMO
=
CMO (~vt , H, p+ )2
(5.2.7)


then finally putting equations 5.2.6 and 5.2.7 together we get the Sharpe ratio as
µS
σS
µDMO
=
σDMO

SS =
SDMO

(5.2.8)

The advantage of using the Sharpe ratio is that spoofing may yield a lower expected
cost than delaying the market order, but the improved return on the strategy may not
be worth the increased risk.
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SS < SDMO

µS < 0

µDMO < 0

N

N

Y

µS < 0
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DMO

Spoof
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Figure 5.4: Decision tree using expected costs and Sharpe ratio to determine optimal
strategy. The three options: Spoof, DMO, and MO, refer to spoofing, delayed market
order, and immediate market order, respectively.
In Figure 5.4 we show a slightly different decision making process from Figure 5.3.
In this case if we can expect to save money from both spoofing and delaying our market
order we choose the option which yields the highest savings per unit of risk – represented
by the Sharpe ratio. Spoofing will always be riskier than delaying our market order
because our spoofing limit orders have a chance to be executed against us. Taking into
account the Sharpe ratio gives us a way to quantify if that increased risk is worth the
associated expected savings.
With our optimal strategy criteria established we can investigate how our decisions
change over time for a given stock and their possible dependency on the number of shares
H we wish to buy and the number of shares Ṽ we are willing to spoof with.

5.3
5.3.1

Spoofing Payoff and Optimal Strategy
Spoofing Criteria

To investigate the difference between our two decision criteria when both µS < 0 and
µDMO < 0 we use the calibration presented in Figure 5.1 for BMO stock on April 17,
2017. The optimal decision for both criteria is presented in Figure 5.5 for the time period
10:30 – 11:30 AM over 5 second intervals. In this example we also use the free weights
when calculating the imbalance and we aim to buy H = 200 shares and spoof with up to
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Ṽ = 500 shares. Using the Sharpe ratio over just the net-expected cost gives more regions
where we would delay our market order instead of spoofing the book. To understand what
is happening here we first look at the impact spoofing has on the imbalance at the start
of each 5 second time period. The optimal decisions (as color coded in the figures) are
being made after rounding µS and µDMO to the nearest penny.
Figure 5.6 shows the pre- and post-spoofing imbalance for each 5 second interval
presented in Figure 5.5. We see a clear divide between immediately placing a market
order and either spoofing or delaying the market order. We see that we immediately
place the market order when the pre-spoofing imbalance is initially positive and cannot
be made sufficiently negative with our spoofing order. We then spoof when we can drive
the imbalance negative so it is more likely for the best ask to decrease over the next 5
seconds. When using the net-expected cost criteria we delay our market order only if the
imbalance is already so negative that we cannot make it better for us with a spoofing
order, but when we use the Sharpe ratio there is a new region of points where we delay
over spoofing. These points lie in the region where the imbalance is already so negative
we can hardly improve it, but we can still get a modest improvement by still spoofing.
Why would we delay the market order over spoofing then? We have to see what is
happening between the net savings, µS and µDMO , and the Sharpe ratios, SS and SDMO .
In Figure 5.7 we compare the two criteria inequalities, µS − µDMO and SS − SDMO .
We see there is a region where using only the expected net savings determines that we
should spoof instead of delaying our market order even though the net savings on our
spoofing strategy is smaller per unit of volatility than the delayed market order strategy.
That is, the net savings with spoofing may be better, but that net savings is not worth
the associated increased risk which is captured by the Sharpe ratio.
Then in Figure 5.8 we compare the net savings, µS − µDMO , to the spoofing strategy
Sharpe ratio SS . We see that when the spoofing strategy has a positive cost we place an
immediate market order as delaying the market order or spoofing will more than likely
increase our cost of buying H shares. We then spoof the book if SS is negative with a net
savings sufficiently greater than the net savings on delaying the market order. We also see
in the limit that the µS −µDMO → 0 we delay our market orders instead of spoofing as the
net savings is not there to justify spoofing. The Sharpe ratio then captures the fact that
the net savings of spoofing over delaying the market order is not worth the associated
increased risk. Going back to Figure 5.6 we have that there are times where we can
spoof to push the imbalance further negative than it already is, but the increased risk of
exposing ourselves to our limit order being executed can offset the small improvement in
the expected net savings.
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(a) Net-Expected Cost Criteria

(b) Sharpe Ratio Criteria

Figure 5.5: Optimal strategy over 5 second intervals from 10:30 AM – 3:00 PM on April
17, 2017 for BMO stock using both selection criteria. The black line is the best ask price
time series. You place an immediate market order in the green regions, a delayed market
order in the blue regions, and spoof in the red regions. H = 100 and Ṽ = 200.
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(a) Net-Expected Cost Criteria

(b) Sharpe Ratio Criteria

Figure 5.6: The pre- and post-spoofing imbalance for each 5 second time period in Figure
5.5 labeled by optimal strategy using both selection criteria. The post-spoofing imbalance
is determined by the imbalance after the optimal spoofing order – even if spoofing was
not the optimal decision.
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(a) Net-Expected Cost Criteria

(b) Sharpe Ratio Criteria

Figure 5.7: Comparing net spoofing savings and Sharpe ratio over a delayed market
order for each 5 second time period in Figure 5.5 labeled by optimal strategy using both
selection criteria.
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(a) Net-Expected Cost Criteria

(b) Sharpe Ratio Criteria

Figure 5.8: Comparing net spoofing savings over a delayed market order to spoofing
Sharpe ratio for each 5 second time period in Figure 5.5 labeled by optimal strategy
using both selection criteria.
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Figures 5.9, 5.10, and 5.11 compare the decision clusters with increasing H and Ṽ .
Increasing Ṽ gives the spoofer an increased ability to manipulate prices, so the spoofing
decision becomes a profitable investment over the delayed market order and optimal
decisions switch from the delayed market order to spoofing. In both cases we see that
using the Sharpe ratio makes better clusters compared to using expected net savings as
it provides a distinct boundary between the two decisions.
Ultimately, both criteria yield similar results, but using the Sharpe ratio could narrow
our search for potential price manipulators to time periods where not only was it profitable to spoof the book, but the potential profit earned was worth the risk of spoofing as
well. If we are to catch people attempting to manipulate the limit order book of every
stock each day we will need ways to save time and narrow down where to look for when
the books were most vulnerable. This was an example of a single stock over one hour,
but the purpose was to illustrate how our model could be used in practice.

5.3.2

Decision Boundary, H, and Ṽ

In Figure 5.6 we can see there is a clear decision boundary between the immediate market
order choice and either spoofing or delaying the market order. This decision boundary is
dependent on the number of shares H we wish to purchase and the number of shares Ṽ
we are willing to spoof with. We want to know if we can extract some general decision
rules based on the initial imbalance of the book, H, and Ṽ which a spoofer may use or
the exchange may use to narrow their search down for possible price manipulators. These
rules will of course vary between stocks and the time of day, but we want to see if some
simple ‘rules of thumb’ can be gained from our model.
We present the results using the free weights for the imbalance as this allows for limit
order placement deeper in the book with a larger association between the imbalance
and changes in the best ask price. This gives a ‘worse case scenario’ for the book’s
vulnerability to spoofing. We also found our model would predict almost no advantage to
spoofing when using exponential weights – the risk of spoofing near the touch completely
removed the advantages of moving the best ask price in a favourable direction. The
free weights allow for the same limit order placement near the touch as the exponential
weights, so even if that was the best spoofing order placement it would be captured with
the free weights anyway.
We determine the decision boundary using a support vector machine (SVM) with a
linear kernel. This will find the linear boundary between the classes, immediate market
orders and the spoofing/delayed market orders, which separates both classes on either
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(a) Net-Expected Cost Criteria

(b) Sharpe Ratio Criteria

Figure 5.9: Comparing net spoofing savings over a delayed market order to spoofing
Sharpe ratio for each 5 second time period in Figure 5.5 labeled by optimal strategy
using both selection criteria. H = 200 and Ṽ = 200 for this case.
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(a) Net-Expected Cost Criteria

(b) Sharpe Ratio Criteria

Figure 5.10: Comparing net spoofing savings over a delayed market order to spoofing
Sharpe ratio for each 5 second time period in Figure 5.5 labeled by optimal strategy
using both selection criteria. H = 200 and Ṽ = 300 for this case.
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(a) Net-Expected Cost Criteria

(b) Sharpe Ratio Criteria

Figure 5.11: Comparing net spoofing savings over a delayed market order to spoofing
Sharpe ratio for each 5 second time period in Figure 5.5 labeled by optimal strategy
using both selection criteria. H = 300 and Ṽ = 300 for this case.
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side of the boundary and has the largest distance between the boundary and points in
both class. We also perform a linear regression for the pre- and post-spoofing imbalance
as seen in Figure 5.6 so that the intersection of our SVM boundary and the regression line
will approximate the location of the boundary. The intersection point will be referred to
as the ‘midpoint’ of the decision boundary. We can then see how this midpoint moves
as we change H and Ṽ for different stocks. An example of this process is presented in
Figure 5.12 where the SVM boundary is the dashed black line and the regression line is
in solid black.

Figure 5.12: Example decision boundary for AEM stock on April 17, 2017 using data
from 10:30 AM – 3:00 PM over 5 second intervals. H = 100 and Ṽ = 300. Decision
boundary midpoint determined by the intersection of the regression line (solid black) and
the support vector (dashed black).
Figure 5.13 presents the results of the boundary midpoint’s movement from changing
H and Ṽ for AEM stock on April 17, 2017 using data from 10:30 AM – 3:00 PM over 5
second intervals. We excluded the first and last hours as there are some 5 second intervals
where there is not enough shares available within the first 15 ticks of the best ask price
to fulfill a market order of say, 1000 shares, and definitely not enough if the spoofing
orders are also executed. This would prevent us from calculating the cost of walking the
book when buying that many shares.
The points, which increase to the right, are color coded by the number of shares Ṽ
with which we are willing to spoof. Within each color the points move up with increasing
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H. There are a few things to note in the figure. First, the number of shares we are willing
to spoof with for a given H, in general, increases the initial imbalance we are willing to
spoof at. This is intuitive as the more shares we spoof with the more impact with can
have on the imbalance to push prices in our favour. Second, the more shares we need
to purchase increases the spoofer’s willingness to manipulate prices even if they cannot
move the imbalance much with their spoofing orders – likely because the book is in a
state where they cannot push the imbalance negative without a massive spoofing order.
This would reflect the spoofer’s willingness to take risks for the smallest chance to lower
the best ask because they intend to purchase so many shares that any price improvement
they get is worth it.

Figure 5.13: Midpoint of decision boundary for changing H and Ṽ for AEM stock on
April 17, 2017 using data from 10:30 AM – 3:00 PM over 5 second intervals. For a given
Ṽ , points move up the graph with increasing H. H ∈ [100, 200, 300, 400, 700, 1000].
We also see the same patterns and behaviour in Figures 5.14 and 5.15 for BMO and
CNR stock on the same day over the same time period and also over 5 second intervals.
We only present these three cases for brevity, but this pattern was consistent across all
stocks we investigated. In short, increasing H causes the spoofer to manipulate prices
even if they cannot influence the imbalance as much as they would like and increasing Ṽ
causes the spoofer to manipulate more often because they have more shares to impact
the imbalance.
In addition to this, we can look at the dependency of the slope and intercept for the
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Figure 5.14: Midpoint of decision boundary for changing H and Ṽ for BMO stock on
April 17, 2017 using data from 10:30 AM – 3:00 PM over 5 second intervals. For a given
Ṽ , points move up the graph with increasing H. H ∈ [100, 200, 300, 400, 700, 1000].

Figure 5.15: Midpoint of decision boundary for changing H and Ṽ for CNR stock on
April 17, 2017 using data from 10:30 AM – 3:00 PM over 5 second intervals. For a given
Ṽ , points move up the graph with increasing H. H ∈ [100, 200, 300, 400, 700, 1000].

Chapter 5. Spoofing Detection

142

regression line on H and Ṽ . In Figure 5.16 we present the exponential and free imbalance
weights for AEM and BMO stock to keep in mind how the imbalance is being calculated
for these two stocks. The key difference is that BMO has 2 spots beyond the touch which
have a strong association to movements in the best ask price – compared to the one spot
for AEM stock. AEM also has a significant weight deep in the book compared to the
smaller weights for BMO.
In Figures 5.17 and 5.18 we present the impact of H and Ṽ on the slope and intercept
of the regression line for AEM and BMO stock. Both AEM and BMO have decreasing
slope and intercept with increasing Ṽ because increasing Ṽ allows for a larger impact
on the post-spoofing imbalance. However, we see a difference in the dependency in the
slope and intercept on H for BMO, but not for AEM. This is because AEM has only a
single tick location deeper in the book where a spoofer can place orders to manipulate
prices, but BMO has two. The only way to impact the imbalance through H is by the
optimal spoofing strategy defined in equation 5.2.1, so the optimal strategy is changing
depending on the number of shares a spoofer wishes to buy.
It is also clear why the optimal strategy is changing – the spoofing orders are being
rearranged to give largest impact on the post-spoofing imbalance that is possible. This is
interesting because this would, by Figure 5.16, mean that riskier orders are being placed
at tick 6 instead of tick 7 to capture that extra weight when calculating the imbalance.
Likewise, when H is small the imbalance is smaller than it could be for a given Ṽ which
implies the spoofing orders are placed at tick 7 to have a smaller chance of being executed.
The more shares the spoofer wants to buy, the more risk they are willing to take to cut
costs. This is an important insight as it provides evidence the spoofer’s strategy will
change depending on the number of shares they want to buy and this will need to be
considered when employing detection technology to catch spoofers purchasing different
amounts of H.
When there are multiple locations at which spoofing can impact the imbalance deeper
in the book we see the optimal strategy changing with H. To understand why this is
happening we can look deeper into how BMO’s optimal spoofing strategy changes with
H and Ṽ .

5.4

BMO Optimal Spoofing Strategy

We found in the previous section that when we have two available locations to spoof
and a fixed number of shares to spoof with we are faced with allocating our ‘spoofing
resources’ optimally. This did not occur with AEM as there was only one location deep
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(a) AEM

(b) BMO

Figure 5.16: Comparing exponential and free imbalance weights for BMO and AEM on
April 17, 2017 using the entire trading day over 5 second intervals.
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(a) AEM

(b) BMO

Figure 5.17: Comparing the dependency of the slope of the regression line on H and Ṽ
for AEM and BMO stock on April 17, 2017 using the entire trading day over 5 second
intervals.
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(a) AEM

(b) BMO

Figure 5.18: Comparing the dependency of the intercept of the regression line on H and
Ṽ for AEM and BMO stock on April 17, 2017 using the entire trading day over 5 second
intervals.

Chapter 5. Spoofing Detection

146

in the book with a nonzero weight. Also, for BMO, in Figure 5.16 (b) there is more
weight at tick 6 than tick 7 – because of this, it may be optimal to place spoofing orders
at tick 6 to gain the impact of the larger weight. If tick 7 had the larger weight you
would always spoof that location since it is less risky and carries a larger impact on the
imbalance.
From Figures 5.17 and 5.18 we see both the slope m and intercept b of the regression
line I post-spoof = mI pre-spoof + b of Figure 5.12 with increasing H for a fixed Ṽ . This is
caused by the spoofing orders being shifted to the larger weight tick 6 to the smaller
weight tick 7 – thus giving a smaller impact on I after spoofing. However, the regression
slope and intercept are just capturing an aggregate over the entire day of this behaviour,
so we can take specific limit order book examples from the day and investigate the optimal
spoofing order placement for a given H and Ṽ to see how the controls change in each
case.
We choose four different limit order books for BMO on April 17, 2017 as shown in
subplot (a) of Figures 5.19, 5.20, 5.21, and 5.22 to represent large positive, small positive,
small negative, and large negative imbalances, respectively. In subplot (b) we show the
objective surface of the expected spoofing cost µS for different values of ṽ6 and ṽ7 with
H = 300. We know from the previous optimizations of BMO on April 17, 2017 that
those were the only locations where spoofing orders were placed. We also have a large
red point at (ṽ6 , ṽ7 ) = (0, 0) representing the case where we do not spoof – this would
be the value of µDMO . Moving out from this red point are lines of constant Ṽ with the
optimal allocation of the spoofing shares for each Ṽ being represented by a black point.
For example, in Figure 5.19, the first line is Ṽ = 100 where we can place either 100 shares
at tick 6 or 100 shares at tick 7 – these are the two points closest to the red point. In
this case placing 100 shares at tick 6 provides the biggest expected cost reduction. For
Ṽ = 200 we have 3 points now – 200 shares at tick 6, 200 shares at tick 7, or 100 shares
on each. Here the optimal strategy is again to place all 200 shares on tick 6. This process
is repeated until we find the global minimum at (ṽ6 , ṽ7 ) = (0, 3700).
We should also note the existence of a global minimum for our four cases and that
the spoofer would not just place an infinite number of shares at either tick 6 or tick 7
to drive the imbalance to -1. The fear of their spoofing orders being executed is strong
enough that even with infinite resources the spoofer can still lose if they are not allocated
properly. Clearly, for these cases, the spoofer realizes diminishing returns when spoofing
with an increasing number of shares. This is not a proof of the convexity of the problem,
but it suggests that convexity may be provable in some cases.
Interestingly, it is not just the initial imbalance that determines how much the spoofer
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(a) Large positive imbalance ≈ 0.35

(b) µS by strategy for H = 300

Figure 5.19: Example limit order book for BMO stock on April 17, 2017 with large
positive imbalance. The second plot is the surface µS as a function of the spoofing
volumes ṽ6 and ṽ7 – the volumes placed 5 and 6 ticks from the best ask, respectively.
The large red point represents the case where Ṽ = 0 which is the expected net savings
for a delayed market order. The path of black points leading to the largest point is the
optimal strategy for increasing Ṽ to the global minimum at (ṽ6 , ṽ7 ) = (0, 3700) with
µS = −0.0601. The imbalance after spoofing is I ≈ −0.238.
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(a) Small positive imbalance ≈ 0.062

(b) µS by strategy for H = 300

Figure 5.20: Example limit order book for BMO stock on April 17, 2017 with small
positive imbalance. The second plot is the surface µS as a function of the spoofing
volumes ṽ6 and ṽ7 – the volumes placed 5 and 6 ticks from the best ask, respectively.
The large red point represents the case where Ṽ = 0 which is the expected net savings
for a delayed market order. The path of black points leading to the largest point is the
optimal strategy for increasing Ṽ to the global minimum at (ṽ6 , ṽ7 ) = (0, 2500) with
µS = −0.327. The imbalance after spoofing is I ≈ −0.327.
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(a) Small negative imbalance ≈ −0.024

(b) µS by strategy for H = 300

Figure 5.21: Example limit order book for BMO stock on April 17, 2017 with small
negative imbalance. The second plot is the surface µS as a function of the spoofing
volumes ṽ6 and ṽ7 – the volumes placed 5 and 6 ticks from the best ask, respectively.
The large red point represents the case where Ṽ = 0 which is the expected net savings
for a delayed market order. The path of black points leading to the largest point is the
optimal strategy for increasing Ṽ to the global minimum at (ṽ6 , ṽ7 ) = (200, 2500) with
µS = −0.206. The imbalance after spoofing is I ≈ −0.263.
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(a) Large negative imbalance ≈ −0.58

(b) µS by strategy for H = 300

Figure 5.22: Example limit order book for BMO stock on April 17, 2017 with large
negative imbalance. The second plot is the surface µS as a function of the spoofing
volumes ṽ6 and ṽ7 – the volumes placed 5 and 6 ticks from the best ask, respectively.
The large red point represents the case where Ṽ = 0 which is the expected net savings
for a delayed market order. The path of black points leading to the largest point is the
optimal strategy for increasing Ṽ to the global minimum at (ṽ6 , ṽ7 ) = (0, 2900) with
µS = −0.807. The imbalance after spoofing is I ≈ −0.684.
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can impact the book. The actual shape of both sides of the book is just as important
for determining just how negative the imbalance can be brought through spoofing. For
example, in Figure 5.20 the imbalance after spoofing at the global minimum is ≈ −0.327
while in Figure 5.21 the imbalance after spoofing is ≈ −0.263 even though Figure 5.20
has an initial positive imbalance while Figure 5.21 has a small negative imbalance. The
initial imbalance does not tell the whole story: the imbalances of some limit order books
are more sensitive to spoofing than others simply due to how the volume of shares are
spread over both sides of the book.
In each of the four figures we see that the optimal strategy moves from allocating all
shares at tick 6 to tick 7 with increasing Ṽ . In all cases, except Figure 5.21, all shares
are eventually placed entirely at tick 7. In Figure 5.21 the spoofer will still place 200
shares at tick 6 even at the global minimum. This is behaviour we see in multiple cases
for H and Ṽ for each of our four limit order books. The spoofer is willing to take the
extra risk with these 200 shares for the increased impact on the imbalance because even
if they are executed they would not walk the book according to Figure 5.21 (a) since the
200 executed shares at tick 6 plus the 300 shares we buy is equal to the 500 shares at
the best ask. So, the shape of the limit order book near the touch is also important for
determining optimal spoofing strategies. We see these results because we have made the
modelling assumption that the book would remain constant over ∆t, but this is obviously
not typically the case. Because of this the spoofer is able to allocate their spoofing shares
to locations that are guaranteed they minimize the distance they walk the book. A more
accurate model would have the spoofer evaluating expected values not only with respect
to changes in the best ask, but also changes to the volumes near the best ask given the
current state of the book. However, the modelling required there is much harder.
The impact of the shape of the book on the objective function is even more clear
in Figure 5.22 (b) with the obvious changes in slope at specific points. Since the book
already has a large negative imbalance there is little improvement from spoofing and
changes in the objective function are mostly determined by the costs associated with
executed spoofing orders and walking the book to recover those shares while still having
to purchase H shares. If we follow the points away from the red point where all spoofing
shares are placed at tick 6 we see obvious changes in slope at Ṽ = 500, 800, and 2900.
Combining with the H = 300 we also have to purchase, these three quantities correspond
to the 800, 300, and 2100 shares at the first three ticks of the ask side of the limit order
book. We do not see such clear changes in the objective function caused by the shape of
the book in the other cases because we can impact the imbalance more and benefit from
the increased probability of the best ask decreasing – this smooths out the surface and
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removes edges we see in Figure 5.22 (b).
In Figures 5.23, 5.24, 5.25, and 5.26 we present the optimal spoofing strategy for our
four limit order books for different values of H and increasing values of Ṽ . For each
value of Ṽ we plot the number of shares placed at tick 6 and tick 7 in blue and green,
respectively. The more shares the spoofer wishes to buy the more risk they are willing to
take with their spoofing orders if Ṽ is small since they want to influence the book as best
they can with what limited resources they have available, but as the spoofer is willing
to spoof with increasing shares they are instead placed at the less risky tick 7. There is
then a transition period between these two cases where the spoofer mixes their spoofing
orders between the two locations. Then, as seen in Figure 5.21, the spoofer is still willing
to leave some shares at tick 6 in the limit Ṽ → ∞ based on how deep they would have
to walk the book to recover those shares if they were executed.
For example, in Figure 5.23 (b), the spoofer still leaves 100 shares at tick 6. They
are already buying 400 shares and, according to Figure 5.19 (a), would already walk the
book one tick to the right of the best ask and leave 100 shares at this position. So, the
spoofer could have 100 shares executed against them and not have to walk the book to
recover them. Again, in Figure 5.23 (c) the spoofer leaves 600 shares at tick 6 because
buying 600 shares would cause you to walk the book two ticks from the best ask anyway
with 600 shares left at that position.
This behaviour is not followed in all cases for H and Ṽ for each limit order book
snapshot, but for the cases it is we are able to see why the spoofer would still risk some
amount of shares being executed. In some cases the spoofer could impact the imbalance
enough at tick 7 that the risk of any shares being executed at tick 6 is not worth it – as
in Figures 5.24 (b), 5.25 (a), or 5.26 (b) for example. These results further emphasize the
importance of properly modelling the shape of the book at the next time period given
the current shape.
We have seen that minimize spoofing order execution is important for the strategy of
the spoofer. Built into the model is the idea that the spoofer attempts to minimize their
risks while maximizing their profits through lower the expected cost of their intended
market order. Just like the previous section it may be more paramount to the spoofer to
minimize the expected net savings relative to the risk associated with that net savings –
minimizing the Sharpe ratio of their spoofing strategy rather than the pure savings itself.
In this spirit we can also see how the optimal strategy from Figures 5.19, 5.20, 5.21, and
5.22 changes under a different minimization criteria. So, rather than minimize µS with
respect to (ṽ6 , ṽ7 ) we minimize SS .
This is similar to the optimization problem in equations 5.2.1 and 5.2.2, but we write
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Large Positive Imbalance

(a) H = 200

(b) H = 400

(c) H = 600

Figure 5.23: Optimal spoofing order placement with changing H and Ṽ for large positive
imbalance as seen in Figure 5.19.
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Small Positive Imbalance

(a) H = 200

(b) H = 400

(c) H = 600

Figure 5.24: Optimal spoofing order placement with changing H and Ṽ for small positive
imbalance as seen in Figure 5.20.
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Small Negative Imbalance

(a) H = 200

(b) H = 400

(c) H = 600

Figure 5.25: Optimal spoofing order placement with changing H and Ṽ for small negative
imbalance as seen in Figure 5.21.
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Large Negative Imbalance

(a) H = 200

(b) H = 400

(c) H = 600

Figure 5.26: Optimal spoofing order placement with changing H and Ṽ for large negative
imbalance as seen in Figure 5.22.
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Large Positive Imbalance

(a) SS by strategy for H = 300

(b) µS by strategy for H = 300

Figure 5.27: Comparison of optimal spoofing strategy for limit order book in Figure 5.19
using Sharpe ratio SS instead of expected net savings µS . Both strategies are plotted
together in subplot (b) with green points representing the Sharpe ratio strategy. The
largest green point being the global minimum for the Sharpe ratio at (ṽ6 , ṽ7 ) = (0, 3300).
If a line of Ṽ = constant has only a black point then the two strategies are the same. At
the Sharpe ratio minimum we have µS = −0.0551, SS = −0.00734, and I = −0.202. At
the expected cost minimum SS = −0.00696.
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Small Positive Imbalance

(a) SS by strategy for H = 300

(b) µS by strategy for H = 300

Figure 5.28: Comparison of optimal spoofing strategy for limit order book in Figure 5.20
using Sharpe ratio SS instead of expected net savings µS . Both strategies are plotted
together in subplot (b) with green points representing the Sharpe ratio strategy. The
largest green point being the global minimum for the Sharpe ratio at (ṽ6 , ṽ7 ) = (0, 1500).
If a line of Ṽ = constant has only a black point then the two strategies are the same. At
the Sharpe ratio minimum we have µS = −0.272, SS = −0.0539, and I = −0.291. At the
expected cost minimum SS = −0.0414.
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Small Negative Imbalance

(a) SS by strategy for H = 300

(b) µS by strategy for H = 300

Figure 5.29: Comparison of optimal spoofing strategy for limit order book in Figure 5.21
using Sharpe ratio SS instead of expected net savings µS . Both strategies are plotted together in subplot (b) with green points representing the Sharpe ratio strategy. The largest
green point being the global minimum for the Sharpe ratio at (ṽ6 , ṽ7 ) = (200, 1400). If a
line of Ṽ = constant has only a black point then the two strategies are the same. At the
Sharpe ratio minimum we have µS = −0.179, SS = −0.0437, and I = −0.182. At the
expected cost minimum SS = −0.0358.
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Large Negative Imbalance

(a) SS by strategy for H = 300

(b) µS by strategy for H = 300

Figure 5.30: Comparison of optimal spoofing strategy for limit order book in Figure 5.22
using Sharpe ratio SS instead of expected net savings µS . Both strategies are plotted
together in subplot (b) with green points representing the Sharpe ratio strategy. The
largest green point being the global minimum for the Sharpe ratio at (ṽ6 , ṽ7 ) = (0, 500).
If a line of Ṽ = constant has only a black point then the two strategies are the same. At
the Sharpe ratio minimum we have µS = −0.780, SS = −0.225, and I = −0.604. At the
expected cost minimum SS = −0.170.
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it here for clarity:
E [ CS (~vt , H, p+ , xt , ṽt ) |Ft , I(~vt + ṽt )] − CMO (~vt , H, p+ )
min p
ṽt
Var [ CS (~vt , H, p+ , xt , ṽt ) |Ft , I(~vt + ṽt )] − CMO (~vt , H, p+ )

(5.4.1)

Subject to
0
X
i=−K

ṽi = 0,

K
X

ṽi ≤ Ṽ ,

ṽi ≥ 0 and ṽi ∈ 100N ∀i ∈ [−K, K]

(5.4.2)

i=1

Subplot (a) in Figures 5.27, 5.28, 5.29, and 5.30 gives the optimal spoofing strategy
according to the Sharpe ratio SS . Subplot (b) plots the optimal strategy according to
SS and µS on the same objective surface µS . However, the optimal strategy according to
the Sharpe ratio is given by green points with the global minimum a large green point.
If only a black point is present for a line of constant Ṽ then the two strategies coincide.
The optimal strategy according to the Sharpe ratio follows a similar path to the one
found from the expected cost, but ultimately the global minimum is always found using
fewer spoofing shares. The structure of the Sharpe ratio is also interesting in that as
Ṽ → ∞ the Sharpe ratio asymptotes to 0 since the variance grows to infinity as you
spoof with an increasing number of shares. The other limit, as Ṽ → 0, determines how
large a cost reduction the spoofer can expect for their risk. If the red point lies too far
above zero there may be no global minimum at all or it may lie so far out in the surface
the net savings is still too risky (as in Figure 5.27). If it lies too far below zero the
optimal strategy will be to do nothing at all (as in Figure 5.30). However, in between
these extremes gives the spoofer an opportunity to see real cost savings for their risk.
For example, in Figure 5.27, the imbalance is initially so positive that a spoofer would
need to spoof with 3300 shares to see an expected cost reduction on the purchase of only
300 shares. This is a significant risk to take on comparatively small market order, and
the Sharpe ratio of less than 1% return per unit of risk reflects this. In Figures 5.28
and 5.29, the imbalance is small enough that the spoofer can find a solid return for their
risk using only 1500 and 1600 spoofing shares, respectively. However, in Figure 5.30, the
imbalance is already so in favour of the spoofer that spoofing with more than 500 shares
only hurts the Sharpe ratio.
In the previous sections we used the expected cost of spoofing the book for determining
the optimal strategy, but the Sharpe ratio builds in the actions one would expect from
a spoofer attempting to manipulate the book with the smallest amount of risk to their
orders. This may lead to further interesting results if we repeated our previous analysis
under this new optimization criteria, but the expected net savings at the point which
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minimizes the Sharpe ratio is never significantly worse and we would not expect the
results of the previous sections to deviate much from what we have presented. The
major different between the two methods would be when looking into the book for specific
spoofing orders because when using the Sharpe ratio to determine the optimal strategy
the spoofer is not willing to risk as many spoofing shares compared to if they are driven
purely by achieving the largest possible cost reduction. We would need access to already
labeled data sets which include known spoofing orders into order to make any judgment
on which method would provide a more accurate strategy to what a spoofer might actually
do in reality.

5.5

Conclusions

This chapter is a culmination of the model building and calibration we presented in the
previous chapters. Equipped with the tools needed to explore the costs associated with
spoofing limit order books we were able to analyze the sensitivity of the book for a given
stock throughout the day as well as draw some general rules from the aggregated results.
We started by establishing two criteria for determining whether a spoofer would either
immediately place a market order, delay their market order to the next time period, or
spoof the book combined with a delayed market order. These two criteria were based
on the expected cost reduction and the Sharpe ratio – the latter being used to take
into account the risk associated with the execution of the spoofing orders against the
spoofer. We found that the Sharpe ratio criteria provided a more consistent decision
boundary between these three possible actions as the Sharpe ratio punished spoofing the
book with a considerable volume of shares to earn tiny cost reductions of a couple of
pennies on market orders of hundreds of shares. This gave better clusters between the
decisions to spoof and immediately place a market order. The improvement between
these two clusters allowed us to explore the dependency of the boundary between them
as a function of H and Ṽ .
We then used these decision boundaries to determine a relationship between the
number of shares H the spoofer wishes to buy, the number of shares Ṽ they are willing
to spoof with, and the decision boundary between spoofing and immediately placing a
market order. We explored this relationship for AEM, BMO, and CNR stocks and found
that a spoofer is willing to spoof a more positive imbalanced book with increasing Ṽ . A
spoofer aiming to purchase more shares was also more willing to manipulate the book
even if their spoofing orders were less able to make large impacts on the imbalance – a
spoofer was willing to take more risks the more shares they needed to purchase.
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From this analysis of the decision boundary we found that BMO showed different
behaviour from AEM and CNR because there were two locations a spoofer could impact
the imbalance deep in the book as opposed to the single location for the other two stocks.
The more risky locations carried more weight in the imbalance, so the spoofer needed to
properly allocate their spoofing shares to balance risk with return. This balancing act
made a spoofer more willing to take risks the more shares they wanted to buy as well
as if they had a smaller number of shares to spoof with. The spoofer was less willing
to take risks the more shares they had available to manipulate the book with. We also
found that the shape of book at the next time period was important for determining
the optimal strategy based on the costs associated with walking the book to buy H and
recover any spoofing shares executed by movement in the best ask against the spoofer.
Finally, we explored how different the optimal spoofing strategy would be if the Sharpe
ratio was used to take into account risk based on how effective this was in determing
the spoofer’s ultimate strategy between spoofing, delayed market orders, and immediate
market orders. We found that a spoofer was less willing to risk a large number of shares
using the Sharpe ratio and the strategies themselves reflected more accurately what one
would naively expect from a spoofer without attempting to model their behaviour. We
do not believe this alternative strategy would drastically change the decision boundary
analysis, but would be possibly more effective when attempting to flag limit orders in the
book as suspicious. However, this type of work would require an actual labelled data set
which included limit orders which were already deemed as spoof orders by some regulator
of the exchange.

Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
6.1

Summary of Conclusions

The goal of this project was to develop a model which would allow us to explore the
conditions under which a spoofer may attempt to manipulate a limit order book in order
to gain insights into identifying potential illegal behaviour for regulators to investigate
further. Not only is it difficult to find the figurative ‘needle in a haystack’, but one also
needs evidence to the spoofer’s intent to illegally spoof the book. We take the approach
of stepping back from individual broker IDs to look at the aggregate behaviour of the
book in response to the orders placed, so that we can find a general relationship between
the shape of the book and movements in the best ask or bid. Then, a regulator could
check to see if an individual trader was attempting to abuse this general relationship
through spoofing limit orders. Since we did not have access to individual trader IDs or
labeled cases of actual spoofing we were only able to probe the vulnerability of the limit
order book to a potential spoofer using our new model.
The spoofer pads the limit order book with limit orders they never intend to execute in
an attempt to get other traders to move prices in the spoofer’s best interest. The spoofer
manipulates the shape of the book itself to gain an advantage, so the natural start for a
model would be to use a statistic which captures shape information about the limit order
book and is correlated to price movements – the volume imbalance ratio. We provided
initial statistical tests across 50 different stocks which support the existing literature that
positive/negative price movements accompany positive/negative imbalance ratios.
The usual definition of the volume imbalance ratio involves only volumes of shares at
the best ask and best bid of the book, but we want to be able to capture the imbalance
deeper into the book. We use a generalized definition of the imbalance which uses weights,
w, applied to each share volume in the book. We assume the weights are the same
164
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for the bid and ask side. The first natural extension of this is to allow exponentially
decaying weights from the touch, so the volumes at the best bid/ask remain the most
important when calculating the imbalance ratio. Then, we can relax the exponentially
decaying weight assumption and allow the weights to be free parameters, but still with
the constraint that the largest weight is applied to the best ask/bid. The statistical tests
we performed on the classical imbalance definition gave consistent results for these two
new methods and also provided increased association between changes in the best ask and
the imbalance ratio as we move from the classical definition → exponentially decaying
weights → free weights. With a generalized form of the imbalance including information
about volumes deeper in the limit order book we set up a model for how changes in the
best ask are impacted through the volume imbalance.
With price changes one needs to also talk about the time interval ∆t over which
the price changed. Aggregating the instantaneous imbalances over ∆t into an average
imbalance was done by weighting the imbalances by the length of time the book remained
in that state. This method removed the negative correlations between price changes and
the imbalance ratio that we saw for some stocks when aggregating the instantaneous
imbalances with a simple arithmetic mean. We set ∆t for all stocks as the ∆t that gives
the closest variance in the change in the best ask price to 2. This way we can compare
them since each stock has its own time scale in which prices move – some move more over
smaller time intervals, for example. Our specific choice of how to fix ∆t was to allow us
to compare results between stocks, but ∆t is a free parameter which can be set based on
what time scales one wishes to examine the book.
Our model incorporates the imbalance into the distribution of the change in the
best ask price by using the imbalance as the weight in a convex combination of two
distributions, dp + and dp − , representing the change in the best ask price if I = 1, and
I = −1, respectively. If we know dp + we also know dp − by the assumed symmetry
constraints of our model. The other model parameter is the depth of book, K, which we
define based on the support of the empirical price change distribution. So, after fixing
∆t we have three model parameters dp + , K, and w.
Using maximum a posteriori (maximum likelihood) estimation for the exponential
(free) weight model we calibrated a model for each stock using data from different time
periods. Investigating the model parameters which came out of the calibrations gave
insights into relationships between ∆t, K, the average spread, the average interarrival
time of orders, and the probability of no movement in the best ask price. We were also
able to visually identify outliers in the data which corresponded to American holidays or
days related to financial events. We found a clear dependence of the model parameters
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with the time period of the trading day which was consistent with the usual beliefs in
trade activity over time. We used a large number of stocks over a small time period to
investigate the relationship between price changes and the imbalance. However, we had to
select a smaller number of stocks when investigating the model parameters over a longer
time period due to the computational time needed to run over a hundred calibrations
for each stock. In both cases the calibrations provide excellent fits to the data which we
explored through the KL divergence and repeating our statistical tests from earlier in the
work for both the exponential and free imbalance weights. We found many stocks with a
significantly increased association when weight was given to the depth of book, but also
stocks in which the classic imbalance definition was still optimal.
With an analysis of the model parameters completed we could apply our model to the
problem of spoofing detection. We determined the optimal strategy a spoofer would take
with ∆t = 5 seconds given a limit order book and compare the pay off to immediately
making a market order, or waiting to place a market order at the start of the next time
period. We found that comparing the Sharpe ratio of the three strategies, rather than
the expected value, we got consistent results for three clusters where the spoofer would
determine their strategy. We can then use these values to determine what periods of
the day spoofer was most optimal in which a regular could use to limit their search for
manipulators.
We then tested the decision boundary between an immediate market order and spoofing the book as we changed the number of shares H the spoofer intends to purchase and
the number of shares Ṽ that the spoofer is willing to risk manipulating the book. As
Ṽ increases the spoofer is willing to manipulate the book as it is increasingly positively
imbalanced while as H increases the spoofer is willing to manipulate even if their optimal
spoofing strategy has a smaller impact on the imbalance – the spoofer is willing to take a
bigger risk the more shares they need to buy. We noticed, however, that one stock had a
different behaviour which was attributed to the optimal imbalance weights. There were
two locations in which a spoofer could place limit orders to most impact the imbalance
with the location closest to the touch carrying more weight. How the spoofer allocated
their shares, for a given H, then depended on the number of shares Ṽ they were willing
to spoof with. The fewer the shares the spoofer has for manipulation the riskier they
are willing to be with them. As they are willing to spoof with more shares they start
to move them to the less risky position. The shape of the book played heavily into how
the shares were allocated in order to minimize the impact of walking the book in case
their spoofing limit orders were executed. We found that there was a global minimum in
the cases were investigated for BMO stock which tells us a spoofer would not arbitrarily
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spoof with an increasing number of shares – that there is a point where spoofing with
more only hurts the spoofer.
Based on the success of using the Sharpe ratio for the optimal decision making process
we also checked using the Sharpe ratio to determine the optimal spoofing strategy instead
of the expected value of the cost. The Sharpe ratio provided a more conservative strategy
when spoofing in that the spoofer was using less shares at the global minimum of the
Sharpe ratio. Also, the Sharpe ratio more accurately reflected what one would expect a
manipulator to do in a very positively or negatively imbalanced limit order book – we
would not expect a spoofer to manipulate with many shares, if at all in these cases. The
optimal strategies according to both objective functions could then be used by regulators
to look for traders placing orders of similar sizes in similar locations during the vulnerable
periods of the trading day for the limit order book on a given stock.
Overall, we completed an analysis and application of a one period model in which the
shape of the limit order book determines the distribution of the change in the best ask
price. The model itself could be used in other applications, but we focused on testing the
sensitivity of the book to this type of manipulation through the volume imbalance ratio
as well as determining the optimal strategy a spoofer would take as predicted by our
model. This provides a starting point for further investigation into price manipulating
behaviour by traders abusing the nature of high frequency trading. In the following
section we discuss possible improvements to the model and directions of research to take
based on results from this work.

6.2

Future Work

There are significant directions we can take to improve and expand this work, but first
we will talk about what we can do with the existing model setup. To start, a further
investigation into a proper way of fixing ∆t for a given stock based on some external
objective function. That is, we would like to find some optimal time interval over which
a spoofer is most likely to operate on a given stock rather than simply fixing ∆t to
whatever we want and then investigating the expected costs over that time interval.
From this we could analyze more illiquid stocks or stocks which would require longer
time intervals. Based on the results of this work the longer the time interval the larger
the support of the price change distribution which would require us to know more about
the volumes deeper in the book. We only took the first 15 prices on each side of the book
based on memory restrictions, but we may be required to store information significantly
further into the book than that to investigate spoofing over larger time intervals. We
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could also look into alternative models for weighting the instantaneous imbalances when
aggregating them into an average imbalance over ∆t. We only looked at taking a simple
mean and using time weighting in this work, but there may be better ways to calculate
the average imbalance.
We also saw in chapter 2 that the average imbalance does not affect the probability of
an up or down movement equally. An average imbalance of -0.2 gave a higher probability
of the best ask decreasing than an average imbalance of 0.2 gave for the best ask increasing. However, for simplicity, we built into our model that the change in the best ask was
symmetric about a zero imbalance. Further study needs to be done into this behaviour
and how best to model it. A starting point would be to introduce a new parameter into
the price change distribution model which breaks this symmetry and can be calibrated
with the other model parameters. Alternatively, we could drop the symmetry constraint
in the distribution so that dp − is not completely determined by dp + and becomes a
new distribution we need to find. The downside to this is that we would be introducing
significantly more parameters than a single parameter to break the symmetry.
In this work we looked at three different ways of calculating the instantaneous imbalance – using only the touch, exponentially decaying weights, and free weights. Ideally,
one would find a distribution (or mixture of distributions) to model the imbalance weights with fewer parameters than the free weights use. Over fitting would be less of a risk if
we can reduce the model parameters as much as possible. Also, if we can find an appropriate weight model we could perform cluster analysis based on the weight parameters
for collections of stocks or even single stocks over time.
Along with new models for the imbalance weights we saw in chapter 5 that the shape
of the book itself is important for determining the strategy costs as they also impact the
optimal spoofing strategy. The importance is introduced through the impact of walking
the book at the end of the time period which we would need to estimate at the start
of the time interval. In our work we assumed the shape of the book remained constant
which we found to work for and against the spoofer roughly equally, so if the process was
repeated enough times the spoofer would ‘win’ as often as they ‘lose’ from the modeling
assumption. However, if a spoofer does not manipulate the book regularly they would
ideally want a way to model the volume of shares near the touch to prevent themselves
from spoofing the book during a period where the costs associated with walking the
book would destroy the profits they made from spoofing. If we modeled the volumes
at the end of the time interval conditional on the volumes at the start of the time with
a distribution then the cost of walking the book would be calculated with an expected
value with respect to this distribution.
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After discussing ways we can expand on the existing model we can discuss about how
we can extend it beyond a simple one period model and introduce the bid side of the
book into the problem. We only looked at the problem of spoofing the ask side of the
book in order to lower the best ask and buy shares at a discount1 , but some traders may
actually be spoofing both sides of the book as part of their strategy. In order for us to
model this we would need a joint distribution of the change in the best ask and best
bid prices dependent on the average imbalance. This joint distribution would also be
constrained by the spread since the best bid cannot be greater than or equal to the best
ask. A model of the full joint distribution would give us the ability to investigate any
price manipulation strategy either or both sides of the limit order book.
To further give the model realism we would like to expand the implementation of
the spoofer’s decisions into a multi-period model rather than a single time step. This
way the spoofer could update their strategy continuously over the entire trading day
until the optimal times to place their market orders. If we want to avoid the problems
associated with estimating the cost of walking the book with a delayed market order we
could have the spoofer placing multiple 100 share market orders throughout the day as
they spoof the book to totally avoid these extra costs. This could be implemented as a
dynamic programming problem. Alternatively, one could model the price change joint
distribution as a general mixture or hidden Markov model where the regime changes come
from changes in the average imbalance. These would be significantly more complicated
models, but should provide a more realistic approach to replicating a spoofer’s behaviour
so a regular would know what to look for.
The ultimate goal of this work was to highlight an application of our price change
model to spoofing detection. Since we did not have access to a labeled data set of known
examples of spoofing we were only able to do a type of sensitivity analysis or optimal
control given the states of the order book. With data sets of a known spoofer operating
during the day we would be able to actually develop techniques which should at least
be able to detect them. We also only had access to the broker ID for each action taken
on the limit order book. There are too many traders operating under any given broker
ID to make the claim that a broker’s behaviour may be suspicious when a collection of
potentially manipulative orders were actually being placed by multiple traders. If we had
the trader IDs we could at least look for times during the trading day a trader was acting
in a manner according to our spoofing model which could be grounds for a regulator
to flag them, but is not concrete evidence of illegal behaviour. A fully labeled data
1

Spoofing the bid side to increase the best bid and sell shares at a higher was conceptually the same
due to the symmetry of the book.
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set of known spoofing examples would provide further insights into the model building
procedure and allow us to backtest any results of the models.
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Appendix A
Broker Behaviour
Individual traders go through brokers in order to place orders on the exchange. The trader
ID’s are hidden even in the level 2 data and are usually only available to regulatory bodies
in the financial industry. However, we can see the aggregate activity of these traders
through the broker ID’s in the level 2 data. The actions of all active brokers during the
market open on AEM stock on April 17, 2017 is shown in Figure A.1. The total number
of booked orders by broker ID for the same day and stock ticker is shown in Figure A.2.
The broker ID’s shown in the figure have been changed from their true values in the
dataset in order to keep their identities anonymous.
From Figure A.1 we can see that not all brokers share the same activity on AEM
stock on this day. Similar plots can be made for other stocks on any given day of the
year. For example, brokers 0 through 8 cancel almost all orders they book on AEM
stock. This would suggest algorithmic traders use these brokers to place and quickly
cancel limit orders throughout the day while making very few market orders. Brokers 9
through 18 also cancel many of their orders, while allowing some to be executed as well
as placing market orders. Brokers 19 through 25 cancel very few orders and mostly book
orders and trade. Brokers 9 through 25 are likely to be made up of mixes of algorithmic
traders as well as real people placing orders on the exchange.
Figure A.2 gives us a better picture of which brokers are acting as market makers for
AEM stock on April 17, 2017. Brokers 0, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8 are clearly contributed the
most limit orders to the order book on this day with broker 4 dominating the rest. It is
also interesting to note that these are the same brokers that also cancel almost all orders
they place on the order book.
Figures A.3 and A.4 show the total number of shares booked and cancelled on the
limit order book by broker ID. Here we can see that the brokers we highlighted from
Figure A.2 also place large numbers of shares on the limit order book in addition to
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Figure A.1: Ratio of cancelled, trade, and booked orders to total orders for all active
brokers on AEM stock on April 17, 2017. The broker ID’s displayed above are not the
true broker ID’s in the dataset.

Figure A.2: Total booked orders for all active brokers on AEM stock on April 17, 2017.
The broker ID’s displayed above are not the true broker ID’s in the dataset. Same broker
ID’s as Figure A.1
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placing the most orders. All other brokers contribute relatively little shares to book.
We see the same situations across other stock tickers where a small number of brokers
are driving the dynamics of the limit order book through large and frequent limit order
placements and cancellations.

Figure A.3: Total booked shares of AEM stock on April 17, 2017. Green/red for shares
booked on buy/sell side of limit order book. Same broker ID’s as Figure A.1
Figure A.5 shows the total number of shares traded on the limit order book by broker
ID. Even though brokers 0 through 6 make up most of the activity on the book there are
still brokers that execute trades throughout the day either by market orders or allowing
what few limit orders they have to be matched. The point here is that even though all
brokers are initiating trades on the book there are only a few which provide the vast
majority of the liquidity to the market.
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Figure A.4: Total cancelled shares of AEM stock on April 17, 2017. Green/red for shares
cancelled on buy/sell side of limit order book. Same broker ID’s as Figure A.1

Figure A.5: Total traded shares of AEM stock on April 17, 2017. Green/red for shares
traded on buy/sell side of limit order book. Same broker ID’s as Figure A.1

Appendix B
Maximum a Posteriori Estimation
Say we want to estimate parameters of a distribution, but we want to incorporate our prior
knowledge or belief in how the parameters of the model are distributed. For example,
if we had a new baseball player to the major leagues and we wanted to determine the
probability of this player hitting a home run given that he has only been up to bat once
and struck a home run on his first swing. We have a single data point suggesting, naively,
that he has a 100% probability of hitting a home run. However, we know this could not
possibly be true since no one has ever had such a home run batting average. Given our
limited data set for this new player - how can we incorporate our past knowledge of other
player’s home run batting averages to estimate the probability for this new player? A
technique for doing this is the maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimation.
The maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) for data X = (x1 , x2 , . . . , xn ) with probability distribution f (X|θ) parameterized by θ is:

θ? = arg max L(θ|X) = arg max
θ∈Θ

θ∈Θ

n
Y

f (X|θ)

(B.0.1)

i=1

where L(θ|X) is the likelihood function.
If instead we assume that θ itself is a random variable with prior distribution g(θ)
then we can calculate the posterior distribution f (θ|X) using Bayes’ theorem.

f (θ|X) = R

f (X|θ)g(θ)
f (X|φ)g(φ)dφ
Θ

(B.0.2)

The maximum a posteriori estimation is then the mode of the posterior distribution
f (θ|X) which gives:
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?

θ = arg max
θ∈Θ

n
Y

f (xi |θ)g(θ)
f (xi |φ)g(φ)dφ
Θ

(B.0.3)

R
i=1

However,
Z
f (xi |φ)g(φ)dφ

(B.0.4)

Θ

is independent of θ and strictly positive so can be ignored without affecting the
maximum of equation B.0.3. Substituting in the definition of L(θ|X) we get
?

θ = arg max
θ∈Θ

n
Y

f (xi |θ)g(θ) = arg max L(θ|X)g(θ)

(B.0.5)

θ∈Θ

i=1

as the MAP estimation. We can think of this procedure as assuming some initial
prior distribution g(θ) on θ which is updated by data through the likelihood function
to assign new probabilities to the θ parameters by the posterior distribution. As we see
more data the changes in our beliefs are reflected in the posterior distribution. Again,
like MLE, one usually sees this written in the form of minimizing the negative log of the
MAP estimator. So, the alternative MAP estimation is:
"
θ? = arg min −
θ∈Θ

n
X

!
log f (xi |θ)

#
− log g(θ)

(B.0.6)

i=1

A few things to note are that if we take g(θ) as the uniform distribution over Θ then
the MAP estimation is equivalent to MLE. Also, MAP estimation is the maximum mode
of the posterior distribution unlike the MLE which was the maximum of the likelihood
function. The MAP estimation is also not invariant under reparameterization since g(θ)
is the prior for random variable θ, so if we map θ → θ̂ the prior distribution for θ̂ may
not be g(θ̂). We would need to determine the new prior for θ̂ from the Jacobian of the
reparameterization.
From equation B.0.6 we can also view the MAP estimator as applying a penalty to
the MLE where we penalize values of θ ∈ Θ we deem unlikely from past experience or
belief.

Appendix C
Statistical Tests
C.1

Pearson’s Chi-Squared Test

Pearson’s chi-squared test is a statistical test for sets of categorical data to determine
how likely the difference between the sets came from random chance. So named because
Pearson’s test statistic χ2 asymptotically approaches the χ2 -distribution.
The test is a way for determining the significance level α in which we can reject the
null hypothesis H0 that the sets of categorical data are independent of each other. The
alternative hypothesis H1 is that the sets of categorical data are not independent. We
only use two sets of categorical data in this thesis so we can restrict our case to two data
sets: X1 and X2 . This is usually written as:

H0 : ‘Variable X1 is independent of variable X2 ’

(C.1.1)

H1 : ‘Variable X1 is not independent of variable X2 ’

(C.1.2)

To calculate χ2 we need to construct a R × C contingency table like Table 2.5 where
R is the number of rows and C is the number of columns. For Table 2.5, R = 2 and
C = 4. The test statistic χ2 is then calculated by:
C
R X
X
(oij − eij )2
χ =
eij
i=1 j=1
2

where
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(C.1.3)
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oij is the observed cell count in the ith row and j th column of the table

(C.1.4)

eij is the expected cell count in the ith row and j th column of the table

(C.1.5)

and
R
X

eij =

!
o`j

`=1

C
X

!
oik

k=1

(C.1.6)

oij

(C.1.7)

n

n=

R X
C
X
i=1 j=1

The χ2 statistic is then compared to the critical value χ2crit from the χ2 -distribution
with degrees of freedom dof = (R−1)(C −1) and chosen significance level α. If χ2 > χ2crit ,
then we say we can reject the null hypothesis at the α significance level.
For example, using Table 2.5, we have oij and eij as:
"

#
657
58 1015 7259
oij =
4051 2253 1484 1527

(C.1.8)

"
#
1184.76 1021.88 37.71 2009.05
eij =
1143.30 986.12 35.42 1938.73

(C.1.9)

Then using Equation C.1.3, χ2 = 8355.99 with dof = 3. A significance level α = 0.999
would give χ2crit = 16.266 so we could easily reject the null hypothesis that the two sets
are independent at the 99.9% significance level. A χ2 = 8355.99 would mean we could
reject the null hypothesis at some significance level arbitrarily close to 1.
A p-value for the test can be computed as


p-value = P X ≥ χ2 |H0

(C.1.10)

where X is distributed by the χ2 -distribution with 3 degrees of free and χ2 is the test
statistic we calculated above. That is, the p-value is the probability of observing a test
statistic at least as extreme as χ2 under the null hypothesis.
To give us an idea of how strong the association between the two data sets is we can
calculate the Cramer’s V statistic.
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C.2

Cramer’s V

The Cramer’s V is a statistic which can be calculated from the χ2 statistic that is independent of the sample size and bound between 0 and 1. A Cramer’s V statistic of 1 would
imply the two data sets are identical, 0 would imply they are totally independent. This
gives a measure of association between the data sets used to calculate the test statistic.
The advantage here is if we find our tests producing p-values arbitrarily close to zero then
we can use the Cramer’s V to differentiate between which data sets have the strongest
association.
The Cramer’s V, CV , is defined as
s
CV =

ϕ2
min(R − 1, C − 1)

(C.2.1)

with the Phi coefficient defined as
χ2
(C.2.2)
n
We can introduce a bias correction to give a more conservative estimate of the association with a small modification to our definitions [63].
ϕ2 =



(R − 1)(C − 1)
2
ϕ̃ = max 0, ϕ −
n−1
2

(C.2.3)

R̃ = R −

(R − 1)2
n−1

(C.2.4)

C̃ = C −

(C − 1)2
n−1

(C.2.5)

ϕ̃2
min(R̃ − 1, C̃ − 1)

(C.2.6)

s
C̃V =

From the previous example, we had χ2 = 8355.99, n = 18304, R = 2, and C = 4.
Plugging these into Equation C.2.6 we find the C̃V = 0.676. From our test we have clear
statistical significance between our two data sets and their corresponding association is
very strong.

Appendix D
Additional Plots

Figure D.1: Mean of time series in Figure 2.7 over 10 minute intervals after replacing the
instantaneous imbalance with random draws from normal distribution with mean 0 and
variance 1.
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Figure D.2: Variance of time series in Figure 2.7 over 10 minute intervals after replacing
the instantaneous imbalance with random draws from normal distribution with mean 0
and variance 1.

Figure D.3: Mean of average imbalance over 10 minute intervals. Mean varies slightly
with both methods having periods being greater than the other. Data from ARX stock
on April 17, 2017 for the entire trading day.
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Figure D.4: Variance of average imbalance over 10 minute intervals. Variance is almost
always greater with time weighting. Data from ARX stock on April 17, 2017 for the
entire trading day.

Figure D.5: Average sample size over 10 minute intervals. Effective sample size is also
known as Kish’s effective sample size. Data from ARX stock on April 17, 2017 for the
entire trading day.
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(a) Instantaneous Imbalance

(b) Normal Random Draw

Figure D.6: Future value of volume imbalance ratio It+1 , t orders from current imbalance
ratio It . The top, middle, and bottom subplots are for 1, 10, and 100 orders respectively.
The left subplots are the actual instantaneous imbalance ratio and the right subplots are
replacing It with random draws from N (0, 1). Data was taken from AEM stock on April
17, 2017 for the entire trading day.
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Figure D.7: Future value of volume imbalance ratio It+1 , t orders from current imbalance
ratio It . The top, middle, and bottom subplots are for 1, 10, and 100 orders respectively.
Data was taken from ARX stock on April 17, 2017 for the entire trading day.
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Figure D.8: Difference in G(~vt , H)/H between different time intervals and H throughout
the trading day where H = 1000. The top, middle, and bottom subplots correspond to
time intervals of 5, 30, and 60 seconds, respectively. Data taken from ARX stock on
April 17, 2017 for the entire trading day. Stock price ≈ $18 CAD.
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